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Ratio decidendi

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Bryson, W., Dauchy, S. (Eds.) (2006). Ratio decidendi. Guiding Principles of Judicial Decisions. Vol. 1: Case Law. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-52216-3
Bryson, W. Hamilton and Dauchy, Serge. Ratio decidendi: Guiding Principles of Judicial Decisions. Vol. 1: Case Law. Duncker & Humblot, 2006. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-52216-3
Bryson, W, Dauchy, S (eds.) (2006): Ratio decidendi: Guiding Principles of Judicial Decisions. Vol. 1: Case Law, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-52216-3

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Ratio decidendi

Guiding Principles of Judicial Decisions. Vol. 1: Case Law

Editors: Bryson, W. Hamilton | Dauchy, Serge

Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. 25/1

(2006)

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Abstract

Although the problem of ratio decidendi concerns the essence of law and justice, very little comparative work between the Continental and Anglo-American legal systems has been done on the topic. Legal literature often repeats that it is one of the sharpest points of contrast between the two legal cultures. Within the English speaking legal system, multiple opinions, both concurring and dissenting, prevail where dissent among Continental judges only occurs behind closed doors: the published decision indeed is always presented as the single and incontestable opinion of the whole court. Historical reasons are generally put forward to explain that contrast. Where in the Anglo-American Common Law system judges are asked - and always have been asked - to present the materials and reasons upon which they based their judicial opinions, in Ancien Régime continental Europe it was not considered necessary to formulate the reasons of a decision and in most courts of the European Continent it was even formally forbidden to the judges, until the end of the eighteenth century, to write down or even communicate orally "the secrets of their discussions and deliberations".

To comparatists, this reveals two different cultures among judges and lawyers. In Continental Europe there is much emphasis on the idea of judging as a science which can be learned and reproduced with an impersonal rigour. The Anglo-American judge is not considered to be such a trained scientist, he is merely a practised craftsman. Can the history of ratio decidendi - but also the history of law and justice from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century - therefore be reduced to a total contradiction between two legal cultures?
Although the problem of ratio decidendi concerns the essence of law and justice, very little comparative work between the Continental and Anglo-American legal systems has been done on the topic. Legal literature often repeats that it is one of the sharpest points of contrast between the two legal cultures. Within the English speaking legal system, multiple opinions, both concurring and dissenting, prevail where dissent among Continental judges only occurs behind closed doors: the published decision indeed is always presented as the single and incontestable opinion of the whole court. Historical reasons are generally put forward to explain that contrast. Where in the Anglo-American Common Law system judges are asked - and always have been asked - to present the materials and reasons upon which they based their judicial opinions, in Ancien Régime continental Europe it was not considered necessary to formulate the reasons of a decision and in most courts of the European Continent it was even formally forbidden to the judges, until the end of the eighteenth century, to write down or even communicate orally "the secrets of their discussions and deliberations".

To comparatists, this reveals two different cultures among judges and lawyers. In Continental Europe there is much emphasis on the idea of judging as a science which can be learned and reproduced with an impersonal rigour. The Anglo-American judge is not considered to be such a trained scientist, he is merely a practised craftsman. Can the history of ratio decidendi - but also the history of law and justice from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century - therefore be reduced to a total contradiction between two legal cultures?

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Contents 7
Laurens Winkel: Ratio Decidendi - Legal Reasoning in Roman Law 9
I. Introduction 9
II. Hierarchy of Legal Sources 11
III. Short History of Earlier Research 13
IV. Rationes Decidendi in Pre-Classical Roman Law 16
V. Ratio Decidendi in Classical Roman Law 18
VI. Some Remarks on Medieval Roman Law and Ratio Decidendi 22
VII. Conclusions 23
Jean Hilaire: Ratio decidendi au Parlement de Paris d’après les registres d’Olim (1254-1318) 25
I. L’influence du cadre institutionnel sur le processus de décision 27
1. La curia regis sous le règne de saint Louis 27
2. La transition vers la cour de Parlement 32
II. La nature des motifs de la décision 38
1. La grâce et l’équité 38
2. Le jugement en droit 44
Summary 53
Paul Brand: Reasoned Judgments in the English Medieval Common Law 1270 to 1307 55
I. 55
II. 58
III. 61
IV. 70
V. 70
Richard H. Helmholz: The Ratio Decidendi in England: Evidence from the Civilian Tradition 73
I. Introduction 73
II. Medieval Practice 77
III. Later Medieval Developments 79
IV. English Developments 80
V. Conclusion 85
Véronique Demars-Sion et Serge Dauchy: La non motivation des décisions judiciaires dans l’ancien droit français: un usage controversé 87
I. La lente affirmation de l’usage 89
1. Le silence des textes 89
2. Les hésitations de la doctrine 94
II. Les nécessaires dérogations à l’usage 98
1. Les exceptions à l’usage 99
2. Le contournement de l’usage: l’oeuvre des arrêtistes 104
Summary 115
John Finlay: Ratio Decidendi in Scotland 1650 to 1800 117
The Theoretical Importance of Rationes 119
The Preservation and Presentation of Rationes 121
The Importance of Rationes in Legal Practice 125
Precedent and Natural Law 134
James Oldham: Lord Mansfield, Stare Decisis, and the Ratio Decidendi 1756 to 1788 137
Stare Decisis 138
Legislation 144
Secondary Authorities 149
Conclusion 150
J. Thomas Wren: The Common Law of England in Virginia 1776 to 1830 151
Charles F. Hobson: Precedent, Statute, and Law in John Marshall’s Jurisprudence 1801 to 1835 169
I. Precedent 173
II. Statutory Construction 181
Jean-Louis Halpérin: The Court of Cassation in Nineteenth-Century France and the Binding Effect of Rationes Decidendi 191
Georges Martyn: The Judge and the Formal Sources of Law in the Low Countries (19th-20th Centuries): From ‘Slave’ to ‘Master’? 201
I. The Legal Culture of the Low Countries in the Nineteenth Century: a French Heritage 201
II. Scientific Research on Ratio Decidendi in the Low Countries: State of the Art 205
III. The Judge’s (Formal) Style 209
IV. The Use of the Formal Sources of Law 210
1. The Netherlands 211
2. Belgium 211
a) The Formal Sources of the Law in the Nineteenth Century 211
b) The Formal Sources of the Law Today 213
V. Evaluation by Way of Conclusion 221
Matthew C. Mirow: Case Law in Mexico 1861 to 1919: The Work of Ignacio Luis Vallarta 223
I. Jurisprudencia Today 223
II. Sources of Nineteenth-century Jurisprudencia 226
III. Jurisprudencia Criticized 231
IV. Vallarta and Jurisprudencia 232
Bernard Durand: Motivations des décisions de justice et contrôle des motifs: la pratique judiciaire coloniale sous la troisième République 247
I. La nature des motivations en matière coloniale 250
1. Le souci de justifier par la seule référence à la loi: des juges parfois laconiques 251
2. Le désir de convaincre: des motivations surabondantes 253
a) Les revendications du domaine et le droit de propriété : interpréter les traités 253
b) Entre créanciers et débiteurs: protéger les indigènes 256
II. Le contrôle des motivations en matière coloniale 257
1. L’originalité de la cassation en matière coloniale 257
a) Unité de contrôle par la Cour de cassation 257
b) Compétence variable de la Cour de cassation 258
2. Les motifs retenus par la Cour de cassation 259
a) Sanctionner les erreurs grossières 261
b) Invitation à affiner les motifs 263
c) Adhésion aux motifs satisfaisants 265
Conclusion 268
Summary 269
Knut Wolfgang Nörr: Zur Bindungswirkung von Entscheidungsgründen: das Beispiel des deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts 271
I. Einführung 271
II. Drei Kompetenzen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 272
III. Drei Gattungen seiner Entscheidung 272
IV. Drei Entscheidungswirkungen 274
V. Zur Bindungswirkung gegenüber dem Gesetzgeber 275
VI. Die Erstreckung der Bindungswirkung auf die tragenden Entscheidungsgründe I: zur Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 276
VII. Dito II: zur Kritik des Schrifttums 278
VIII. Schluss 279
Aus dem Schrifttum 280
Further Reading 280
W. Hamilton Bryson: Summary Conclusion 283
Legislative Sources of the Law 285
Judicial Sources of the Law 286
Legal Scholarship 288
Legal Argument 289
Natural Law 289
Contributors 293