Menu Expand

Mitigation and Transfer of Risks: Prevention, Insurance, and Limited Liability

Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE

Style

Fackler, M. Mitigation and Transfer of Risks: Prevention, Insurance, and Limited Liability. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, 99999(), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.3790/zverswiss.2024.1449801
Fackler, Michael "Mitigation and Transfer of Risks: Prevention, Insurance, and Limited Liability" Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 99999., 2024, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.3790/zverswiss.2024.1449801
Fackler, Michael (2024): Mitigation and Transfer of Risks: Prevention, Insurance, and Limited Liability, in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, vol. 99999, iss. , 1-21, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/zverswiss.2024.1449801

Format

Mitigation and Transfer of Risks: Prevention, Insurance, and Limited Liability

Fackler, Michael

Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, Vol. (2024), Online First : pp. 1–21

Additional Information

Article Details

Author Details

Dr. Michael Fackler is a qualified actuary (DAV), Munich, Germany

References

  1. AAE (2021): Insurability and pandemic (or more generally, shared resilience) risk. AAE position paper, Brussels: Actuarial Association of Europe.  Google Scholar
  2. Bernstein, P. L. (1996): Against the gods: The remarkable story of risk, New York: Wiley.  Google Scholar
  3. Borovas, G./Cook, H./Coles, T. (2016): Nuclear Liability in the UK: Implementation of the 2004 Protocols. In: Shearman & Sterling Energy Update 1(3), 15–22.  Google Scholar
  4. Dixon, L./Stern, R. K. (2004): Compensation for Losses from the 9/11 Attacks, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.  Google Scholar
  5. EU (2009): Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. In: Official Journal of the European Union L 263, 11–31.  Google Scholar
  6. Fackler, M. (2011): Risikotransfer: Wie Katastrophen tragbar (gemacht) werden. In: Seemüller, A./Baudson, T. G. (Eds.): Transformationen. Interdisziplinäre Betrachtungen, pp. 17–28, Göttingen: Cuvillier.  Google Scholar
  7. Faure, M. (1995): Economic models of compensation for damage caused by nuclear accidents: Some lessons for the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions. In: European Journal of Law and Economics 2(1), 21–43.  Google Scholar
  8. Faure, M. G./Verheij, A. (2007): Shifts in Compensation for Environmental Damage, Volume 21 of Tort and Insurance Law, Wien/New York: Springer.  Google Scholar
  9. F. R. Germany (2022): Gesetz über die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren (Atomgesetz) [Law on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Protection against the Dangers Posed by It (Nuclear Energy Act)], Berlin: Federal Republic of Germany.  Google Scholar
  10. GIROJ (2014): Earthquake insurance in Japan. Tokyo: General Insurance Rating Organization of Japan.  Google Scholar
  11. Gründl, H./Guxha, D./Kartasheva, A./Schmeiser, H. (2021): Insurability of pandemic risks. In: Journal of Risk and Insurance 88(4), 863–902.  Google Scholar
  12. Günther, B./Karau, T./Kastner, E./Warmuth, W. (2011): Berechnung einer risikoadäquaten Versicherungsprämie zur Deckung der Haftpflichtrisiken, die aus dem Betrieb von Kernkraftwerken resultieren, Berlin: Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energien.  Google Scholar
  13. Hartwig, R./Gordon, R. (2020): Uninsurability of mass market business continuity risks from viral pandemics, Chicago: American Property Casualty Insurance Association.  Google Scholar
  14. Hartwig, R./Niehaus, G./Qiu, J. (2020): Insurance for economic losses caused by pandemics. In: The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 45(2), 134–170.  Google Scholar
  15. Heffron, R. J./Ashley, S. F./Nuttall, W. J. (2016): The global nuclear liability regime post Fukushima Daiichi. In: Progress in Nuclear Energy 90, 1–10.  Google Scholar
  16. IQ (2011): Year of the cat: Japan. In: Insider Quarterly 40, 12–13.  Google Scholar
  17. Kaminski, J. L. (2006): Hurricane windstorm insurance in Florida. In: OLR research report. Office of Legislative Research.  Google Scholar
  18. Knight, F. H. (1921): Risk, uncertainty and profit, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.  Google Scholar
  19. Kobayashi, T./Suzuki, T./Iwata, K. (2019): Accident cleanup costs rising to 35–80 trillion yen in 40 years. Follow up report of public financial burden of the Fukushima nuclear accident. Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER).  Google Scholar
  20. Lahnstein, C. (2011): Tort law and the ethical responsibilities of liability insurers: Comments from a reinsurer’s perspective. In: Journal of Business Ethics 103(1), 87–94.  Google Scholar
  21. Lelieveld, J./Kunkel, D./Lawrence, M. G. (2012): Global risk of radioactive fallout after major nuclear reactor accidents. In: Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 12(9), 4245–4258.  Google Scholar
  22. Lowe, S./Lebens, J./Pummell, M. (2010): Deepwater Horizon disaster: Insurance industry implications. In: Emphasis Magazine 2010(2), 1–6.  Google Scholar
  23. Michel-Kerjan, E./Pedell, B. (2005): Terrorism risk coverage in the post-9/11 era: A comparison of new public-private partnerships in France, Germany and the U.S. In: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance – Issues and Practice 30(1), 144–170.  Google Scholar
  24. Munich Re (2001): 5th International Liability Forum, Munich: Munich Re.  Google Scholar
  25. Munich Re (2012): 15th International Liability Forum, Munich: Munich Re.  Google Scholar
  26. NEA (2010): International Nuclear Law: History, Evolution and Outlook, Paris: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency.  Google Scholar
  27. NEA (2012): Japan’s Compensation System for Nuclear Damage as Related to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, Paris: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency.  Google Scholar
  28. NEA (2019): Nuclear Operators’ Third Party Liability Amounts and Financial Security Limits, Paris: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency.  Google Scholar
  29. Parodi, P. (2014): Pricing in General Insurance, Boca Raton: CRC Press.  Google Scholar
  30. Pooley, E. (2001): Mayor of the world. In: Time 158(28), 40–55.  Google Scholar
  31. Rose, T./Sweeting, T. (2016): How safe is nuclear power? A statistical study suggests less than expected. In: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72(2), 112–115.  Google Scholar
  32. Savage, L. J. (1954): The foundations of statistics, New York: Wiley.  Google Scholar
  33. Schwepcke, A. (Ed.) (2004): Reinsurance: Principles and State of the Art – A Guidebook for Home Learners, Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft.  Google Scholar
  34. Sinn, H.-W. (2010): Casino Capitalism: How the Financial Crisis Came About and What Needs to be Done Now, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Google Scholar
  35. Spiegelhalter, D. J./Riesch, H. (2011): Don’t know, can’t know: embracing deeper uncertainties when analysing risks. In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 369(1956), 4730–4750.  Google Scholar
  36. Tyran, J.-R./Zweifel, P. (1993): Environmental risk internalization through capital markets (ERICAM): The case of nuclear power. In: International Review of Law and Economics 13(4), 431–444.  Google Scholar
  37. Walter, F. (2008): Catastrophes. Une histoire culturelle. XVIe–XXIe siècle [Catastrophes. A cultural history. 16th–21st century], Paris: Seuil.  Google Scholar
  38. White, P. (2021): 10 years since the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Briefing paper. Nuclear-Free Campaign. Friends of the Earth Australia.  Google Scholar
  39. WNN (2021): Nuclear liability protocols ratified to strengthen compensation rights. World Nuclear News, December 21.  Google Scholar
  40. WTW (2020): The Terrorism Pool Index: Review of terrorism insurance programs in selected countries, London: Willis Towers Watson.  Google Scholar

Abstract

Die moderne Gesellschaft mindert und überträgt Risiken auf vielfältige Weise: von ­Katastrophenprävention über Versicherungslösungen bis zu kleinen, unauffälligen Un­gerechtigkeiten. Wir zeigen, dass die ergriffenen Maßnahmen von der Unsicherheit der Risiken abhängen und drei Abwägungen beinhalten: Risikovermeidung gegen Innovation, Haftung gegen kollektive Risikoteilung, Gerechtigkeit gegen praktikable Schaden­regulierung. Einige Beispiele, vor allem die Kernenergiehaftung und die Maßnahmen nach den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001, verdeutlichen, dass eine ganz gerechte Verteilung der Haftung kaum möglich ist, wenn ein Risiko neu ist oder wenn ein schwerwiegendes Ereignis die Verwaltungsressourcen überfordert. Weiter betrachten wir Grenzen der Versicherungskapazität und ihre Relevanz speziell für das Pandemierisiko.