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Eine Anmerkung zu Incentive-Effekten eines Entlohnungsschemas mit fixen Anteilen am Gesamtprodukt

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Pichler, E. Eine Anmerkung zu Incentive-Effekten eines Entlohnungsschemas mit fixen Anteilen am Gesamtprodukt. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 109(3), 421-430. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.109.3.421
Pichler, Eva "Eine Anmerkung zu Incentive-Effekten eines Entlohnungsschemas mit fixen Anteilen am Gesamtprodukt" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 109.3, 1989, 421-430. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.109.3.421
Pichler, Eva (1989): Eine Anmerkung zu Incentive-Effekten eines Entlohnungsschemas mit fixen Anteilen am Gesamtprodukt, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 109, iss. 3, 421-430, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.109.3.421

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Eine Anmerkung zu Incentive-Effekten eines Entlohnungsschemas mit fixen Anteilen am Gesamtprodukt

Pichler, Eva

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 109 (1989), Iss. 3 : pp. 421–430

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Article Details

Pichler, Eva

Abstract

The paper presents a model, in which the relation between efficiency and equity does not necessarily appear as a trade-off: it is possible that both variables can be improved simultaneously, too. It is assumed that within of the firm wages are paid according to fixed shares of total output. Two workers maximize individual utility by choosing an optimal level of effort, given costs and revenue of effort (the latter by Cobb / Douglas production functions). It is shown, that a relatively more uniform and a relatively more uneven distribution of wages (compared to a structure of wages according to marginal productivity) leads to negative output effects if workers are heterogenous. Those losses of efficiency grow with an increasing distortion of the distributional shares.