Menu Expand

Der Fall des Kabelherstellerkartells — Zur Bedeutung von Wettbewerbsrecht und Marktkräften

Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE

Style

Hahn, V., Normann, H. Der Fall des Kabelherstellerkartells — Zur Bedeutung von Wettbewerbsrecht und Marktkräften. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 121(3), 407-426. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.121.3.407
Hahn, Verena and Normann, Hans-Theo "Der Fall des Kabelherstellerkartells — Zur Bedeutung von Wettbewerbsrecht und Marktkräften" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 121.3, 2001, 407-426. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.121.3.407
Hahn, Verena/Normann, Hans-Theo (2001): Der Fall des Kabelherstellerkartells — Zur Bedeutung von Wettbewerbsrecht und Marktkräften, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 121, iss. 3, 407-426, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.121.3.407

Format

Der Fall des Kabelherstellerkartells — Zur Bedeutung von Wettbewerbsrecht und Marktkräften

Hahn, Verena | Normann, Hans-Theo

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 121 (2001), Iss. 3 : pp. 407–426

3 Citations (CrossRef)

Additional Information

Article Details

Hahn, Verena

Normann, Hans-Theo

Cited By

  1. The Law and Economics of Class Actions

    Cartel overcharges

    Connor, John M.

    2014

    https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-589520140000026008 [Citations: 16]
  2. On the sociology of cartels

    Haucap, Justus | Heldman, Christina

    European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 56 (2023), Iss. 2 P.289

    https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09780-x [Citations: 4]
  3. Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik I

    Industrieökonomik

    Schwalbe, Ulrich

    2019

    https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-21777-8_2 [Citations: 0]

Abstract

We analyze the case of the German power-cable producers which was decided by the German cartel authority, the Bundeskartelamt, in 1997. The first cartel contract in the power-cable industry was signed already in 1901. We show that cartel law only had a minor influence on the stability of the cartel. Until 1945 several price wars occurred though cartel agreements were legally enforceable. In the post-war period, the cartel was fairly stable despite the general cartel prohibition. We further argue that the cartel broke down before the decision of the Bundeskartellamt because of excess capacities and the advancing liberalization of European energy markets.