Reforming Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Between Harmonisation and Regulatory Competition
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Reforming Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Between Harmonisation and Regulatory Competition
Schriften zum Wirtschaftsrecht, Vol. 259
(2014)
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Julian Kammin studierte Rechtswissenschaften mit Schwerpunkt Europa- und Völkerrecht in Kiel und Lyon und absolvierte Praktika in Hamburg, Brüssel und London. Von 2010 bis 2012 war er wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Dr. Florian Becker, LL.M. (Cambridge) an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel und arbeitete an dem von der EU-Kommission finanzierten Forschungsprojekt »Reforming the European Civil Justice: The case of cross-border private antitrust law actions«. Von 2013 bis 2015 war er Referendar am Kammergericht Berlin mit Stationen unter anderem in der Rechtsabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes und bei der Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin. Im Mai 2014 wurde er von der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät Kiel zum Doktor der Rechte promoviert und erhielt für die Dissertation »Reforming Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Between Harmonisation and Regulatory Competition« den Fakultätspreis 2014 sowie den Förderpreis des Kieler Doctores Iuris e. V. 2015. Seit 2016 ist er Staatsanwalt bei der Staatsanwaltschaft Köln und dort in der Schwerpunktabteilung zur Vermeidung von Steuerstraftaten tätig.Abstract
Spätestens die Aufdeckung des sog. Bierkartells hat vielen Konsumenten verdeutlicht, dass Preisabsprachen Auswirkungen auf ihr tägliches Leben haben. Die zunehmende Anzahl wettbewerbsverzerrender Praktiken belegt, dass der freie Markt in Europa geschützt werden muss. Der immense volkswirtschaftliche Schaden und die Tatsache, dass die manipulierten, überhöhten Preise regelmäßig an die Verbraucher weitergegeben werden verlangen effektive Lösungen zu deren Bekämpfung. Dabei stellt im Hinblick auf die Geltendmachung von Schadensersatz das Nebeneinander von 28 nur zum Teil harmonisierten Zivilrechtsordnungen die Geschädigten vor fast unüberwindbare Hindernisse.Der Autor hat sich nicht nur der wissenschaftlichen und rechtsvergleichenden Aufarbeitung dieser Probleme an der Schnittstelle von Kartellrecht und internationalem Privatrecht gewidmet, sondern auch zahlreiche Rechtsanwälte von internationalen Sozietäten befragt. Darauf fußend hat er ein neues und in sich geschlossenes System zur Verbesserung des private enforcement von Kartellrecht entwickelt.The beer cartel underlines that antitrust law is of outstanding significance for all citizens. Anti-competitive practices such as price fixing, limiting production or sharing markets in Europe demonstrate that the free and open market is not guaranteed in its entirety. Resulting economic losses are enormous, especially for consumers as the anti-competitive prices are usually passed on to them. However, filing promising antitrust damages actions is virtually impossible due to the fact that 28 legal orders of the Member States may apply to such cross-border disputes. This legal uncertainty benefits the infringers.The author did not only analyse this problem being at the interface between antitrust and private international law but also interviewed a number of practitioners at international law firms with out-standing expertise in order to shed some light on the litigation process, how it functions, and whether and how it might be reformed. He developed a new system to improve private antitrust enforcement and ensure that victims are compensated.
Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Acknowledgements | 7 | ||
Inhaltsverzeichnis | 9 | ||
Part 1: The Situation | 17 | ||
A. Antitrust Policy and Substantive Antitrust Law in Europe | 17 | ||
I. Anti-Competitive Agreements | 18 | ||
II. Abusive Conduct by Monopolists and Dominant Firms | 19 | ||
B. Development of Antitrust Enforcement in General | 20 | ||
C. Antitrust Enforcement through Damages Claims in Particular | 21 | ||
I. Current Situation | 21 | ||
II. Significance for Compensation and Deterrence | 22 | ||
III. Application of Primary Law to Antitrust Damages Claims | 23 | ||
IV. Transnational Dimension of Damages Claims | 24 | ||
1. International Jurisdiction | 25 | ||
2. Applicable Law | 26 | ||
D. Objective of this Thesis | 26 | ||
Part 2: Aspects of Substance, Procedure and Jurisdiction | 28 | ||
A. Introduction | 28 | ||
B. Substantive Law in Cross-Border Antitrust Damages Actions | 29 | ||
I. National Provisions with Regard to Damages | 29 | ||
1. Burden of Proof | 30 | ||
a) Follow-On and Stand-Alone Litigation | 30 | ||
b) Significance of National Provisions | 31 | ||
2. Requirement of Fault | 32 | ||
a) England and France: Strict Liability | 32 | ||
b) Disadvantages for Claimants through Requirement of Fault | 33 | ||
3. Award of Damage | 33 | ||
a) Restitution and Punitive Damages | 33 | ||
b) Assessment of Damages in Germany | 35 | ||
c) Fines by a Public Authority | 35 | ||
d) Summary | 35 | ||
4. Passing-on Defence | 36 | ||
a) Consequences for Damages Litigation | 36 | ||
b) Status Quo in the European Union | 37 | ||
5. Statutes of Limitation | 38 | ||
6. Concluding Remarks | 38 | ||
II. Choice-of-Law Rules | 39 | ||
1. Private International Law Framework | 39 | ||
2. Contractual Claims in Antitrust Litigation | 40 | ||
a) Contract/Contractual | 40 | ||
b) Applicable Substantive Law | 41 | ||
3. Non-Contractual Claims in Antitrust Litigation | 42 | ||
a) Applicable Substantive Law | 42 | ||
b) Role of Art 6 (3) (b) Rome II | 43 | ||
c) Limit Forum Shopping | 44 | ||
III. Conclusion | 45 | ||
C. Procedural Law in Cross-Border Antitrust Damages Actions | 45 | ||
I. Practitioners' Approach | 45 | ||
II. Collective Redress Mechanisms | 47 | ||
1. Role of Consumers | 47 | ||
2. Principle of Equivalence and Effectiveness | 48 | ||
3. Different Mechanisms of Collective Actions | 49 | ||
a) Impracticality of Joint Actions and Test Cases | 50 | ||
b) Opt-In/Out Class Actions | 50 | ||
aa) Restrictive Framework in EU Member States | 51 | ||
bb) Benefits of Class Actions | 51 | ||
cc) Disadvantages of Class Actions | 53 | ||
c) Representative Actions by Associations | 55 | ||
aa) Definition and Benefits | 55 | ||
bb) Examples from France, the United Kingdom and Germany | 55 | ||
d) Assignment of Claims | 57 | ||
aa) Model of “Cartel Damage Claims” (CDC) | 57 | ||
bb) Relationship to other Collective Redress Tools | 58 | ||
e) Summary | 59 | ||
III. Costs | 59 | ||
1. Practitioners' Approach | 60 | ||
2. Cost Rules Among Member States | 61 | ||
3. Consequences for Antitrust Damages Claimants | 62 | ||
IV. Standard of Proof | 63 | ||
1. Cartels and Standard of Proof | 63 | ||
2. National Rules on Standard of Proof | 64 | ||
V. Access to Evidence | 65 | ||
1. Information Asymmetry | 65 | ||
2. Different Approaches | 65 | ||
3. Practical Outcome | 67 | ||
VI. Recognition and Enforcement of the Title | 67 | ||
VII. Conclusion | 69 | ||
D. Jurisdictional Rules in Cross-Border Antitrust Damages Actions | 69 | ||
I. Claimants' Uncertainty about the Forum | 70 | ||
II. Cultural Aspects Guiding Victims | 70 | ||
III. Position of Courts | 71 | ||
Part 3: Ideas for Legal Reform | 73 | ||
A. Approach of the United States | 74 | ||
I. Different Approaches | 74 | ||
II. Characteristics of Antitrust Litigation in the United States | 75 | ||
1. Deterrence or Compensation? | 75 | ||
a) Passing-on Defence and Automatic Trebling | 75 | ||
b) Merging the Approaches | 76 | ||
2. Access to Evidence | 76 | ||
a) Exchange of Evidence between Parties in the United States | 76 | ||
b) Requirement of Related Rules | 77 | ||
3. Collective Redress Mechanisms | 78 | ||
a) Opt-Out-Model of the United States | 78 | ||
b) A Model for the European Union? | 78 | ||
III. Ideas for Reform Inspired by the US System of Antitrust Enforcement | 79 | ||
B. “European” Reform | 80 | ||
I. Harmonisation/Centralisation | 80 | ||
1. Current Example | 81 | ||
2. Benefits of Uniform Rules | 81 | ||
3. Negative Aspects of Centralisation | 82 | ||
a) Traditional Inconsistency | 82 | ||
b) Legal Inconsistency | 83 | ||
c) Harmonisation Costs | 84 | ||
II. Decentralisation and Inter-Jurisdictional Regulatory Competition | 84 | ||
III. Fundamental Ideas for Legal Reform of the Brussels I Regulation | 85 | ||
1. Promotion of Forum Shopping to Improve Private Enforcement | 86 | ||
a) Forum Shopping | 86 | ||
b) Regulatory Competition | 87 | ||
2. Negative Attitudes towards Forum Shopping | 88 | ||
a) Unfairness to the Defendant | 88 | ||
b) Public Interest | 89 | ||
3. Limit to the Choice of Forums | 89 | ||
a) Choice-of-Law Rules | 90 | ||
b) Jurisdictional Rules | 90 | ||
c) Lis Pendens Rules | 91 | ||
4. Availability of Collective Redress and the Claimant's Forum | 92 | ||
5. Stimulating National Legislators | 92 | ||
IV. Summary | 93 | ||
Part 4: Analysis and Reform of the Jurisdictional Rules | 95 | ||
A. Introduction/Framework | 95 | ||
B. Scope of the Brussels I Regulation | 96 | ||
I. Unequal Access to Justice | 96 | ||
II. Antitrust Damages Claims and Non-EU Parties | 97 | ||
C. General Jurisdiction and Antitrust Damages Claims | 98 | ||
I. Actor Sequitur Forum Rei | 98 | ||
II. Ratio of Protecting the Defendant | 99 | ||
1. Situation of Antitrust Victims | 100 | ||
2. Determination of a Well-Placed Court | 101 | ||
III. Claimants' Venue | 101 | ||
1. Analogy to Existing Venues | 102 | ||
2. Home Actions versus Forum Shopping | 103 | ||
IV. Conclusion | 103 | ||
D. Jurisdiction in Contract-Based EU Antitrust Damages Claims | 104 | ||
I. Possible Scenarios | 104 | ||
II. Matters Relating to a Contract/Forum Contractus | 104 | ||
1. Contribution to Private Antitrust Enforcement | 105 | ||
2. Distinction between Contractual and Non-Contractual Matters | 106 | ||
a) Significance of the Distinction | 106 | ||
b) Interpretation | 107 | ||
c) Scope of Contractual Matters | 107 | ||
aa) Voidness of Contractual Agreements | 107 | ||
bb) Damages Claims of a Contracting Party | 109 | ||
3. Place of Performance of the Obligation in Question | 110 | ||
a) Interpretation under the Brussels Convention | 110 | ||
b) Interpretation de Lege Lata | 112 | ||
aa) Art 5 (1) (b) Brussels I | 112 | ||
bb) Benefits for Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law | 112 | ||
c) Consequences for Transnational Antitrust Actions | 113 | ||
aa) Sale of Goods | 113 | ||
bb) Provision of Services | 114 | ||
cc) Other Agreements | 115 | ||
d) Reform Ideas for the Place of Performance | 116 | ||
4. Declaration of Voidness of Anti-Competitive Agreements | 117 | ||
5. Damages Claim of a Contracting Party | 118 | ||
a) Development towards Tortious Damages Claims | 118 | ||
b) Antitrust Damages Claim of a Contracting Party | 120 | ||
aa) Art 5 (3) Brussels I | 120 | ||
bb) Factual Connection of the Claims | 121 | ||
cc) Suggestions for Legal Reform | 122 | ||
6. Ideas for Reform of Art 5 (1) Brussels I | 123 | ||
III. Disputes Arising out of the Operations of a Branch or Agency | 123 | ||
IV. A Number of Defendants | 125 | ||
1. Art 6 Brussels I and Forum Shopping | 125 | ||
a) Benefits to Claimants | 125 | ||
b) Potential for Abuse | 126 | ||
2. Close Connection | 127 | ||
3. Defendants Domiciled Outside the European Union | 128 | ||
4. Concluding Remarks | 129 | ||
V. Matters Relating to a Contract Concluded by a Consumer | 129 | ||
1. Ratio and Role of Consumer Protection in Antitrust-Based Litigation | 130 | ||
a) Application to Antitrust Damages Claims | 131 | ||
b) Betterment of Consumers | 131 | ||
c) Protection of Defendants versus Effective Legal Protection | 131 | ||
2. Addressees of Privileges | 132 | ||
a) Personal Scope: Consumers | 132 | ||
b) Third Parties on Behalf of Consumers | 134 | ||
aa) Consumer Associations | 135 | ||
bb) Consequence for Consumers | 135 | ||
3. Objective Scope of the Privileges | 135 | ||
4. Reform Proposals to Strengthen the Consumers' Position | 136 | ||
a) Consumer Collective Redress Mechanisms | 136 | ||
aa) Home Venue for Consumer Associations | 136 | ||
bb) Permanent Availability of Collective Redress Mechanisms | 137 | ||
b) Tortious Damages Claims | 137 | ||
VI. Agreements on Jurisdiction | 138 | ||
1. Practical Implication | 138 | ||
2. Benefits and Disadvantages of Choice of Court Clauses | 139 | ||
3. Ideas for Legal Reform | 140 | ||
E. Jurisdiction in Tort-Based EU Antitrust Damages Claims | 140 | ||
I. Tort-Based Damages Claims and Venue | 140 | ||
II. International Jurisdiction in Matters Relating to Tort/Forum Delicti | 141 | ||
1. Qualification, Scope, Ratio and Benefits for Antitrust Victims | 141 | ||
2. Place of the Harmful Event | 142 | ||
a) Interpretation: Place of Damages and Place of Acting | 142 | ||
b) Consequences for Antitrust Damages Claimants | 143 | ||
c) Exceptions | 144 | ||
3. Place of the Event Giving Rise to the Antitrust Damage/Place of Acting | 145 | ||
a) Infringement of Art 101 TFEU | 145 | ||
aa) Place of Conclusion | 145 | ||
bb) Place of Implementation or Operation | 146 | ||
cc) Place of the Seat | 147 | ||
dd) Summary | 147 | ||
b) Infringement of Art 102 TFEU | 147 | ||
4. Place where the Antitrust Damage Occurred/Place of Damages | 148 | ||
a) Forum in Antitrust-Based Litigation | 148 | ||
b) Unrestricted Freedom of Choice | 149 | ||
c) Indirect Consequences | 150 | ||
5. Ideas for Legal Reform | 150 | ||
a) Benefits of Forum Delicti Commissi | 150 | ||
b) Avoiding Unlimited Forums and Abusive Forum Shopping | 151 | ||
F. New Venues | 152 | ||
Part 5: Analysis and Ideas for Legal Reform of Lis Pendens and Related Actions | 154 | ||
A. Ratio and Scope of Arts 27 and 28 Brussels I | 154 | ||
B. Avoiding Parallel Proceedings | 155 | ||
I. Response of the Brussels I Regulation | 155 | ||
II. Applicability in Antitrust Law | 156 | ||
1. Art 27 Brussels I and Antitrust Damages Claims | 156 | ||
2. Art 28 Brussels I and Antitrust Damages Claims | 157 | ||
C. Defendants' Tactics: Reverse Forum Shopping | 157 | ||
I. Staying proceedings – Forum Non Conveniens | 158 | ||
1. Applicability of Forum Non Conveniens | 158 | ||
2. Position of Courts as Justification for Forum Non Conveniens? | 159 | ||
II. Negative Declaratory Proceedings | 161 | ||
1. Theoretical Basics | 161 | ||
2. Practical Application | 162 | ||
3. Suggestions for Legal Reform | 163 | ||
Part 6: Summary, Conclusion, Policy | 165 | ||
A. Suggestions for Legal Reform | 165 | ||
I. Fundamental Considerations | 165 | ||
II. Legal Reform of Art 2 Brussels I | 167 | ||
III. Legal Reform of Contract-Based Jurisdiction | 167 | ||
1. Reform Suggestions for Art 5 (1) Brussels I | 167 | ||
2. Reform Suggestions for Art 6 (1) Brussels I | 168 | ||
3. Reform Suggestions for Arts 15 et seq. Brussels I | 169 | ||
4. Reform Suggestions for Art 23 Brussels I | 169 | ||
IV. Legal Reform of Tort-Based Jurisdiction | 170 | ||
V. Legal Reform of Lis Pendens | 170 | ||
B. Legal Policy/Leniency Programme | 171 | ||
I. Significance of the Leniency Programme | 171 | ||
II. Dependence of Private Enforcement on Leniency | 172 | ||
III. Collision Points of Leniency and Cartel Damages Claims | 173 | ||
IV. Ideas for Legal Reform | 174 | ||
1. Civil Immunity for Leniency Applicants | 175 | ||
2. Waiving Joint and Several Liability | 175 | ||
3. Restricting Pre-Trial Disclosure and Access to Files | 176 | ||
4. The Way Ahead | 177 | ||
References | 178 | ||
Subject Index | 185 |