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Systems-Theoretic LawMacro: An Antidote to Keynesian Indigestion?

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Wagner, R. Systems-Theoretic LawMacro: An Antidote to Keynesian Indigestion?. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 99999(), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.375228
Wagner, Richard E. "Systems-Theoretic LawMacro: An Antidote to Keynesian Indigestion?" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 99999., 2025, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.375228
Wagner, Richard E. (2025): Systems-Theoretic LawMacro: An Antidote to Keynesian Indigestion?, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 99999, iss. , 1-21, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.375228
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Systems-Theoretic LawMacro: An Antidote to Keynesian Indigestion?

Wagner, Richard E.

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Online First : pp. 1–21

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Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.375228
Language
Multiple languages
Pages
21
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open-access CC BY 4.0
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George Mason University

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Abstract

This article was written for a Liberty Fund conference on “Liberty in Relation to Law and Macroeconomics.” The paper works with recognition that the models we use are not neutral devices to see more clearly into reality because they also shade that reality in different ways. For instance, a model grounded on systemic equilibrium and aggregation will almost necessarily assign turbulence to market interaction and thereby place the calming of turbulence in the province of political action simply because there is no coherent alternative. By contrast, a model where turbulence is baked into the cake of human action will recognize that human action both creates and calms turbulence, and continually, and will also recognize that the continual shifting among coalitions that is a feature of democratic politics is even more likely to generate turbulence than to calm it, and with turbulence and calmness both being ordinary features of human society.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Richard E. Wagner: Systems-Theoretic LawMacro: An Antidote to Keynesian Indigestion? 1
1. Seeking After the Real John Maynard Keynes 2
2. Aggregation or Transactional Structure? Overcoming a Conceptual Antinomy 6
3. Maffeo Pantaleoni (1911) and Systems-Theoretic Political Economy 9
4. Method, Substance, and their Entanglement 12
5. On Janus and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs 14
6. What Might an Induced Demand for Law and Macroeconomics Accomplish? 16
7. One Illustration of Aggregation vs. Transactional Structure in Closing 18
References 19

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