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Macnair, M. (1999). The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-49198-8
Macnair, Michael R. T.. The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity. Duncker & Humblot, 1999. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-49198-8
Macnair, M (1999): The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-49198-8

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The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity

Macnair, Michael R. T.

Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. 20

(1999)

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Abstract

This volume is a systematic study of the rules of proof in English Courts of Equity between the later sixteenth and the early eighteenth century. In this period the proof practices of the Courts of Equity were controversial, as contemporary lawyers saw them as linked to the Civil Law, and some perceived a threat to the Common Law tradition. The reality of this linkage and threat has continued to be controversial among historians. In addition, this period saw the early stages of the development of the Common Law of Evidence, which in modern law is a striking divergence from Civil Law systems. The origins of the law of evidence have traditionally been linked to the need for judges to control the jury, but this view has been subject to several recent critiques. The Courts of Equity did not generally use jury trial. This study considers Equity proof rules in their relationships to contemporary Civil and Canon Law proof conceptions, medieval Common Law rules governing proof of facts, and early Common Law evidence rules. It concludes that Equity courts operated a variant of civilian proof concepts, and mediated an influence of these concepts on the origins of the Common Law of Evidence. These findings cast a new light on the debates on these origins, and on the relationship between the Common Law and Civil Law traditions in early modern England.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Contents 7
Chapter One: Introductory 13
I. Equity proof and the origins of the common law of evidence 15
II. Common law, civil law and equity procedure 25
III. A note on the scope and sources of the study 40
Chapter Two: Allegations and Confessions 46
I. Secundum allegata et probata: Variance from the bill 46
II. The confession of the adverse party 54
1. Compulsion to answer on oath, and its exceptions 55
a) Compulsion 55
b) Exceptions 60
2. Answer conclusive against the defendant 74
3. Other admissions 76
a) The bill 77
b) Oral admissions out of court 78
4. Use of the answer otherwise than against the defendant 79
a) Exceptions 80
b) Co-defendants 83
c) The weight of the oath 86
III. Conclusion 89
Chapter Three: Proof by Documents - Concepts, Contexts and Conditions of Use 91
I. General conceptions of proof by documents 93
1. Roman-canon principles 93
2. The common law 96
a) Estoppels, pleading and profert 96
b) Evidence to a jury 100
3. Proof by documents in equity, according to Ballow 101
II. Conditions for the use of documents 103
1. Public documents 103
2. Private documents, as admissions? 107
a) Third party documents 108
b) Documents used for their maker 111
c) Conclusion 113
3. Proof of documents 114
a) Documentary originals 114
b) Proof of execution 126
4. Privity and mutuality 128
III. Conclusion 129
Chapter Four: The Weight of Documentary Proof 131
I. Writing preferred 131
1. Estoppel and relief against it 131
2. The parol evidence rule 136
II. Writing required 145
1. Before 1677 145
2. The Statute of Frauds 149
a) Origins 150
b) The application of the Statute in equity 157
III. Conclusion: Preference for writings 164
Chapter Five: Proof by Witnesses - Principles and Procedure 165
I. The principles of proof by witnesses in the learned laws 166
II. The examination of witnesses in equity 169
1. Regularity of examination 169
2. Control of examination by the court and safeguards against subornation 173
a) Examination by officers of the court 173
b) Examination on interrogatories 176
c) Secrecy 177
d) Re-examination 178
3. Cross-examination 179
4. Reprobatio? 180
III. Conclusion 183
Chapter Six: Exceptions to Witnesses 185
I. Wigmore’s arguments 186
II. The classification of exceptions 188
1. Classification by effect 188
2. Classification by grounds 190
III. Intellectual incapacity: Children and lunatics 191
IV. Bad character 192
1. Infamy 192
2. Infidels 197
3. Other bad character 199
4. Status rules 201
V. Bias 202
1. Parties and persons interested 203
a) The dating and origins of the rule 204
b) Theory, limits and exceptions 211
c) Party oaths in equity 219
2. Affinity and dependence 222
a) Affinity and dependence: Spouses 223
b) Dependence: Servants and counsel 224
c) Why were the affinity and dependence exceptions in general not ‘received’? 227
VI. Conclusion 228
Chapter Seven: Compulsion to Testify and its Limits 231
I. Compulsion to testify 231
II. Exemptions from compulsion 233
III. Privilege 235
1. Self-incrimination 236
2. Legal professional privilege 236
IV. Conclusion 242
Chapter Eight: The Weight of Testimony 244
I. The weight of the oath 244
II. Equity examination and the purpose of cross-examination 247
III. The requirement of two witnesses 249
IV. Conflict of testimony 254
V. Hearsay and opinion 258
VI. Conclusion 261
Chapter Nine: The Burden and Standard of Proof and Presumptions 263
I. The burden and standard of proof 264
1. Burden 264
2. Objective and special standards of proof 265
II. Presumptions 267
1. The importance of presumptions 267
2. The classification of presumptions 270
3. How presumptions worked 271
4. Presumptions of fraud 273
Chapter Ten: Conclusions 276
I. Equity proof, trial by jury, and the origins of the law of evidence 276
1. Resort from law to equity 278
2. Law imitates equity 279
3. Resort from equity to law: the feigned issue 281
II. Equity, common law, and civil law 289
Bibliography 296
Table of Statutes 309
Table of Cases 310