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Non-Cooperative Bargaining and Imperfect Competition: A Survey

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  2. Economics, Finance, Business & Management
  3. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch
  4. Vol. 109, Issue 2
  5. pp. 265–286

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Bester, H. Non-Cooperative Bargaining and Imperfect Competition: A Survey. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 109(2), 265-286. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.109.2.265
Bester, Helmut "Non-Cooperative Bargaining and Imperfect Competition: A Survey" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 109.2, 1989, 265-286. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.109.2.265
Bester, Helmut (1989): Non-Cooperative Bargaining and Imperfect Competition: A Survey, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 109, iss. 2, 265-286, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.109.2.265
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Non-Cooperative Bargaining and Imperfect Competition: A Survey

Bester, Helmut

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 109 (1989), Iss. 2 : pp. 265–286

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Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.109.2.265
Language
Multiple languages
Pages
22

Bester, Helmut

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Abstract

Non-cooperative bargaining theory has led to new insights not only in bilateral monopoly situations. It has also provided new tools for the analysis of imperfectly competitive markets. Bargaining games may be used to study the formation of prices in models of decentralized exchange. Of particular interest is the relationship between the market equilibria of such models and the Walrasian competitive outcome. In this area the bargaining approach has been helpful to develop a better understanding of the prerequisites of perfect competition. So far only a few models have imbedded bargaining under asymmetric information in a market context. The main reason for this seems to be that the non-cooperative bargaining approach still faces considerable conceptual difficulties in this area

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Helmut Bester: Non-Cooperative Bargaining\rand Imperfect Competition: A Survey 265
1. Introduction 265
2. Non-Cooperative Bargaining Equilibrium 267
3. Wage Bargaining and Job Rationing 270
4. Equilibrium in Random Meetings Markets 271
5. Price Uncertainty and Search 273
6. Differentiated Commodity Markets 275
7. Bargaining with Incomplete Information 277
8. Beliefs and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium 279
Summary 282
Zusammenfassung 282
References 283

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