Abstract

Post-democracy and Administrative Law

“Post-democracy” leads back to the political concepts of Colin Crouch, Sheldon Wolin, and – above all – Jacques Rancière. Rancière defines “democracy” in opposition to the system of government institutions, which he calls in adaption of a Hegelian terminology: “police”. Starting with Rancière, this contribution shows some possibilities to applicate the post-democracy argument in German public law. The principle of democracy stems from Art. 20 sect. 1 and 2 of the German Grundgesetz. While Art. 20 sect. 2 GG points to the formality of democratic sovereignty and of the legitimacy concerning the exertion of government power, Art. 20 sect. 1 GG refers to the rather idealistic layers of democracy. As a consequence, it is suggested to define “democracy” in terms of Art. 20 sect. 1 GG as a principle of responsive government. Although it is a leading topic in political science (e.g. with respect to the theory of representation), democratic responsiveness has not yet become part of judicial reflection on democratic principles. Instead “legitimacy” is the overriding term of German constitutional theory. As a result, the consequences of democratic responsiveness concerning administrative procedures and administrative organisation are subject to further discussion. Finally, this contribution applies overlapping and separating moments of post-democracy theory to the theories of governmental intervention and of network governance.