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Verhandlungen brauchen Zeit

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Bolle, F. Verhandlungen brauchen Zeit. . Bemerkungen zur siebzehnten der Masurischen Geschichten von Siegfried Lenz. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 116(3), 395-416. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.3.395
Bolle, Friedel "Verhandlungen brauchen Zeit. Bemerkungen zur siebzehnten der Masurischen Geschichten von Siegfried Lenz. " Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 116.3, 1996, 395-416. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.3.395
Bolle, Friedel (1996): Verhandlungen brauchen Zeit, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 116, iss. 3, 395-416, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.3.395

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Verhandlungen brauchen Zeit

Bemerkungen zur siebzehnten der Masurischen Geschichten von Siegfried Lenz

Bolle, Friedel

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 116 (1996), Iss. 3 : pp. 395–416

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Bolle, Friedel

References

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Abstract

The Coase Conjecture for Rubinstein bargaining models with incomplete information and unilateral proposals states that „ if the length of the bargaining period converges to zero then the duration of the bargaining process converges to zero“. Initiated by a short story by Siegfried Lenz, first, the standard structure of the model is varied. The Coase Conjecture is proven to be true also in the case of additional bargaining costs. An indirect technique is applied which is simpler and shorter than the usual constructive proofs. Second, the short story serves to criticize the crude simplifications of normal game theoretic modelling of bargaining.