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The Future of Europe: A Constitutional Political Economy Argument in Favour of “Variable Geometries”

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  3. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch
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Wohlgemuth, M. The Future of Europe: A Constitutional Political Economy Argument in Favour of “Variable Geometries”. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 99999(), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.378705
Wohlgemuth, Michael "The Future of Europe: A Constitutional Political Economy Argument in Favour of “Variable Geometries”" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 99999., 2025, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.378705
Wohlgemuth, Michael (2025): The Future of Europe: A Constitutional Political Economy Argument in Favour of “Variable Geometries”, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 99999, iss. , 1-20, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.378705
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The Future of Europe: A Constitutional Political Economy Argument in Favour of “Variable Geometries”

Wohlgemuth, Michael

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. (2025), Online First : pp. 1–20

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Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.378705
Language
Multiple languages
Pages
20
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Author Details

Michael Wohlgemuth, Walter Eucken Institute, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany

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Abstract

For decades European integration combined its deepening and widening in a mostly unitary fashion. A “one-size-fits-all” approach, however, seems little promising for a future EU of some 35 member states and an enlarged set of EU-competencies. To manage further deepening and widening of the EU, more flexible forms of integration of the “willing and capable” seem both realistic and desirable. A combination of Constitutional Political Economy, club theory and basic requirements of legitimacy provides relevant arguments for integration based on “variable geometries” that tend to be ignored by narrow perspectives of public finance theories of the optimal allocation of competencies.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
By Michael Wohlgemuth: The Future of Europe: A Constitutional Political Economy Argument in Favour of “Variable Geometries” 1
1. Introduction 1
2. Europe’s Challenge 2
3. Club-Theoretical Considerations 5
4. Alternative Scenarios for European Integration 8
5. Alternative Models of Flexible Integration 10
5.1 Flexible Integration amongst Member States 11
5.2 Flexible Integration vis-à-vis Third Countries 16
6. Outlook: Concentric Circles and Variable Geometry as Ways Forward 17
References 18

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