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Noch mehr zur Meritorik

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Tietzel, M., Müller, C. Noch mehr zur Meritorik. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 118(1), 87-127. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.118.1.87
Tietzel, Manfred and Müller, Christian "Noch mehr zur Meritorik" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 118.1, 1998, 87-127. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.118.1.87
Tietzel, Manfred/Müller, Christian (1998): Noch mehr zur Meritorik, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 118, iss. 1, 87-127, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.118.1.87

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Noch mehr zur Meritorik

Tietzel, Manfred | Müller, Christian

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 118 (1998), Iss. 1 : pp. 87–127

4 Citations (CrossRef)

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Article Details

Tietzel, Manfred

Müller, Christian

Cited By

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    https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2006-11-79-94 [Citations: 1]

Abstract

"Merit goods", since the notion came into being in 1957, have persistently remained thorns in the neoclassical economist's flesh. In the paper we first try to specify the very notion of a "merit good" and to identify the welfare effects connected with their provision. We then proceed to analyze the arguments usually put forward to justify their public provision. The analysis presumes acceptance of normative individualism and predominantly assumes a constitutional perspective. We come to the following conclusions: (1) what is defensible in the theory of merit goods is not novel and covered more convincingly by other theories; (2) what is novel in the theory of merit goods is indefensible from an individualistic point of view.