JOURNAL ARTICLE
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Eigentums- und Verfügungsrechte am Grundwasser: Effiziente Allokation mit Überwachungskosten
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 111 (1991), Iss. 2 : pp. 227–250
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Kuckshinrichs, Wilhelm
Abstract
The discussion of the allocation of a groundwater resource from a property rights point of view is extended to the cost of controlling the implementation of contractual agreements. With a low fine for breaking the agreements contractual fidelity is not enforceable. Even with a high fine the acquiescence of a contract violation ordinarily is profitable for a water company. The social optimal allocation is not reached in this model. But a social optimal fine may be defined that minimizes the difference between the social and the property rights solution.