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The Development of Central Bank Independence: Empirical Evidence

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  2. Economics, Finance, Business & Management
  3. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital
  4. Vol. 56, Issue 2
  5. pp. 123–144

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Höfer, A., Jaenke, K. The Development of Central Bank Independence: Empirical Evidence. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 56(2), 123-144. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.56.2.123
Höfer, Andreas and Jaenke, Katrin "The Development of Central Bank Independence: Empirical Evidence" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 56.2, 2023, 123-144. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.56.2.123
Höfer, Andreas/Jaenke, Katrin (2023): The Development of Central Bank Independence: Empirical Evidence, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 56, iss. 2, 123-144, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.56.2.123
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The Development of Central Bank Independence: Empirical Evidence

Höfer, Andreas | Jaenke, Katrin

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 56 (2023), Iss. 2 : pp. 123–144

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Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.56.2.123
Language
English
Pages
22
Keywords

Author Details

Prof. Dr. Andreas Höfer, Deutsche Bundesbank University of Applied Sciences, Schloss, 57627 Hachenburg, Germany.

Katrin Jaenke, Deutsche Bundesbank.

References

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Abstract

In the academic literature there are different indices to quantify the independence of Central Banks. The main indices to measure Central Bank Independence (CBI) were published between 1970 and 1990. This paper applies CBI indices to a sample of 15 industrial countries and the European Central Bank (ECB) to the current legal conditions. Hence, we are able to study the development of CBI and how it is related with change of inflation. Overall, we find that CBI has increased over the last decades. However, the original approaches to determine CBI do not consider the unconventional monetary policy (Quantitative Easing (QE)) that has been practised by Central Banks in recent years. Considering QE leads to lower CBI scores which are still higher than the original scores that were determined in the 1970’s–1990’s.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Andreas Höfer / Katrin Jaenke: The Development of Central Bank Independence: Empirical Evidence 123
Abstract 123
I. Introduction 123
II. Related Literature 124
III. Measurement Approaches of Central Bank Independence 125
IV. Data and Methodology 130
V. Results and Discussion 133
VI. Conclusion 141
References 141
Annex de facto CBI Indices 144

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