Die Wirksamkeit der Managementdisziplinierung über den externen Kontrollmechanismus des Marktes für Unternehmenskontrolle
JOURNAL ARTICLE
Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE
Style
Format
Die Wirksamkeit der Managementdisziplinierung über den externen Kontrollmechanismus des Marktes für Unternehmenskontrolle
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 114 (1994), Iss. 1 : pp. 81–98
Additional Information
Article Details
Röhrich, Martina
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effectiveness of management control by the external mechanism of the market for corporate control. Ten potential sources of takeover gains are excerpted from the variety of takeover theories: Disciplining management, synergy, diversification, hubris, market power, empire building, free cash flow, redistribution, implicit contracts, and information. An empirical investigation reveals that, under the given empirical evidence, a pluralistic interpretation is necessary. Finally, a critical assessment of the internal limits to the disciplining force of the market for corporate control, the efficiency of capital markets, free-rider problems, a prisoner's dilemma due to shareholder coordination problems, and other economic consequences, follows.