Vertriebssteuerung auf Basis des Customer Lifetime Value am Beispiel der Finanzdienstleistungsbranche
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Vertriebssteuerung auf Basis des Customer Lifetime Value am Beispiel der Finanzdienstleistungsbranche
Buhl, Hans Ulrich | Dzienziol, Jochen | Heidemann, Julia
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 43 (2010), Iss. 4 : pp. 501–532
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Prof. Dr. Hans Ulrich Buhl, Universität Augsburg, Kernkompetenzzentrum Finanz- & Informationsmanagement, Universitätsstraße 12, D-86159 Augsburg.
Dr. Jochen Dzienziol, Universität Augsburg, Kernkompetenzzentrum Finanz- & Informationsmanagement, Universitätsstraße 12, D-86159 Augsburg.
Dr. Julia Heidemann, Universität Augsburg, Kernkompetenzzentrum Finanz- & Informationsmanagement, Universitätsstraße 12, D-86159 Augsburg.
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Customer lifetime value-based sales force control in the financial services industry— an incentive-compatible remuneration model
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Customer Lifetime Value: Entwicklungspfade, Einsatzpotenziale und Herausforderungen
Heidemann, Julia | Kamprath, Nora | Görz, QuirinJournal für Betriebswirtschaft, Vol. 59 (2009), Iss. 4 P.183
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Ein Ansatz zur Bestimmung kundenindividueller Finanzierungslösungen am Beispiel gekoppelter Absatz- und Finanzierungsgeschäfte
Wiesent, Julia
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 44 (2011), Iss. 4 P.579
https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.44.4.579 [Citations: 0]
Abstract
Customer Lifetime Value-Based Sales Management – the Example of Financial Services Providers
The goal of this study is to develop a recommendation for an incentive-compatible commission-system that rewards the value-based performance of the sales force in the financial services industry. The commission-system should ensure that every decision on customer-actions made by the sales force should be consistent with the key figure customer lifetime value (CLV) and thus with shareholder value. This study shows that both, the wide-spread and commonly used acquisition commission and the product- and time-specific participation commission can destroy value for the company and therefore can not be incentive-compatible. This study shows how well-known monetary incentive-systems from corporate planning and sales have to be combined in an innovative way with a CLV-oriented view to develop an appropriate, optimal commission-system.