Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE
Instrumente und gerichtliche Kontrolle der Finanzaufsicht
Die Verwaltung, Vol. 49 (2016), Iss. 3 : pp. 339–368
1 Citations (CrossRef)
Prof. Dr. Ann-Katrin Kaufhold, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Juristische Fakultät, Professor-Huber-Platz 2, 80539 München
Vertikale Aufhebungsentscheidungen. Zu einem neuen Phänomen der Verbundverwaltung im Europäischen Bankenaufsichtsrecht
Die Verwaltung, Vol. 50 (2017), Iss. 2 P.189https://doi.org/10.3790/verw.50.2.189 [Citations: 0]
In order to secure financial stability EU and national policymakers have equipped financial supervisors with a wide range of instruments that follow different regulatory strategies. In response to the financial crisis of 2007/2008 these instruments have once again been substantially modified and extended. Their specific design mirrors the characteristics of the financial system and the regulatory task. In this article I analyse the structures and peculiarities of the individual supervisory instruments as well as the characteristics of this set of instruments as such. In a second step I examine the opportunities for judicial review of supervisory measures offered by EU and national law. In this study I demonstrate the inadequacy of judicial controls of information published by supervisory authorities and of supervisory measures taken by the ECB. To that extant I argue that an amendment of the European Treaties is necessary.