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How Thinking about Markets and Institutions Influences Thinking about the Future of Banks

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Hübenbecker, U., Homölle, S. How Thinking about Markets and Institutions Influences Thinking about the Future of Banks. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 99999(), 1-32. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.2024.1454201
Hübenbecker, Ulf and Homölle, Susanne "How Thinking about Markets and Institutions Influences Thinking about the Future of Banks" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 99999., 2024, 1-32. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.2024.1454201
Hübenbecker, Ulf/Homölle, Susanne (2024): How Thinking about Markets and Institutions Influences Thinking about the Future of Banks, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 99999, iss. , 1-32, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.2024.1454201
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How Thinking about Markets and Institutions Influences Thinking about the Future of Banks

Hübenbecker, Ulf | Homölle, Susanne

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. (2025), Online First : pp. 1–32

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Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.2024.1454201
Language
English
Pages
32
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Author Details

Ulf Hübenbecker, FHöVPR M-V, Lecturer in Economics, Goldberger Straße 12–13, Building 1, Room 218a, 18273 Güstrow.

Prof. Dr. Susanne Homölle, University of Rostock, Chair of Banking and Finance, Ulmenstr. 69, Thünen-Haus, Raum 207, 18057 Rostock.

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Abstract

As the narratives about the future of banks seem to lack of theoretical rigour, the paper undertakes a very fundamental analysis of what economic theories can tell us about the future of banks. The New Institutional Economics portrays new challengers as perfecting the market and thereby sidelining the more passive banks, which could lead to their demise. This gloomy narrative is critically discussed and contrasted. By re-evaluating concepts such as uncertainty, trust, and power, a more nuanced perspective emerges. Banks may have a greater agency and potential for success than previously thought, challenging the pessimism about their future.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Ulf Hübenbecker / Susanne Homölle: How Thinking about Markets and Institutions Influences Thinking about the Future of Banks 1
Abstract 1
I. Introduction 1
II. Methodology 4
III. Thinking about markets and institutions 5
1. Neoclassical Economics 5
2. New Institutional Economics 6
a) Transaction Cost Theory 6
b) Agency Theory 9
IV. Implications for narratives about the future of banks 11
V. Discussion 14
1. Uncertainty 15
2. Trust 17
3. Power 19
VI. Summary and Conclusion 22
References 25

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