Der Fall des Kabelherstellerkartells — Zur Bedeutung von Wettbewerbsrecht und Marktkräften
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Der Fall des Kabelherstellerkartells — Zur Bedeutung von Wettbewerbsrecht und Marktkräften
Hahn, Verena | Normann, Hans-Theo
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 121 (2001), Iss. 3 : pp. 407–426
3 Citations (CrossRef)
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Hahn, Verena
Normann, Hans-Theo
Cited By
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Abstract
We analyze the case of the German power-cable producers which was decided by the German cartel authority, the Bundeskartelamt, in 1997. The first cartel contract in the power-cable industry was signed already in 1901. We show that cartel law only had a minor influence on the stability of the cartel. Until 1945 several price wars occurred though cartel agreements were legally enforceable. In the post-war period, the cartel was fairly stable despite the general cartel prohibition. We further argue that the cartel broke down before the decision of the Bundeskartellamt because of excess capacities and the advancing liberalization of European energy markets.