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Interest Rate Rules and Money as an Indicator Variable

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Gerberding, C., Seitz, F., Worms, A. Interest Rate Rules and Money as an Indicator Variable. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 45(4), 501-529. https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.45.4.501
Gerberding, Christina; Seitz, Franz and Worms, Andreas "Interest Rate Rules and Money as an Indicator Variable" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 45.4, 2012, 501-529. https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.45.4.501
Gerberding, Christina/Seitz, Franz/Worms, Andreas (2012): Interest Rate Rules and Money as an Indicator Variable, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 45, iss. 4, 501-529, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.45.4.501

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Interest Rate Rules and Money as an Indicator Variable

Gerberding, Christina | Seitz, Franz | Worms, Andreas

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 45 (2012), Iss. 4 : pp. 501–529

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Article Details

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Dr. Christina Gerberding, Deutsche Bundesbank, Economics Department, Wilhelm Epstein Str. 14, D-60431 Frankfurt.

Prof. Dr. Franz Seitz, University of Applied Sciences, Weiden, WSB Poznan, Hetzenrichter Weg 15, D-92637 Weiden.

Dr. Andreas Worms, Deutsche Bundesbank, Economics Department, Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14, D-60431 Frankfurt.

Abstract

Interest Rate Rules and Money as an Indicator Variable

The paper derives the monetary policy reaction function implied by using money as an indicator variable. It consists of an interest rate response to deviations of the inflation rate from target, to the change in the output gap, to money demand shocks and to the lagged interest rate. We show that this type of inertial interest rate rule characterises the Bundesbank's monetary policy from 1979 to 1998 quite well. This result is robust to the use of real-time or ex post data. The main lesson is that, in addition to anchoring long-term inflation expectations, money introduces inertia and history-dependence into the monetary policy rule. This is advantageous when private agents have forward-looking expectations and when the level of the output gap is subject to persistent measurement errors. (E43, E52, E58)