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Zur Ambivalenz einer unternehmensinternen Verwendung von Wettbewerbsmechanismen - eine personalpolitische Diskussion am Beispiel relativer Leistungsturniere
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 118 (1998), Iss. 1 : pp. 61–85
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Kräkel, Matthias
Abstract
This article discusses the problem of using competitive (quasi-market-) mechanisms inside firms. When there are market failures - which is a necessary condition for the existence of firms in the sense of neo-institutional economics -, firms can generate rents (e.g., informational or cooperation rents). On the other hand, this may imply internal rent seeking. We can suspect that the internal use of competitive mechanisms strengthens the internal rent seeking problem. As an example, sabotage in rank-order tournaments is discussed. It is shown, however, that the employer is able to make use of different personnel policies to mitigate the sabotage problem.