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The Protection of Minority Shareholders in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia

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Olberg, S. (2014). The Protection of Minority Shareholders in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-54349-6
Olberg, Susanne. The Protection of Minority Shareholders in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia. Duncker & Humblot, 2014. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-54349-6
Olberg, S (2014): The Protection of Minority Shareholders in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-54349-6

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The Protection of Minority Shareholders in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia

Olberg, Susanne

Schriften zum Wirtschaftsrecht, Vol. 263

(2014)

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About The Author

Susanne Olberg studierte Jura, Kulturwissenschaften (B.A.) und Japanologie (M.A.) in Berlin, Frankfurt (Oder), Marburg und Tokio. Im Anschluss an ihr Referendariat am Landgericht Marburg – mit Stationen in Frankfurt a.M. und Peking – arbeitete sie als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Im Rahmen ihrer Promotion verbrachte sie Forschungsaufenthalte am Institute of State and Law, Hanoi, Thammasat University, Bangkok, und International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. Anschließend trat sie in den höheren Dienst des Auswärtigen Amtes ein.

Susanne Olberg studied law, cultural sciences and Japanese studies in Berlin, Frankfurt (Oder), Marburg and Tokyo. During her legal clerkship at the Marburg Regional Court, she worked at an international law firm in Frankfurt am Main and for the GIZ in Beijing. Following to her Second State Examination in law (bar exam), she worked as a research assistant at the Humboldt-University Berlin and was a visiting fellow at the Institute of State and Law in Hanoi, at the Thammasat University in Bangkok, and the International Islamic University Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur. After finishing her PhD thesis she joined the German Federal Foreign Office.

Abstract

In ihrer rechtsvergleichend angelegten Arbeit untersucht die Verfasserin den Schutz von Minderheitenaktionären in Vietnam, Thailand und Malaysia sowohl auf der Ebene der gesetzlichen Regelungen als auch auf der Ebene ihrer tatsächlichen Wirkung. Ziel der Arbeit ist es, einen Einblick in die tatsächliche Funktionsweise des Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrechts zu ermöglichen. Gestützt auf die Ergebnisse ihrer Feldforschung zeigt die Autorin, dass sich die Rechtsregelungen in den drei Jurisdiktionen auf dem Papier zwar denjenigen der USA annähern, zwischen dem »law in the books« und dem »law in action« jedoch ein erheblicher Unterschied besteht, dessen Ausmaß vom jeweiligen lokalen Kontext bestimmt wird. Die Autorin zeigt auf, dass sich die Mechanismen, die dem Schutz von Minderheitenaktionären dienen, in allen drei Jurisdiktionen trotz der erheblichen Unterschiede im lokalen Kontext ähnlichen Schwierigkeiten ausgesetzt sehen. Der Schutz von Minderheitenaktionären erweist sich im Ergebnis als ein öffentliches Gut, der in Anbetracht einer mangelnden Kontrolle durch den Kapitalmarkt auf stattliche Durchsetzung angewiesen ist und damit nicht nur Reformen der corporate governance, sondern auch der public governance voraussetzt.In her comparative analysis of the protection of minority shareholders in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia, the author first compares the law-on-the-books, then evaluates which informal rules and enforcement characteristics determine the protection of minority shareholders in each country, and finally compares these factors and their impact. The analysis of the formal rules aiming to protect minority shareholders in the three countries shows that a conversion towards the Anglo-American concept of corporate law is taking place. However, in all three jurisdictions, there is a gap between the »law in the books« and the »law in action« although the degree of this gap depends on the local context. Although the local context is very different in the three countries for various reasons, the legal devices to protect minority shareholders face similar problems in all three jurisdictions. In sum, monitoring of corporations - and thus the protection of minority shareholders - remains a public good. Due to the lack of control by a fully developed capital market, public enforcement remains a key issue. The author therefore concludes that in all three countries, further improvement of corporate governance requires reforms of public governance.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Table of Contents 5
List of Tables and Figures 8
A. Theoretical and Methodological Framework 11
I. Introduction 11
II. Definition of Terms 13
III. Methodological Approach 15
1. Functional Comparative Law 15
2. New Institutional Economics 16
IV. The Conflict Between Majority and Minority Shareholders 19
1. The Principal-Agent Approach 19
2. Incomplete Contracts, Information Asymmetry and Opportunism 21
3. Private Benefits of Control 22
V. The Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders 23
1. Convergence Towards the Anglo-American Model of Corporate Law? 23
2. The Legal Devices Protecting Minority Shareholders 24
VI. The Factual Protection of Minority Shareholders 28
1. Incentives for the Expropriation of Minority Shareholders 28
2. Constraints on the Expropriation of Minority Shareholders 30
a) Shareholder Activism 30
b) Independent Directors 33
c) Gatekeepers 37
d) External Product Market Competition 39
e) Control by the Capital Market 40
f) Private and Public Enforcement 41
g) Labor 42
h) Moral and Reputational Concerns 43
i) Internal Corporate Governance Practices 43
3. Conclusions 44
VII. Empirical Research 44
B. The Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia 48
I. Sources of Law 48
II. A Comparative Legal Analysis 49
1. Minority Shareholder Appointment Rights 49
2. Minority Shareholder Decision and Action Rights 52
3. Independent Directors 57
4. Equal Treatment 59
5. Constraints and Affiliation Rights 60
6. Takeovers 63
7. Delisting 65
III. Conclusions 65
C. The Factual Protection of Minority Shareholders in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia 69
I. Vietnam 69
1. Features of the Vietnamese Corporate Landscape 69
a) Restructuring State-Owned Enterprises 71
b) General Corporations 73
c) Economic Groups 76
d) Equitization of SOEs 78
e) The State Capital Investment Corporation 84
f) Ownership Structure and Means of Control 87
aa) Ownership Structure in Equitized Companies 87
bb) Ownership and Control in Private Shareholding Companies 93
cc) Means of Control 95
2. Capital Market and Investors’ Base 96
3. Internal Corporate Governance Practices 102
4. Shareholder Activism 107
5. Foreign Investment 110
6. Gatekeepers 112
7. Public and Private Enforcement 114
8. Implications for the Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders 121
a) Minority Shareholder Appointment and Decision Rights 121
b) Independent Directors and Equal Treatment 124
c) Constraints and Affiliation Rights 125
9. Summary 125
II. Thailand 127
1. The State-Party-Business Nexus 127
2. Features of the Thai Corporate Sector 135
a) Thai Corporations and Ethnicity 135
b) Ownership Structure 138
c) Control of Companies 147
d) State-Owned Enterprises 151
3. The Capital Market and Investors’ Base 154
4. Internal Corporate Governance Practices 161
5. Shareholder Activism 168
6. Foreign Investors 173
7. Gatekeepers 177
8. Public and Private Enforcement 180
9. Implications for the Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders 187
a) Minority Shareholder Appointment and Decision Rights 187
b) Independent Directors and Equal Treatment 188
c) Constraints and Affiliation Rights 191
10. Conclusions 193
III. Malaysia 196
1. The State-Party-Business Nexus 196
2. Features of the Malaysian Corporate Sector 210
a) The State as Owner, Shareholder and Investor 210
b) Ownership Structure and Means of Control 214
3. The capital market 220
4. Internal Corporate Governance Practices 226
5. Shareholders’ Activism 231
6. Gatekeepers 235
7. Public and Private Enforcement 237
8. Implications for the Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders 243
a) Minority Shareholder Appointment and Decision Rights 243
b) Independent Directors and Equal Treatment 244
9. Conclusions 247
D. Summary and Conclusions 250
I. The Case of Thailand 250
II. The Case of Malaysia 252
III. The Case of Vietnam 255
IV. General Conclusions: Monitoring as a Public Good 257
Appendices 261
Bibliography 265
Subject Index 288