Capital Markets Union: the need for common laws and common supervision
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Capital Markets Union: the need for common laws and common supervision
Friedrich, Jan | Thiemann, Matthias
Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, Vol. 86 (2017), Iss. 2 : pp. 61–75
6 Citations (CrossRef)
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Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main
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Abstract
This paper examines the supervision of Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs) in Europe, since they function as an important pillar of the Capital Markets Union. Our research indicates that the current national-based supervision of CCPs leads to regulatory arbitrage and exposes the EU to huge financial risks, especially in the context of the Brexit. We claim that a unified capital market should have a centralized capital markets regulator to avoid a hazardous regulatory race to the bottom. We argue that the ECB is suitable for taking on this common supervisor role in the short run, while ESMA should be equipped with enhanced capabilities to accomplish the task in the long run.