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Drei neoklassische Modelle der Diskriminierung. Eine vergleichende Darstellung
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 105 (1985), Iss. 4 : pp. 459–479
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Lorenz, Wilhelm
References
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Abstract
The discrimination models of Becker, Krueger and Bergmann are analyzed within the framework of the familar MacDougall diagram which was originally elaborated in the context of the theory of international direct investments. Public policy interventions in conjunction with appropriate distributional measures lead to a Pareto superior position compared with the outcome of pure market allocation when discrimination occurs. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the three distinct discrimination models predict a basically similar impact on the income positions of the relevant social groups