Anreize zur Risikoselektion? Anmerkungen zum Risikostrukturausgleich in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung
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Anreize zur Risikoselektion? Anmerkungen zum Risikostrukturausgleich in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 120 (2000), Iss. 2 : pp. 187–206
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Felder, Stefan
Abstract
Risk adjustment schemes (RAS) within social insurance are designed to prevent health insurers from engaging in risk selection. We show that the current German RAS still creates incentives for insurers to select risk. In particular the geographic range of RAS, the risk-adjusters and financing health insurance by means of wage contributions rather than premiums create incentives for risk selection. We discuss alternatives to RAS such as health insurance premiums complemented by means tested transfers which could reduce some of the incentive problems.