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Richter, R. Sichtweise und Fragestellungen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 110(4), 571-591. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.110.4.571
Richter, Rudolf "Sichtweise und Fragestellungen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 110.4, 1990, 571-591. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.110.4.571
Richter, Rudolf (1990): Sichtweise und Fragestellungen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 110, iss. 4, 571-591, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.110.4.571
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Sichtweise und Fragestellungen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik

Richter, Rudolf

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 110 (1990), Iss. 4 : pp. 571–591

4 Citations (CrossRef)

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Article Details

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Duncker & Humblot GmbH
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.110.4.571
Language
Multiple languages
Pages
21

Richter, Rudolf

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Abstract

„Views and Questions of the New Institutional Economics“

The central interest of the representatives of the New Institutional Economics is directed towards the economic explanation of contractual bahavior in the real world. They pay special attention to incomplete or relational contracts and particularly to private ex ante safeguards against ex post opportunism, i.e. „private ordering“. Relational contracting arises where suppliers and buyers intend to do business on a continuing basis, transactions are recurrent and, in particular, transaction-specific investments of suppliers play a role. The new Institutional Economics can be interpreted as an extension of the older property-rights approach which did not analyze the problems of the execution phase of contracts. In real life, in a world with transaction costs, ex ante safeguards have an important influence on the governance structure of contracts or organizations and thus on the specific form of property rights

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Rudolf Richter: Sichtweise und Fragestellungen der\rNeuen Institutionenökonomik 571
I. Einführung 571
II. Verfügungsrechte (property rights) 574
III. Transaktionskosten 576
IV. Unvollständige Verträge 580
V. Schlußbemerkungen 586
Zusammenfassung 588
Summary 588
Literatur 588

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