Optimale Beschaffungsverträge bei asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung
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Optimale Beschaffungsverträge bei asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung
Zur Erklärung des nationalsozialistischen „Rüstungswunders“ während des Zweiten Weltkriegs
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 118 (1998), Iss. 2 : pp. 275–294
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Streb, Jochen
Streb, Sabine
Abstract
Laffont and Tirole (1986) analyse the optimal performance of procurement contracts under asymmetric information. They suggest to use a linear incentive contract which seems to prevent both adverse selection and moral hazard. On the basis of their model we examine the National Socialist arms procurement from 1939 to 1944. The National Socialists tried to solve their procurement problems till 1941 by using costplus contracts and simple linear incentive contracts, from 1942 by employing fixedprice contracts which were developed further to incentive contracts. The historical example confirms some of the predictions of the theory of regulation. Further more it provides new insights in the advantages and disadvantages of different types of procurement contracts some of which are unknown by theory.