Monetary Policy, Reputation and Hysteresis
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Monetary Policy, Reputation and Hysteresis
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 116 (1996), Iss. 1 : pp. 15–29
4 Citations (CrossRef)
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Grüner, Hans Peter
Cited By
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Wirtschaftspolitik
Literatur
2006
https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32558-1_12 [Citations: 0] -
Wirtschaftspolitik
Geldpolitik
Grüner, Hans Peter
2017
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49286-4_9 [Citations: 0] -
Wirtschaftspolitik
Literatur
2008
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75800-6_12 [Citations: 0] -
Wirtschaftspolitik
Geldpolitik und Finanzsystemstabilität
Grüner, Hans Peter
2018
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58058-5_9 [Citations: 0]
Abstract
Backus and Driffill have shown that reputation has a disciplinary effect on weak monetary policy makers if output shocks are not persistent. In European countries, however, one observes hysteresis in output and employment. The present signaling game examines the effect of hysteresis on the labour market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in the presence of hysteresis. Thus, reputation alone is not a sufficient device for establishing monetary discipline. We discuss alternative concepts for central bank credibility which rely on contracts rather than on central bank independence alone.