Gewerkschaften und Korruption
JOURNAL ARTICLE
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Gewerkschaften und Korruption
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 114 (1994), Iss. 4 : pp. 617–634
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Article Details
Schwalbe, Ulrich
Abstract
Corruption and Trade Unions
Usually, a trade union is during wage negotiations represented by a union leader. If he has more information than the rank and file, the firm might be tempted to bribe the union leader in order to obtain a more favourable contract. As corruption can never be carried out without leaving at least some traces, there is a positive probability that the union members will detect such a corruption and can thereby complete their imperfect information. By using a simple signaling game it is shown that even if the company and the union leader are punished after being detected, the only equilibrium is one in which the union leader is bribed with positive probability.
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ulrich Schwalbe: Gewerkschaften und Korruption | 617 | ||
| 1. Einleitung | 617 | ||
| 2. Das Signal-Spiel | 619 | ||
| 3. Gleichgewichte im Signal-Spiel | 625 | ||
| 4. Schlußbemerkung | 632 | ||
| Zusammenfassung | 633 | ||
| Summary | 633 | ||
| Literatur | 633 |