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Optimale Arbeitsverträge bei asymmetrischer Information: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit

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  2. Economics, Finance, Business & Management
  3. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch
  4. Vol. 105, Issue 4
  5. pp. 433–458

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Wolfstetter, E. Optimale Arbeitsverträge bei asymmetrischer Information: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 105(4), 433-458. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.105.4.433
Wolfstetter, Elmar "Optimale Arbeitsverträge bei asymmetrischer Information: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 105.4, 1985, 433-458. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.105.4.433
Wolfstetter, Elmar (1985): Optimale Arbeitsverträge bei asymmetrischer Information: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 105, iss. 4, 433-458, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.105.4.433
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Optimale Arbeitsverträge bei asymmetrischer Information: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit

Wolfstetter, Elmar

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 105 (1985), Iss. 4 : pp. 433–458

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Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.105.4.433
Language
Multiple languages
Pages
26

Wolfstetter, Elmar

References

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Abstract

This paper explores optimal wage-employment contracts under asymmetric information, allowing for worksharing as well as for layoffs. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for involuntary under- and overemployment. These results characterize and explain deviations from the Arrow/ Debreu equilibrium. The paper concludes with a welfare evaluation and a discussion of economic policies which may reduce the welfare losses caused by the presence of asymmetric information

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Elmar Wolfstetter: Optimale Arbeitsverträge bei asymmetrischer Information: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit 433
1. Grundlagen 435
2. Optimale Arbeitsverträge bei asymmetrischer Information 438
3. Die optimale Versicherung des Kündigungsrisikos 442
4. Unfreiwillige Unter-/Überbeschäftigung 445
5. Ein ordnungspolitischer Eingriff 451
6. Gesamtwirtschaftliche und wirtschaftspolitische Konsequenzen 454
7. Zwei Randbemerkungen 455
Zusammenfassung 456
Summary 457
Literatur 457

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