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Gewerkschaften und Korruption

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Schwalbe, U. Gewerkschaften und Korruption. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 114(4), 617-634. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.114.4.617
Schwalbe, Ulrich "Gewerkschaften und Korruption" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 114.4, 1994, 617-634. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.114.4.617
Schwalbe, Ulrich (1994): Gewerkschaften und Korruption, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 114, iss. 4, 617-634, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.114.4.617

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Gewerkschaften und Korruption

Schwalbe, Ulrich

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 114 (1994), Iss. 4 : pp. 617–634

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Schwalbe, Ulrich

Abstract

Corruption and Trade Unions

Usually, a trade union is during wage negotiations represented by a union leader. If he has more information than the rank and file, the firm might be tempted to bribe the union leader in order to obtain a more favourable contract. As corruption can never be carried out without leaving at least some traces, there is a positive probability that the union members will detect such a corruption and can thereby complete their imperfect information. By using a simple signaling game it is shown that even if the company and the union leader are punished after being detected, the only equilibrium is one in which the union leader is bribed with positive probability.