Abstract

Responsibility in Public Law

The term responsibility appears quite frequently in the field of law. To some extent the term is used without any normative foundation. The author interprets the legal term of responsibility as the foundation/the basis for the attainment of normative demands. He specifies the characteristics of legal responsibility and examines how responsibility is allocated in public international law, European Union law, and national public law. This article argues in favour of a constitutionalisation of international organisations with decision-making authority, the efficacy of the European principle of subsidiarity, and more rights of influence to the EU Commission in the independent European regulatory agencies. Regarding the allocation of responsibility in the nation state, and following the concept of a “chain of legitimation” developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), it is shown what the limits are for establishing independent national administrative bodies by including autonomous/self-determining private persons on behalf of the state. Furthermore, the constantly changing notion of responsibility in the relationship between state and citizens is examined. The author advocates more attention to the legal concept of the legal relationship and to the issue of defining correlations between the state's duties to protect and subjective rights. As it comes to the responsibility of the citizen, a distinction is made between legal and ethical requirements. From a legal perspective, the citizen is only responsible for requirements the law has imposed on him. Therefore, fundamental rights can be invoked without any reservation, e.g. for ecological reasons. The article concludes with an excursus on the responsibility of the academic. It contends that, in contrast with citizens, the academic at a public university has a moral duty to exercise his academic freedom.