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Borrower Information and the Choice between Bank Debt and Trade Credit: The Case of France and Germany

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  2. Economics, Finance, Business & Management
  3. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch
  4. Vol. 116, Issue 3
  5. pp. 379–394

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Breig, H., Wilson, P. Borrower Information and the Choice between Bank Debt and Trade Credit: The Case of France and Germany. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 116(3), 379-394. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.3.379
Breig, Hildegard and Wilson, Patricia Furlong "Borrower Information and the Choice between Bank Debt and Trade Credit: The Case of France and Germany" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 116.3, 1996, 379-394. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.3.379
Breig, Hildegard/Wilson, Patricia Furlong (1996): Borrower Information and the Choice between Bank Debt and Trade Credit: The Case of France and Germany, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 116, iss. 3, 379-394, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.3.379
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Borrower Information and the Choice between Bank Debt and Trade Credit: The Case of France and Germany

Breig, Hildegard | Wilson, Patricia Furlong

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 116 (1996), Iss. 3 : pp. 379–394

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Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.3.379
Language
Multiple languages
Pages
16

Breig, Hildegard

Wilson, Patricia Furlong

References

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Abstract

This paper develops a model to better understand the different levels of trade credit and bank debt in France and Germany. The greater use of trade credit in France relative to Germany may be caused by the French central bank providing borrower information to all banks through the data bank FIBEN. The banks act as brokers and ‘sell’ the information to trade creditors rather than use the information to make additional loans. The model predicts that numerous French firms benefit from using trade credit, whereas numerous German firms benefit from developing multiple bank relationships.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Hildegard Breig/Patricia Furlong Wilson: Borrower Information and the Choice between\rBank Debt and Trade Credit:\rThe Case of France and Germany 379
1. Introduction 379
2. The Institutional Environment for Borrower Information in France and Germany 382
2.1 France 382
2.2 Germany 383
3. The Model 384
3.1 Timing of Information and Actions 384
3.2 Second Period 385
3.3 First Period 389
4. Discussion 390
5. Empirical Relevance and Conclusion 391
References 392
Zusammenfassung 394
Abstract 394

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