Die Zuordnung von Regulierungskompetenzen im deutschen Bankensektor. Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse
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Die Zuordnung von Regulierungskompetenzen im deutschen Bankensektor. Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 129 (2009), Iss. 3 : pp. 415–442
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Uwe Vollmer, Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Institut für Theoretische Volkswirtschaftlehre, Grimmaische Straße 1, 04109 Leipzig.
Abstract
The paper applies the incomplete financial contract models of Repullo (2000) as well as Kahn and Santos (2005; 2006) to the German banking sector and discusses what consequences the current institutional allocation of bank regulatory powers has for the functionality of the banking sector. It asks whether bank regulatory competences in Germany should be concentrated on a single regulatory and supervisory authority or whether different regulatory institutions should be involved. The question which authority should do what task in the latter case is also addressed. The paper shows that, under weak conditions, Deutsche Bundesbank should act as lender of last resort.
Received: September 13, 2007
Accepted: November 4, 2008