Verhandlungsprozesse zur Bestimmung von Qualität, Output und Kosteneffizienz bei öffentlichen Unternehmen
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Verhandlungsprozesse zur Bestimmung von Qualität, Output und Kosteneffizienz bei öffentlichen Unternehmen
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 114 (1994), Iss. 3 : pp. 405–418
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Schimmelpfennig, Jörg
Abstract
Institutional arrangements between politicians and public enterprises can only be modelled as sequential games if both the order of play and the respective action sets are properly identified. To lessen these assumptions a bargaining framework based on the microeconomic concept of a pure exchange economy is presented. Its solution set is similar to the core. Under standard assumption both output and quality prove to be excessive. However, in addition to solutions exhibiting the usual budgetary slack cost efficiency is found to be feasible as well. This is in line with the ambiguity which can be observed in corresponding empirical studies.