Populistische Verwaltungspolitik und wehrhafter Verwaltungsstaat

Abstract

In the face of authoritarian populism, the resilience of constitutional democracy in Germany is currently under scrutiny. The bureaucracy, however, has so far received little public and scholarly attention. This article examines the level of protection provided by federal laws against strategies of populist administrative policy, particularly by mapping out the Basic Law’s commitment to a Militant Administrative State. To this end, the conflicting relationship between populism and public administration is outlined, which serves both as an ideological target of and a necessary tool for populist governance. Furthermore, the article identifies populist administrative policies at the levels of rulemaking, organization, and personnel in order to examine whether and which safeguards federal law provides against them.

The article finds that effective protective mechanisms encompass the German administrative federalism, the constitutional protection of the permanent civil service, and the constitutional requirements of the specific enactment of a statute and of parliamentary approval. At the same time, the constitutional commitment to a Militant Administrative State impacts the interpretation, justification, and balancing of legal interests. The article concludes with policy suggestions to enhance the protection against populist administrative policies. From guaranteeing institutional autonomy to effectively combatting unfair patronage or committing the civil service to the idea of the Militant Administrative State, much can still be done to this end.