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Gehrig, T. Leverage, Competitiveness and Systemic Risk in Banking. Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 92(3), 37-50. https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.92.3.37
Gehrig, Thomas "Leverage, Competitiveness and Systemic Risk in Banking" Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 92.3, 2023, 37-50. https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.92.3.37
Gehrig, Thomas (2023): Leverage, Competitiveness and Systemic Risk in Banking, in: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, vol. 92, iss. 3, 37-50, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.92.3.37
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Leverage, Competitiveness and Systemic Risk in Banking

Gehrig, Thomas

Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, Vol. 92 (2023), Iss. 3 : pp. 37–50

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Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.92.3.37
Language
English
Pages
14
Keywords

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Author Details

Thomas Gehrig, University of Vienna, CEPR, ECGI, SRC, and VGSF, Department of Finance, Oskar-Morgenstern Platz 1, 1090 Vienna, Austria

  • Thomas P. Gehrig ist Professor für Finanzwirtschaft an der Universität Wien und Mitglied der Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF). Er ist Fellow des CEPR in London, des ECGI in Brüssel und des Systemic Risk Centers der LSE. Nach seiner Promotion an der LSE hatte er Professuren inne an der Universität Basel, der Northwestern University in Evanston und der Universität Freiburg, sowie eine Adjunct Professur an der Rice University in Houston. Seine Forschungsinteressen betreffen Informationsverarbeitung in Märkten sowie die Rolle von Finanzintermediären. Er ist Editor-in-Chief des Schmalenbach Journals of Business Research.
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Abstract

Zusammenfassung: Die Steuerbefreiung von Fremdkapitalzinsen verschafft Fremdkapital einen erheblichen Finanzierungsvorteil gegenüber Eigenkapital. Dieser Steuervorteil bewirkt, dass insbesondere Banken mit extreme Schuldenhebel arbeiten und somit große Überschuldungsrisiken eingehen. Diese Steuerbefreiung von Fremdkapitalzinsen widerspricht somit den Zielen der prudenziellen Eigenkapitalregulierung, die zum Zwecke der Stabilität und Sicherheit des Bankensystems eine hinreichende Mindestausstattung sicherstellen möchte. Eine Reduktion der impliziten Subventionierung von Fremdfinanzierung ist dagegen ein komplementäres Instrument zur Eigenkapitalregulierung. Sie erhöht einerseits die Krisenfestigkeit der Banken und fördert andererseits deren Wettbewerbsfähigkeit im internationalen Wettbewerb. Reformen zur Reduktion oder gar Umkehrung des Steuervorteils, die in der kurzen Frist fiskalisch neutral sind, sparen langfristig erhebliche Kosten der Bankenrettung ein.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Thomas Gehrig: 1
1 Introduction 2
2 Post-GFC Reforms 3
3 Transatlantic Comparison 5
4 Debt Bias 7
5 Complementarity of Taxation and Prudential Regulation in Banking 9
6 Political Economy of Tax Reform 10
References 12

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