Reichsbankpolitik 1918-1923 zwischen Zahlungsbilanz- und Quantitätstheorie
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Reichsbankpolitik 1918-1923 zwischen Zahlungsbilanz- und Quantitätstheorie
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 97 (1977), Iss. 3 : pp. 193–214
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Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig
Cited By
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Private Equity, Social Inequity: German Judges React to Inflation, 1914–24
Hughes, Michael L.
Central European History, Vol. 16 (1983), Iss. 1 P.76
https://doi.org/10.1017/S000893890001089X [Citations: 1]
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Abstract
After summarizing the salient monetary characteristics of the German inflation of 1914 - 1923, the author presents the two current interpretations of the problem: the balance-of-payments- and the quantity-theories. He shows that they are deduced from different assumptions about the degree of elasticity of the economy and about priorities of economic policy goals. The Reichsbank did not rely on mono-causal explanations. Until 1921, the Bank argued mainly from the premise of the quantity theory vis-a-vis the government, but from the balance-of-payments theory to the public. This is explained by a dual effort of the Reichsbank to fight the inflation: via the money supply and via the money demand. After Germany’s reparation bill had been fixed in May 1921, the Reichsbank valued further resistance to inflation as too costly