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It Takes a Model to Beat a Model

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Munger, M. It Takes a Model to Beat a Model. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 99999(), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.375232
Munger, Michael C. "It Takes a Model to Beat a Model" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 99999., 2025, 1-26. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.375232
Munger, Michael C. (2025): It Takes a Model to Beat a Model, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 99999, iss. , 1-26, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.375232
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It Takes a Model to Beat a Model

Munger, Michael C.

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Online First : pp. 1–26

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Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.2024.375232
Language
Multiple languages
Pages
26
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open-access CC BY 4.0
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Author Details

Michael C. Munger, Department of Political Science, Duke University, USA

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Abstract

Generating verisimilous and policy-relevant models of the macroeconomy in a democracy is a challenge. Three broad theoretical perspectives are considered: (A) the orthodox Keynesian Synthesis; (B) the Austrian response; and (C) the Public Choice response. The orthodox view is inaccurate, but has the advantage of being “a model.” The Austrian critique, while largely correct, generates no usable political advice. The Public Choice critique provides a model for understanding the likely form and effects of government policies. But Public Choice scholars have missed the policy thrust of Progressivism, which accounts for the problem of political equilibrium, and insulates technocratic power from voters and interest groups. Keynesian orthodoxy has consistently won because it is playing a different game.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Michael C. Munger: It Takes a Model to Beat a Model 1
1. Introduction 1
2. The Neoclassical Synthesis and the Austrian Response 3
3. Public Choice and “Political Equilibrium” 6
4. The Caricature Version of Progressive Macro Policy Models 8
5. The More Accurate Version of the Progressive Macro Model View 10
6. The Problem of Planned Industrial Policies and Macro-Interventions in a Democracy 12
7. Conclusion 20
References 22

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