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Rauscher, M. Markteintritt durch Exportsubventionen. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 110(1), 83-91.
Rauscher, Michael "Markteintritt durch Exportsubventionen" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 110.1, 1990, 83-91.
Rauscher, Michael (1990): Markteintritt durch Exportsubventionen, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 110, iss. 1, 83-91, [online]


Markteintritt durch Exportsubventionen

Rauscher, Michael

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 110 (1990), Iss. 1 : pp. 83–91

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Rauscher, Michael


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If high fixed costs prevent a domestic firm from entering a foreign market, the government of the home country can induce entry by providing export subsidies. This paper compares two types of subsidies. It is shown that a lump-sum subsidy is superior to output-related subsidies since the latter bias the firm’s decision about its production.