Abstract

Beyond the Core of Autonomous Executive Decision-Making: Participatory Rights of the Parliament Regarding the Termination of Treaties and in the Context of Soft Law Instruments – A Comparative Analysis

The contribution analyzes participatory rights of the Parliament both regarding the termination of international treaties as well as in the context of the generation of soft law within the German constitutional order. It identifies – by employing insights of comparative constitutional law – common normatively-backed argumentative topoi, which argue in both cases for a more extensive parliamentary participation than suggested by current constitutional practice. Key determinants in this context are principles rooted inter alia in fundamental rights (especially the idea of “reservation of law” and the “theory of materiality”). The idea that the termination of international treaties would be a prerogative of the executive, which finds confirmation in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, is in this generality not convincing. Similarly, it would be ill-guided to qualify soft law processes as moments purely within the prerogative sphere of the executive.