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Iwasa, Y., Vollmer, U. Tolling the Bell for „Too-Big-to-Fail"? – A Comparison Between Four Special Bank Resolution Regimes. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 50(4), 509-543. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.50.4.509
Iwasa, Yoichi and Vollmer, Uwe "Tolling the Bell for „Too-Big-to-Fail"? – A Comparison Between Four Special Bank Resolution Regimes" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 50.4, 2017, 509-543. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.50.4.509
Iwasa, Yoichi/Vollmer, Uwe (2017): Tolling the Bell for „Too-Big-to-Fail"? – A Comparison Between Four Special Bank Resolution Regimes, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 50, iss. 4, 509-543, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.50.4.509

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Tolling the Bell for „Too-Big-to-Fail"? – A Comparison Between Four Special Bank Resolution Regimes

Iwasa, Yoichi | Vollmer, Uwe

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 50 (2017), Iss. 4 : pp. 509–543

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Author Details

Prof. (em.) Dr. Yoichi Iwasa, Kansai University, Faculty of Business and Commerce, 3-3-35, Yamate-cho, Suita-shi, Osaka, 564-8680, Japan

Prof. Dr. Uwe Vollmer, University of Leipzig, Economics Department, Institute for Theoretical Economics, Grimmaische Str. 12, D-04109 Leipzig, Germany

Abstract

In many countries, legislators have introduced special bank resolution regimes in order to handle the „too-big-to-fail"-(TBTF)-problem. Bank resolution schemes allow supervisors to restructure or liquidate an ailing bank, even without the consent of the bank owners. We identify key elements of bank resolution schemes and consider how they are implemented in Japan, the US, the Euro area, and in the UK. We compare the bank resolution regimes in these countries and evaluate whether they comply with the „Key Attributes" proposed by the Financial Stability Board. We also ask whether they are effective in addressing the TBTF-problem and promoting financial stability.