Abstract

The chapter asks how political protest that falls under the definition of a criminal offense should be evaluated, for instance, protest against the insufficiency of measures against climate change. It takes the perspective of criminal law theory and assumes that criminal law theory should integrate debates in moral philosophy and political philosophy. The author analyses the notion of civil disobedience and argues that it would be preferable to avoid this term. She is also critical regarding both the rediscovered focus on conscience and recent literature in the field of political theory that proposes to supplement or replace civil disobedience with uncivil disobedience. Other than these current debates postulate, the author assumes that the judgment „politically legitimate“ is more demanding than the notion of civil disobedience. It requires a close examination of goals and the means that are used to put pressure on decision-makers. Attempts to deal with macro level risks such as the risks of climate change have to recognize that this requires genuinely political coordination and that it is not legitimate to instrumentalize third parties for the purpose of political protest. For the application of criminal law, this means that the term “danger” in the necessity defense (§ 34 German Criminal Code) must be interpreted narrowly. Punishment should not be mitigated based solely on the argument that protesters act with altruistic motives but only if protest is moderate and politically legitimate.