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Coman-Kund, F., Karatzia, A., Amtenbrink, F. The Transparency of the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 51(1), 55-72. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.51.1.55
Coman-Kund, Florin; Karatzia, Anastasia and Amtenbrink, Fabian "The Transparency of the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 51.1, 2018, 55-72. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.51.1.55
Coman-Kund, Florin/Karatzia, Anastasia/Amtenbrink, Fabian (2018): The Transparency of the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 51, iss. 1, 55-72, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.51.1.55

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The Transparency of the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism

Coman-Kund, Florin | Karatzia, Anastasia | Amtenbrink, Fabian

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 51 (2018), Iss. 1 : pp. 55–72

1 Citations (CrossRef)

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Article Details

Author Details

Dr. Florin Coman-Kund, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Law, Department of International and EU Law, P.O. Box 1738, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Dr. Anastasia Karatzia, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Law, Department of International and EU Law, P.O. Box 1738, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Prof. Dr. Fabian Amtenbrink, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Law, Department of International and EU Law, P.O. Box 1738, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Cited By

  1. The Political Role of the European Central Bank: Between European Politics and National Constraints

    Heidebrecht,, Sebastian

    Kaeding, Michael

    Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 51 (2018), Iss. 1 P.1

    https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.51.1.1 [Citations: 1]

Abstract

Not least due to the relatively short period of existence of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the transparency of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the SSM has not attracted significant attention from legal scholarship. This contribution seeks to close this gap to some extent by mapping out the ECB"s transparency regime within the SSM and illustrating, where relevant, the notable differences not only with the transparency regime applicable in the area of monetary policy, but also the general transparency regime of the EU.