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Budgetregeln und ihre Wirkung auf die öffentlichen Haushalte: Empirische Ergebnisse aus den US-Bundesstaaten und den Schweizer Kantonen

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Schaltegger, C. Budgetregeln und ihre Wirkung auf die öffentlichen Haushalte: Empirische Ergebnisse aus den US-Bundesstaaten und den Schweizer Kantonen. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 122(3), 369-413. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.122.3.369
Schaltegger, Christoph A. "Budgetregeln und ihre Wirkung auf die öffentlichen Haushalte: Empirische Ergebnisse aus den US-Bundesstaaten und den Schweizer Kantonen" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 122.3, 2002, 369-413. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.122.3.369
Schaltegger, Christoph A. (2002): Budgetregeln und ihre Wirkung auf die öffentlichen Haushalte: Empirische Ergebnisse aus den US-Bundesstaaten und den Schweizer Kantonen, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 122, iss. 3, 369-413, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.122.3.369

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Budgetregeln und ihre Wirkung auf die öffentlichen Haushalte: Empirische Ergebnisse aus den US-Bundesstaaten und den Schweizer Kantonen

Schaltegger, Christoph A.

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 122 (2002), Iss. 3 : pp. 369–413

24 Citations (CrossRef)

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Schaltegger, Christoph A.

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of budget rules on government finances. First, a survey of the empirical literature is given, which is mainly focused on evidence from the United States. Most studies examine the effect of budget rules on the state level. In the latest studies in particular a significant negative impact of a budget rule on the size of government has been found. Next, the paper studies budget rules within Switzerland. The empirical work uses cantonal data from 1980 to 1998. The results show that budget rules in Swiss cantons do work. They reduce government deficits, government debts and government spending, but not government revenue. Furthermore, the results show that budget rules together with budget referenda are particularly effective to stabilize the public finances. In contrast to budget rules, the budget referendum also reduces government revenue.