Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE
Leistungsanreize und Risikoteilung in der Wohnungsbauförderung
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 110 (1990), Iss. 2 : pp. 239–259
Recently, West Germany experienced the revival of large scale subsidies for social housing. The paper analyses the efficiency of the way in which subsidies are given. The system of contractual arrangements between state, tenant, investor and financier is evaluated with respect to the sharing of risks and the incentives for efficiency (moral hazard). Taking into account the typical risks of the housing sector and the specific problems of asymmetric information and control it is shown that the efficiency of the scheme can be improved if the investor and financiers take over risks which are now carried by the state and if the state relieves the tenant of some of his share of the risks.