Eine Anmerkung zu Incentive-Effekten eines Entlohnungsschemas mit fixen Anteilen am Gesamtprodukt
JOURNAL ARTICLE
Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE
Style
Format
Eine Anmerkung zu Incentive-Effekten eines Entlohnungsschemas mit fixen Anteilen am Gesamtprodukt
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 109 (1989), Iss. 3 : pp. 421–430
Additional Information
Article Details
Pichler, Eva
Abstract
The paper presents a model, in which the relation between efficiency and equity does not necessarily appear as a trade-off: it is possible that both variables can be improved simultaneously, too. It is assumed that within of the firm wages are paid according to fixed shares of total output. Two workers maximize individual utility by choosing an optimal level of effort, given costs and revenue of effort (the latter by Cobb / Douglas production functions). It is shown, that a relatively more uniform and a relatively more uneven distribution of wages (compared to a structure of wages according to marginal productivity) leads to negative output effects if workers are heterogenous. Those losses of efficiency grow with an increasing distortion of the distributional shares.