Tolling the Bell for „Too-Big-to-Fail"? – A Comparison Between Four Special Bank Resolution Regimes
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Tolling the Bell for „Too-Big-to-Fail"? – A Comparison Between Four Special Bank Resolution Regimes
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 50 (2017), Iss. 4 : pp. 509–543
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Prof. (em.) Dr. Yoichi Iwasa, Kansai University, Faculty of Business and Commerce, 3-3-35, Yamate-cho, Suita-shi, Osaka, 564-8680, Japan
Prof. Dr. Uwe Vollmer, University of Leipzig, Economics Department, Institute for Theoretical Economics, Grimmaische Str. 12, D-04109 Leipzig, Germany
Abstract
In many countries, legislators have introduced special bank resolution regimes in order to handle the „too-big-to-fail"-(TBTF)-problem. Bank resolution schemes allow supervisors to restructure or liquidate an ailing bank, even without the consent of the bank owners. We identify key elements of bank resolution schemes and consider how they are implemented in Japan, the US, the Euro area, and in the UK. We compare the bank resolution regimes in these countries and evaluate whether they comply with the „Key Attributes" proposed by the Financial Stability Board. We also ask whether they are effective in addressing the TBTF-problem and promoting financial stability.
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yoichi Iwasa / Uwe Vollmer: Tolling the Bell for “Too-Big-to-Fail”? – A Comparison Between Four Special Bank Resolution Regimes | 1 |