Post Positivism
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Engle, E. (2014). Post Positivism. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-53987-1
Engle, Eric. Post Positivism. Duncker & Humblot, 2014. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-53987-1
Engle, E (2014): Post Positivism, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-53987-1
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Post Positivism
Schriften zur Rechtstheorie, Vol. 270
(2014)
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About The Author
Eric Engle (JD, St Louis, DEA, Paris, LLM DrJur Bremen) ist Lehrbeauftragter an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, wo er Verfassungsrecht, Gesellschaftsrecht und Vertragsrecht der Vereinigten Staaten Amerikas lehrt. Zuvor unterrichtete er Rechtslehre und Europarecht am Pericles LL.M Institut, Moskau, sowie an der Universität Tartu, Estland. Vorlesungen in U.S.-Gesellschaftsrecht und U.S.-Deliktsrecht an der Universität Bremen.Eric Engle (JD, St. Louis, DEA, Paris, LL.M. Dr.Jur. Bremen) currently teaches law at Humboldt Universität Berlin. He has taught law in France, Germany, Estonia, and Russia. He speaks English, French, and German fluently, and also speaks Spanish, Russian, and Estonian. He has published several dozen law review articles.Abstract
Post-positivism presents a materialist, holist, monist, cognitivist theory of law and justice. It argues that positivism and natural law are complementary, not conflicting, and that normative inference (is-to-ought) can be a valid form of logical reasoning. These are two key breaks from 20th Century legal theory, which wrongly assumed that normative inferencing was logically flawed and consequently that positivism and natural law were logically contradictory. David Hume never rejected normative inferencing. Hume's counsel was that whoever wishes to make a normative inference must express their implicit premises. Normative propositions can be recast as logical conditionals and thus be used as premises of syllogisms. Laws are best understood as logical conditionals (if-then statements). Logic consists of two branches, theoretical rationality and practical reasoning. The inadequacy of binary logic to accurately describe law is seen in several logical paradoxes about law, which can be avoided by multivariate logic.
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preface | 5 | ||
| Table of Contents | 13 | ||
| Chapter 1: Method: Ontology, Epistemology, Axiology | 25 | ||
| A. Introduction | 25 | ||
| B. Ontology: Materialism v. Philosophical Idealism | 31 | ||
| C. Epistemology: Realism v. Atomism | 32 | ||
| I. Atomism | 33 | ||
| II. Critique of Atomism and, by Extension, (International Relations) Realism | 34 | ||
| III. Holism | 37 | ||
| IV. Critiques of Holism | 37 | ||
| V. Is it Possible to Synthesize Holist and Atomist Methods? | 38 | ||
| D. Axiology: Relativism (Post-modernism and Neo-liberals) v. Cognitivism (Classical Liberals) | 39 | ||
| E. A New Natural Law Theory of International Relations | 39 | ||
| F. Conclusion | 43 | ||
| Chapter 2: Legal Theory in Antiquity: Aristotle | 46 | ||
| A. Introduction | 46 | ||
| B. Aristotle’s Contributions to Legal Science | 46 | ||
| I. Logic and Dialectical Reasoning | 46 | ||
| II. Tort Law: Causality is Rooted in Aristotle’s Thought | 49 | ||
| C. Aristotle and Justice | 49 | ||
| I. Political Justice – A Relation | 50 | ||
| 1. Elements and Origins of the Polis | 51 | ||
| a) The Family | 51 | ||
| b) The Individual: Dependency | 51 | ||
| 2. Inequality | 52 | ||
| a) The Condition of Slaves | 52 | ||
| b) The Condition of Women | 52 | ||
| 3. Rationality | 53 | ||
| 4. State of Nature? | 53 | ||
| 5. The Ends of the Polis | 54 | ||
| a) The Good | 54 | ||
| b) Autarchy | 54 | ||
| II. Typology of Justice According to Aristotle | 54 | ||
| 1. The Just Man, Justice, and Just Acts | 55 | ||
| a) The Just Man | 55 | ||
| b) Universal Justice (the Lawful) | 55 | ||
| c) Just Acts: Justice in the Particular (Fairness) | 55 | ||
| 2. Distributive Justice ("Geometric" Justice) | 55 | ||
| 3. Corrective Justice (arithmetic justice) | 56 | ||
| III. Critique of the Aristotelian Theory of Justice | 56 | ||
| 1. What are the Sources of Inequality? | 56 | ||
| 2. What are the Consequences of Inequality? | 57 | ||
| a) Limitation of the Development of Individuals | 57 | ||
| b) Limitation of the Development of the Polis | 57 | ||
| c) Economic Inequality | 58 | ||
| IV. Global Elements of Justice: Volition and Equity | 58 | ||
| 1. The Relation between Volition and Culpability: Aristotle’s Influence on the Concept of Culpability in the Common Law | 59 | ||
| 2. Equity | 59 | ||
| D. Criticisms of Aristotle | 60 | ||
| E. Aristotle and Foucault | 63 | ||
| F. Conclusion | 64 | ||
| Chapter 3: Pre Modern Theory: Medieval Scholasticism and the Universals (1400–1600) | 65 | ||
| A. Introduction | 65 | ||
| B. Problématique | 65 | ||
| C. History: From Realism to Nominalism by Way of the Universals | 66 | ||
| I. The Scholastics | 66 | ||
| 1. External Contradictions | 66 | ||
| 2. Internal Contradictions | 67 | ||
| II. The Universals | 68 | ||
| 1. Verum | 68 | ||
| a) Truth Scepticism: Nietzsche – The Will to Truth | 69 | ||
| b) Moral Relativism: Freud and Psychological Interpretation | 71 | ||
| c) The American Realists | 71 | ||
| aa) Fact Sceptics | 71 | ||
| bb) Rules Sceptics | 72 | ||
| 2. Bonum | 73 | ||
| 3. Unum | 75 | ||
| D. Logic: Indeterminacy and Decidability | 75 | ||
| I. Gödel | 76 | ||
| II. Quine | 77 | ||
| 1. Linguistic Indeterminacy | 77 | ||
| 2. Paradox | 78 | ||
| a) Definition of Paradox | 78 | ||
| b) Self Reference | 79 | ||
| c) Paradoxes of the State | 81 | ||
| d) The Paradox of Omnipotence and Self-limitation | 81 | ||
| e) Paradox of Universal Truth | 81 | ||
| III. Raz and the Paradox of Authority | 82 | ||
| IV. Kelsen and the Paradox of the Prescription of Prescription | 83 | ||
| V. Juridical Functions as Determining Legal Knowledge | 83 | ||
| 1. The Maintenance of Order | 84 | ||
| 2. Prediction | 84 | ||
| E. Conclusion: The Temporary Victory of Relativism | 85 | ||
| I. Volontarism | 85 | ||
| II. Relativism | 85 | ||
| Chapter 4: Into Modernity: Natural Law and Normative Inference | 86 | ||
| A. Introduction: The Contemporary View | 86 | ||
| B. The False Dichotomy of Either Positivism or Natural Law but not Both | 91 | ||
| I. Aristotle | 91 | ||
| II. Hobbes | 95 | ||
| III. The Implications of Re-cognizing the False Dichotomy of "Naturalism v. Positivism" | 98 | ||
| C. Normative Inferencing | 99 | ||
| I. Hume’s Trap | 99 | ||
| II. Hume and Kelsen | 102 | ||
| III. Conclusion | 107 | ||
| Chapter 5: Modernity: Social Contract and Natural Law | 109 | ||
| A. Natural Rights | 112 | ||
| I. Foundation of Natural Law in Intellectual Realism | 112 | ||
| II. Human Rights | 118 | ||
| 1. The Central Function of Human Rights is Political Legitimation | 118 | ||
| 2. The Idea of Human Rights is Necessarily Ambiguous | 118 | ||
| a) Universal Terminology is a Source of Ambiguity in Human Rights | 118 | ||
| b) The Multiplicity of Theoretical Sources of Law is the Source of the Ambiguity Inherent in Human Rights | 119 | ||
| c) The Multiplicity of Legal Sources is also at the Root of the Ambiguity of Human Rights | 119 | ||
| d) The Quest for Political Legitimacy based on Human Rights is Unworkable because of the Ambiguity Inherent in the Idea of Human Rights | 120 | ||
| B. Social Contract Theory | 120 | ||
| I. The State of Nature | 121 | ||
| II. The Social Contract | 122 | ||
| C. Contemporary Social Contract Theorists | 124 | ||
| I. Ronald Dworkin | 124 | ||
| 1. Dworkin on Natural Law and Positivism | 125 | ||
| a) Principles and Policies | 126 | ||
| b) Intensive Reiteration to Exhaustion of a Fundamental Principle | 127 | ||
| c) The Inductive Deductive Method | 128 | ||
| 2. Dworkin versus Posner on Law and Economics | 129 | ||
| 3. Conclusion: A Potentially Powerful Synthesis as yet Undeveloped and Rife with Contradictions Due to Absent Resolution of Conflicting Presuppositions | 129 | ||
| II. John Rawls | 130 | ||
| 1. The "Original Position" | 130 | ||
| 2. Rawls and the School of "Public Choice" | 134 | ||
| 3. Rawls Contrasted with Aristotle | 134 | ||
| a) Origin of the State | 134 | ||
| b) Human Inequality | 135 | ||
| c) The Theory of Justice | 135 | ||
| d) A Catholic Inspired Synthesis of Rights Theory and Natural Justice | 136 | ||
| D. Libertarians | 137 | ||
| I. Introduction: Commonalities between Different Anarchisms | 137 | ||
| II. Points of Divergence among Anarchisms | 138 | ||
| III. Anarcho-Capitalists (Libertarians) | 139 | ||
| 1. Nozick | 140 | ||
| a) The Political Theory of Anarcho-capitalism | 140 | ||
| b) Nozick’s Ultra Minimal State | 142 | ||
| 2. David Friedman – the Economic Theory of Anarcho Capitalism (Libertarianism) | 144 | ||
| 3. Conclusions | 146 | ||
| a) Anarcho-capitalism is Unrealistic | 146 | ||
| b) No Dissolution of Private Property | 147 | ||
| c) Privatization of State Functions | 147 | ||
| d) Negativism | 147 | ||
| E. Criticisms of the Social Contract | 149 | ||
| I. Criticisms of the Social Contract from within its own Terms | 149 | ||
| 1. The State of Nature is an Impossibility | 149 | ||
| 2. The Social Contract is but a Fiction | 149 | ||
| II. Criticisms of the Social Contract from Outside its own Terms | 150 | ||
| 1. The Necessity of Government | 150 | ||
| 2. The Impossibility of an End of History | 151 | ||
| F. Conclusion: Explaining the Success of the Theory of Social Contract Theory | 151 | ||
| Chapter 6: Late Modernity: Legal Realism | 155 | ||
| A. Introduction | 155 | ||
| B. The Judicial "Revolution" | 155 | ||
| I. The Great Depression: The Judicial Revolution | 157 | ||
| II. Legal Realism "We are all Legal Realists now. Or are we?" | 159 | ||
| III. The Realist Rejection of "Formalism’ | 162 | ||
| C. Post War: Co-opting Radicalism to Serve Global Hegemony | 168 | ||
| I. Law and Economics | 170 | ||
| II. Legal Process Interest Balancing | 172 | ||
| D. Conclusion | 179 | ||
| Chapter 7: Beyond Legal Realism (1950-1980) | 181 | ||
| A. Introduction: The Failure of the Left | 181 | ||
| B. Epistemological Basis of Realist Legal Method | 185 | ||
| I. Dualism (Plato) | 189 | ||
| II. Relativism | 192 | ||
| 1. Nietzsche | 192 | ||
| 2. Gödel, Quine, Saussure | 199 | ||
| 3. Constructivism: Popper | 201 | ||
| 4. Intersubjectivism | 203 | ||
| C. Axiological Basis of Realist Legal Method – Hume and Kelsen | 204 | ||
| D. Legal Method | 212 | ||
| I. Legal Realism v. Formalism | 214 | ||
| II. Realism Set the Stage for Law and Economics | 219 | ||
| III. Critique of Realist Legal Method | 220 | ||
| E. Conclusion: Beyond Legal Realism | 223 | ||
| Chapter 8: Law and Economics (1980-?) | 225 | ||
| A. Introduction | 225 | ||
| B. The Origin of Contemporary LE in Classical Economists | 227 | ||
| I. Adam Smith | 227 | ||
| II. David Ricardo | 228 | ||
| C. Law and Economics: Richard Posner | 228 | ||
| D. The Chicago School (Supply Side Theory): Milton Friedman | 231 | ||
| I. Supply Determines Demand | 232 | ||
| II. The General Theory as a Special Theory | 232 | ||
| III. Primacy of the Market | 232 | ||
| 1. The Role of Prices | 232 | ||
| 2. Monetary Policy | 233 | ||
| a) Money as a Signalling System | 234 | ||
| b) Money as an Instrument of Economic Management | 234 | ||
| c) Monetary Policy must Prevent Inflation (and Deflation) | 235 | ||
| d) Opposition to State Intervention | 236 | ||
| E. The Vienna School | 236 | ||
| I. Mises and Rothbard | 238 | ||
| II. Hayek | 241 | ||
| 1. Hayek on Inflation | 241 | ||
| 2. Hayek on Epistemology | 241 | ||
| 3. Hayek’s Prescriptions | 246 | ||
| F. The School of Public Choice: James Buchanan | 247 | ||
| I. The Analysis of "Political Markets" | 248 | ||
| 1. Political Failure | 251 | ||
| 2. Bureaucracy | 252 | ||
| 3. Public Bads | 252 | ||
| 4. The Political Market | 253 | ||
| II. Consequences of the Analysis | 253 | ||
| 1. Balanced Budget | 253 | ||
| 2. Privatization of Legal Functions | 254 | ||
| III. Critiques of the School of Public Choice | 255 | ||
| G. Conclusions | 256 | ||
| I. Valid Applications of Economic Methods in Law – "Weak" Law and Economics | 256 | ||
| 1. Balancing Tests | 256 | ||
| 2. Cost-benefit Analysis | 257 | ||
| II. Invalid Claims: "Strong" Law and Economics | 258 | ||
| 1. Homo Economicus – An Unrealistic Model of Human Behaviour in the Real World | 259 | ||
| 2. Presumptions about Markets – And Failure to Account for Market Failure | 260 | ||
| 3. Information Theory | 261 | ||
| III. Why Law and Economics? | 262 | ||
| IV. A Reductio to Refute Strong Law and Economics | 262 | ||
| Chapter 9: Kelsen | 264 | ||
| A. Normative Inference | 265 | ||
| I. Rejection of Normative Inference | 265 | ||
| II. The Normative Syllogism | 274 | ||
| III. Demonstration of Legal Inferencing | 277 | ||
| B. Critique | 278 | ||
| I. Terminology | 278 | ||
| 1. Polysemy | 278 | ||
| 2. Ambiguity | 279 | ||
| 3. Confusion | 280 | ||
| 4. Neutrality? | 281 | ||
| II. Useless Complexity | 282 | ||
| 1. Terminological Multiplication | 282 | ||
| 2. Multiplication of Syllogisms | 282 | ||
| 3. Imputation: A Useless Distinction | 283 | ||
| 4. A Special Juridical Logic? | 283 | ||
| 5. The Posthumous Character of the ATN | 283 | ||
| III. Methodological Aporia | 284 | ||
| IV. Problem of Postulates | 284 | ||
| 1. Separation of Law and Morality | 284 | ||
| 2. The Basic Norm | 284 | ||
| V. Tautology of the Basic Norm | 285 | ||
| VI. Rationalisation | 285 | ||
| VII. From Subjective to Objective Signification | 286 | ||
| C. Conclusion | 286 | ||
| Chapter 10: After Modernity? – Critical Legal Studies | 287 | ||
| A. The Origins of Critical Legal Studies: Legal Realism | 287 | ||
| B. Marxist Legal Theory | 290 | ||
| I. Antinomianism | 290 | ||
| II. Historical (Dialectical) Materialism | 290 | ||
| III. Socialist Legalism | 291 | ||
| IV. Criminal Theory | 291 | ||
| C. Critical Legal Studies | 291 | ||
| D. Post Modernism | 293 | ||
| Chapter 11: Contemporary Legal Theory: Scientificity | 296 | ||
| A. Introduction | 296 | ||
| B. Scientificity of Law – How the Study of Law is Scientific? | 298 | ||
| I. Past Efforts at Universalisation in Human Sciences | 298 | ||
| II. Borrowing Methods, Observations, and Analogies from Natural Sciences | 299 | ||
| III. Human Sciences are not Nomothetical | 302 | ||
| IV. Human Sciences are Dialectical | 303 | ||
| 1. Union of Opposites | 305 | ||
| 2. Struggle of Opposites | 305 | ||
| 3. Each Opposite Holds the Seeds of its Opposite | 306 | ||
| 4. Transformation of Opposites into each other Through Struggle | 306 | ||
| 5. Dynamic Change | 308 | ||
| 6. A Long Series of Quantitative Changes Leads to a Sudden Qualitative Change | 308 | ||
| 7. The Importance of Dialectics for Science | 308 | ||
| V. Object of Study | 310 | ||
| VI. Analytical Method: False Dichotomies | 311 | ||
| VII. Synthetic Method: Discover Latent Hidden Similarities in Apparently Different Institutions by Abstraction and Comparison | 312 | ||
| VIII. Teleology of Legal Science | 313 | ||
| 1. Structuralist Approach | 313 | ||
| 2. Goal of Science – the Good Life (Aristotle, Maslow) | 313 | ||
| IX. Hume, Weber and Kelsen | 314 | ||
| C. Language, Logic, and Law | 317 | ||
| I. Logic | 317 | ||
| 1. The Paradox of Crows The Problem of Causality | 318 | ||
| 2. The Correspondence Theory of Truth | 322 | ||
| 3. Truth Functionality (Truth, Falsehood and Indeterminacy) | 323 | ||
| 4. Logical Implication: Ternary Logic | 325 | ||
| 5. Normative Inferencing | 330 | ||
| II. Language | 334 | ||
| 1. Language – The Arbitrary Character of Signs | 334 | ||
| 2. Linguistic Determinacy and Law | 335 | ||
| 3. Interpretation and Argumentation | 337 | ||
| D. A Critical Response to Duncan Kennedy’s Theory of Argumentation | 338 | ||
| I. The Death of Reason Narrative | 338 | ||
| II. Critique of the Death of Reason Critique | 347 | ||
| III. Frames of Reference | 349 | ||
| 1. Base/Superstructure | 349 | ||
| 2. Structuralism | 350 | ||
| 3. Post-structuralism | 352 | ||
| 4. Post Modernism (PoMo) | 352 | ||
| IV. Kennedy’s Theory of U.S. Law | 353 | ||
| 1. Before CLT - The "Classical Period" (Natural Law) (Individualism – Begriffsjurisprudenz) | 354 | ||
| 2. Classical Legal Thought (CLT) (Positivism - Interessenjurisprudenz) | 355 | ||
| 3. The Social (Legal Realism/CLS) (Collectivism) | 363 | ||
| 4. Contemporary Legal Thought (Neo-formalism) | 366 | ||
| 5. Mediation | 374 | ||
| 6. Law as Logical Equations | 375 | ||
| V. "Outs" and Contestable Points | 376 | ||
| E. Pedagogy | 378 | ||
| I. Constructivism | 378 | ||
| II. Research Networks | 380 | ||
| III. Peer Review | 381 | ||
| F. Conclusion | 381 | ||
| Chapter 12: Legal Indeterminacy and Autonomy of Law | 382 | ||
| A. Introduction | 382 | ||
| B. Truth | 385 | ||
| I. Kurt Gödel, Indeterminacy and Autonomy | 385 | ||
| II. Theories of Truth | 387 | ||
| 1. The Correspondence Theory of Truth | 387 | ||
| 2. The Consensus Theory of Truth | 388 | ||
| 3. The Coherence Theory of Truth | 388 | ||
| 4. The Pragmatic Theory of Truth | 390 | ||
| 5. Truth Statements are Reflections of the Material World | 391 | ||
| C. Logic | 393 | ||
| I. Practical versus Theoretical Logic | 393 | ||
| 1. Theoretical Rationality | 393 | ||
| 2. Practical Reasoning | 393 | ||
| II. (Qua-)Ternary Logic | 394 | ||
| 1. Interpretations (Values) of Statements | 394 | ||
| 2. Truth Functors | 396 | ||
| 3. Multivariate Logic Invalidates Reductio Proofs | 399 | ||
| III. Puzzles in Law | 400 | ||
| 1. Antinomies in Law | 400 | ||
| a) Conflicts of Law | 401 | ||
| b) Lacunae | 401 | ||
| 2. Paradox | 402 | ||
| a) Paradoxes of Material Implication Reveal the Inadequacy of Binary Logic | 403 | ||
| b) Paradox in Laws | 404 | ||
| c) Circling the Square: Statements about Pegasus | 404 | ||
| D. Conclusion: Law and Morality | 406 | ||
| Chapter 13: Rights Discourse | 407 | ||
| A. Introduction | 407 | ||
| B. Rights and Laws | 408 | ||
| C. Rights Discourse | 409 | ||
| I. Dworkin | 409 | ||
| II. Rawls | 413 | ||
| III. Hohfeld | 414 | ||
| D. Types of Rights | 416 | ||
| I. Perfect (Vested) Rights | 417 | ||
| II. Imperfect Rights | 418 | ||
| 1. Rights at Will: Permissions, Privileges and Licenses | 418 | ||
| Example: Ferae Naturae | 418 | ||
| 2. Potential Rights: Mere Expectancies | 419 | ||
| Example: Ferae Naturae | 419 | ||
| 3. Hortatory Rights: Programmatic Goals | 419 | ||
| Example: The Right to Food, "Third Generation Rights’ | 420 | ||
| III. Other Distinctions among Rights | 421 | ||
| E. Inferring Rights | 422 | ||
| F. Conclusion | 425 | ||
| Chapter 14: The Right to Food | 427 | ||
| A. On Radical Legal Critique | 427 | ||
| B. Classical Law: More Geometrico | 429 | ||
| C. Taking Empire Seriously: Radicalized Rights as a Key to Third World Well Being | 433 | ||
| I. A Typology of Rights | 435 | ||
| II. Positive Policies, Natural Rights | 438 | ||
| III. The Right to Food (Basic Alimentary Rights) | 440 | ||
| D. Conclusion | 441 | ||
| Global Conclusions | 443 | ||
| Bibliography | 444 | ||
| Table of Cases | 468 | ||
| Index | 469 |