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Compensation and Transparency of Compensation of Management Boards in Germany

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Stadtmann, G. Compensation and Transparency of Compensation of Management Boards in Germany. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 42(3), 435-461. https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.42.3.435
Stadtmann, Georg "Compensation and Transparency of Compensation of Management Boards in Germany" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 42.3, 2009, 435-461. https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.42.3.435
Stadtmann, Georg (2009): Compensation and Transparency of Compensation of Management Boards in Germany, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 42, iss. 3, 435-461, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.42.3.435

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Compensation and Transparency of Compensation of Management Boards in Germany

Stadtmann, Georg

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 42 (2009), Iss. 3 : pp. 435–461

1 Citations (CrossRef)

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Article Details

Author Details

Prof. Dr. Georg Stadtmann, Europa-Universität Viadrina, Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Makroökonomie, Postfach 1786, D-15207 Frankfurt (Oder).

Cited By

  1. Compliance and transparency of German supervisory board compensation

    Koch, Rosemarie

    Corporate Ownership and Control, Vol. 8 (2011), Iss. 3 P.94

    https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i3p8 [Citations: 0]

Abstract

Compensation and Transparency of Compensation of Management Boards in Germany

The transparency of compensation of the members of the management board has become a central element of the German corporate governance system. We perform an empirical examination with respect to the structure of the compensation of the management board of DAX-30 companies. Some companies show a strong differentiation among the compensation of their board members while others do not. Furthermore, the proportion of fixed to overall compensation varies between companies. We identify those company as well as person specific variables that explain individual compensation levels. Additionally, we check which factors influence the change in compensation. Thereby, we test whether a bidding-up effect is present as suggested by some theoretical considerations. Nevertheless, the empirical results show that we are unable to detect a bidding-up effect. (JEL J33, M12, M52, O16)