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Vermögensspezifität, Agency-Kosten und Kapitalstruktur

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Erlei, M., Schmidt-Mohr, U. Vermögensspezifität, Agency-Kosten und Kapitalstruktur. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 116(4), 561-591. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.4.561
Erlei, Mathias and Schmidt-Mohr, Udo "Vermögensspezifität, Agency-Kosten und Kapitalstruktur" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 116.4, 1996, 561-591. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.4.561
Erlei, Mathias/Schmidt-Mohr, Udo (1996): Vermögensspezifität, Agency-Kosten und Kapitalstruktur, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 116, iss. 4, 561-591, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.4.561

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Vermögensspezifität, Agency-Kosten und Kapitalstruktur

Erlei, Mathias | Schmidt-Mohr, Udo

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 116 (1996), Iss. 4 : pp. 561–591

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Article Details

Erlei, Mathias

Schmidt-Mohr, Udo

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the impact of asset specificity on the capital structure of a firm. We show that the transaction cost economic argument in Williamson (1988) is at least incomplete in major aspects. However, we find that his basic idea that higher asset specificity leads to a lower debt / equity ratio is confirmed in our theoretically more consistent model. Some additional insights from our model are: (a) Project aggregation has an impact on the firm's optimal capital structure even if all projects of the firm show the same specificity. Therefore, a project oriented analysis as presented by Williamson (1988) is problematic, (b) The relationship between asset specificity and capital structure holds only if uncertainty is prevalent.