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Krawietz, W. Summers, R. Weinberger, O. Wright, G. (Eds.) (2000). The Reasonable as Rational?. On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio. Duncker & Humblot.
; Krawietz, Werner; Summers, Robert S.; Weinberger, Ota and Wright, Georg Henrik von. The Reasonable as Rational?: On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio. Duncker & Humblot, 2000. Book.
Krawietz, W, Summers, R, Weinberger, O, Wright, G (eds.) (2000): The Reasonable as Rational?: On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio, Duncker & Humblot, [online]


The Reasonable as Rational?

On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio

Editors: Krawietz, Werner | Summers, Robert S. | Weinberger, Ota | Wright, Georg Henrik von


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Book Details



In the course of the last few decades Aulis Aarnio has made a major contribution to the process of laying of new foundations for the theory of practical legal argumentation and modern jurisprudence (legal theory, philosophy of law). He was influenced by the modern philosophy of language and by the late works of Ludwig Wittgenstein as well as being inspired by the analytical-hermeneutic philosophy of his teacher Georg Henrik von Wright.

With his original and widely acknowledged research in law and legal systems and the rationality of the resulting scholarly interpretation which have been crowned and honoured with the Alexander von Humboldt Research Award in the field of the Humanities he has changed the face of modern legal science, above all, that of juridical or legal method, the methodology of law and the social sciences and of legal and social theory, the latter in his capacity as editor-in-chief of »Associations«, a new periodical from the same publisher.

The »Festschrift« was presented to him on his 60th birthday in the name of his friends and colleagues from all over the world in a specially hand-rafted copy. This book is a kind of handbook to his discipline and contains very profound and sophisticated responses to his magnum opus, »The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification«, which has determined and significantly advanced contemporary research in the field of legal and scholarly interpretation and argumentation. It deals with nearly all the central issues in the application of law and its justification.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Werner Krawietz: Hommage à Professor Aulis Aarnio to his 60th Birthday V
I. V
V. X
Conclusion XI
Content XIII
I. New Analytical Hermeneutics, Moral Relativism and Legal Rightness 1
Robert Alexy: Recht und Richtigkeit 3
I. Zum Begriff des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit 4
1. Die Subjekte 4
2. Die Adressaten 5
3. Das Erheben 5
II. Die Notwendigkeit der Verknüpfung von Recht und Richtigkeit 7
1. Ein absurder Verfassungsartikel 7
2. Ein absurdes Urteil 7
3. Die Alternative 11
III. Rechtliche und moralische Richtigkeit 13
1. Die Offenheit des Rechts 13
2. Der Autonomieeinwand 14
3. Der Unmöglichkeitseinwand 15
4. Wirklichkeit und Ideal 16
Åke Frändberg: The Relation between Norm and Reality as a Key to the Understanding of Law 21
I. 21
II. 22
III. 23
IV. 24
V. 24
VI. 25
VII. 27
Hermann Klenner: Aufklärungshistorisches zur Gerechtigkeit als Rechtfertigung des Rechts 31
Maija-Riitta Ollila: Moral Relativism and Social Criticism 39
References 46
Michel Troper: Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l` Homme de 1789 47
Nature de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 52
Fonctions de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 55
Contenus de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 61
Bibliographie 65
II. On Reasonableness and Legal Rationality in Modern Legal Systems 67
Gunnar Bergholtz: Rationality and Reasonableness of Judicial Decisions. Some Thoughts from the Swedish Point of View on Judges' Decision-Making 69
I. Introduction 69
II. What Actually Happens in the Court? 69
III. The Analogy from Theory of Science 70
IV. The Context of Discovery 71
V. The Context of Justification 73
VI. The Reasons as a Description of the Decision Process 74
VII. The Reasons as Justification of the Judgment 74
VIII. Rational Reasons 76
IX. Some Critical Voices 77
X. The Sociology of Knowledge Analogy 78
Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen: Changing Conceptions of Legal Rationality 81
I. Introduction 81
II. Two Conceptions of Legal Rationality 82
III. Lines of Evolution 84
IV. The Circle is Closed 86
Rex Martin: On Hohfeldian Liberties 87
References 98
Ilkka Niiniluoto: Is it Rational to be Rational? 101
I. Introduction 101
II. The Rationality of Rationality: A Puzzling Question 102
III. Three Notions of Rationality 102
IV. Is it Rational to be Rational?: Nine Questions 105
V. Concluding Remarks: Rationality and Law 108
Bibliography 109
Valentin Petev: Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts 111
I. Welche Rationalität? 112
II. Elemente einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts 116
III. Inwiefern ist die sozio-axiologische Konzeption des Rechts rational? 123
III. Norms and Normpropositions in the Perspectives of Legal Expressivism 127
Eugenio Bulygin: On Norm Propositions 129
References 134
Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki: Types of Vagueness 135
I. Introduction 135
II. Scale Vagueness 138
III. Multidirectional Vagueness 139
IV. Multi-sided Vagueness 140
V. Open Texture 141
VI. Conclusion 144
Ricardo Guibourg: The Concept of Reasonability and the Argumentative Tree 145
I. Reason & Opinion, Inc. 145
II. Acceptability and Thinking Systems 147
III. Acceptability and Acceptance 150
IV. The Argumentative Tree 152
V. Argumentation, or How to Climb the Tree 154
Aleksander Peczenik: Certainty or Coherence? 157
I. The Background 157
II. Aarnio on Audience and Paradigms 158
III. Aarnio and Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy 159
IV. Description of Reconstruction 159
V. Coherence and Epistemologica! Conservatism 160
VI. Coherence and Truth 163
VII. Wittgenstein Behind Coherentism? 163
VIII. Social Epistemology of Law? 165
IX. Social Coherence Without Epistemology 167
X. On the Postulate that the Law Should Be Coherent 168
References 170
Georg Henrik von Wright: On Norms and Norm-Propositions. A Sketch 173
I. 173
II. 174
III. 174
IV. 175
V. 176
VI. 177
References 178
IV. New Constitutionalism and Legalism in Modern State Legal Systems 179
Zenon Bańkowski / Neil MacCormick: Legality without Legalism 181
I. Introduction 181
II. Shklar and the Meaning of Legalism 182
III. Legalism and Legal Theory 186
1. Positivism 186
2. Natural Law 189
3. American Legal Realism 190
IV. Legalism, Formalism and Certainty 192
V. Legality: The Same as Legalism? 193
References 195
Jes Bjarup: Authority and Roles 197
I. 197
II. 198
III. 200
IV. 205
V. 208
Werner Krawietz: New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? On how to Differentiate between Legal Systems and the Modern State 219
I. Constitutionalism and Constitutional Patriotism - New or Old? 219
II. The Concept of the Constitutional State (\"Rechtsstaat\") as an Ideal Type 222
III. Critical Review of the Relations between Constitution, Legal Systems and the State Legal System 225
IV. Relations between Constitution, State Legal Systems and Society 228
V. Résumé 230
Burton M. Leiser: Custom as Constitutive of Law 233
I. Positivist Conceptions of the Relations of Custom to Law 233
II. Implications for International and Primitive Law 235
III. Critique of the Positivist Position 235
IV. What Is Custom? 239
V. The Unwritten Law 243
VI. Custom and the Abrogation of Law 243
Enrico Pattaro: Language and Behaviour: An Introduction to the Normative Dimension 251
I. Senders and Receivers: Uses and Effects of Language 251
II. Representative Effects and Uses of Language - Meaning as Representative Effect of Language 253
III. The Declarative Use of Language and its Illative (Belief-Inducing) Effect 256
IV. Emotional Uses and Effects of Language - Expressive Use and Illative Effects of Language 257
V. The Illative Effect of Language and of Non-Linguistic Signs 258
VI. Language, Communication, and Causes of the Linguistic Effects which are neither Linguistic nor Communicative 260
VII. The Directing Use of Language 261
1. Illative Effect and Directing Use of Language 261
2. Representative Effect and Directing Use of Language 261
3. Some Distinctions Concerning the Definition of Directive 262
4. Definition of Directive 264
VIII. Conative Effects of Language 265
1. Conative Effects Determined by the Receiver's Suggestibility 265
2. Conative Effects Determined by the Receiver's Interests ( Especially His/Her Interest in Avoiding Sanctions 266
3. Conative Effects Determined by the Idea or Belief of Obligation , i. eby a Preexisting Norm Internalised by the Receiver 267
4. The Nature of the Factors that Bring About the Conative Effects of Language is neither Linguistic nor Communicative 267
IX. Directives and Norms: Norms as Customs 267
X. Some Conclusions With Reference to the Italian Tradition in Analytical Legal Philosophy 270
Stig Strömholm: Rationality and Goal-Setting - Tasks for Legal Scholars? 273
I. 273
II. 274
III. 277
IV. 280
Kaarlo Tuori: The Supreme Courts and Democracy. Who are the Princes of Law's Empire? 283
I. The Courts and Democracy: The Vulgar Conception 283
II. Three Contenders 284
III. The Problem of the Limits of Law 286
IV. The Aspects and the Levels of Law 287
V. Principles and Policies 292
VI. Are There Any Princes in the Realm of Law? 295
References 295
V. Law, Meta-Legal Positivism and Legal Dogmatics as a Rational Legal Science 297
Martin Schulte: Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens 299
I. 300
II. 302
III. 306
IV. 308
V. 310
Matti Sintonen: Fact and Value: The Copernican Revolution in the Sciences of Man 311
I. The Rational and the Reasonable 312
II. Cognitive and Non-cognitive Values 313
III. The Copernican Revolution 315
IV. From Classical to Analytic Hermeneutics 317
References 319
Robert S. Summers: The Formality of Rules 321
I. The Special Importance of Rules 321
II. The Essential Preceptual Formality of Rules 323
III. The Affirmatively Formal Features of Rules 324
IV. Definiteness as an Affirmatively Formal Attribute of a Rule - an Excursus 328
V. Organizational and Other Formality of Rule Content 329
VI. The Pervasiveness of Formality in Rules 329
References 330
Sebastián Urbina: Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress 331
Ota Weinberger: Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 347
I. Der Non-Kognitivismus und wohlerwogenes Werten 347
II. Gibt es Fehl Wertungen? Grundlagen der Methodologie des Wertediskurses 349
III. Wertekategorien und die Präferenzentscheidung 351
IV. Persönlich freie Wertung und gesellschaftliche Einflüsse 352
V. Die Genesis kollektiver Wertungen 353
VI. Anmerkung 354
VII. Differenzierende Charakteristik des Wertens in Moral, Recht und Politik 356
VI. Democracy, Legislative Powers and Ultimate Authority 365
Ernesto Garzón Valdés: Democratic Consensus: Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities 367
I. The Instrumental Value of Democracy 367
II. The Irrelevance of Factual Consent and the Conceptual Uselessness of Hypothetical Consent 373
III. Minority Dissent 373
IV. The Insufficiency of a Minimalist Conception of Democracy for the Regulation of the Basic Principles of a Morally Valuable Social Organization 375
V. The Recourse to an \"Off Limits 377
VI. A Proposal for a Rational Foundation of the Content and the Limits of the \"Off Limits\" Area 380
VII. Once More: Minority Reaction as a Measure for the Effective Validity of the \"Off Limits 383
Stanley L. Paulson: On Hans Kelsen's Role in the Formation of the Austrian Constitution and his Defense of Constitutional Review 385
I. Introduction: The Question of Kelsen's Role 385
II. Kelsen as Draftsman 386
III. The Ideas Underlying the High Court 388
IV. The Defense of Constitutional Review 390
1. Hierarchical Structure and the Nature of the Constitution 391
2. Objection and Reply 392
Kauko Pietilä: Normative Sociology 397
I. Social Responsibility 397
II. Different and Widely Apart? 398
III. From the Science of Police to Sociology 401
IV. A Case 405
V. The Legal Dogmatist's Interest 406
VI. The Sociologist's Interest 407
VII. Normative Sociology 409
VIII. Sociological Rationality 413
References 415
Mihály Samu: Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit 417
I. 417
II. 422
III. 424
IV. 428
Resümee 432
Agustín Squella Narducci: Democracy and the Law 433
I. 433
II. 433
III. 434
IV. 435
V. 436
VI. 438
VII. 440
Ruth Zimmerling: Power and Freedom. A Comment on the Conception of Felix Oppenheim 441
I. Introduction 441
II. An Approach to the Relationship between Power and Freedom 441
III. Oppenheim's Conception 446
IV. Discussion 453
V. Conclusion 459
References 459
VII. On Normative Argumentation and Justification and the Critique of Legal Reasoning 461
Paolo Comanducci: Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 463
I. Introduction 463
II. Materials for a Meta-Theoretical Map 463
III. The Judicial Role in the Interpretation of Law 476
Svein Eng: Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law? 483
I. The Question to be Discussed 483
II. How Does the Doctrine of Precedent in Respect of its Content Fit Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law? 486
1. The Relevance of Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law 487
2. Ways of Generating Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law 487
3. The Weight of Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law. Transition to a New Question 493
III. Is the Doctrine of Precedent in Respect of its Foundation Applicable to Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law? 494
1. Policy Considerations 494
2. Case Law 497
IV. Legislation, Particularly Act No. 2 of 25 June 1925 (\"Plenary Proceedings Act\") 498
V. Legal Literature 500
VI. Summary 501
Hannu Tapani Klami: Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory 503
I. Cosmos - But How? 503
II. Elements of Chaos 506
III. Inherent Chaos? 508
1. Socioeconomic Effects 508
2. Evidentiary Problems 512
IV. Concluding Remarks 515
Summary 516
Geoffrey Marshall: Values, Intentions, Objectives and Purposes: Some Fallacies about Statutory Interpretation 517
I. Theories and Values 518
II. Textualism and Legislative Intention 519
III. The Purpose or Object of Legislation 522
Rodolfo Vázquez: Rights and Tolerance 525
I. 528
II. 531
Luc J. Wintgens: On Coherence and Consistency 539
VIII. Jurisprudence, Jurisdictional Power and Legal Professions 551
Ghita Holmström-Hintikka: Reasonable Doubt 553
I. Introduction 553
II. The Interrogative Framework 554
1. The Dialectic Model 554
2. The Interrogative Model 555
III. On Evidence 560
1. Basic Features and General Terminology 560
2. Language and Basic Assumptions 562
3. What Kind of Evidence 562
4. Binding and Partial Evidence 563
IV. Beyond Reasonable Doubt 564
1. 'Reasonable Doubt' 565
2. Deliberation and Bracketing 565
Bibliography 570
Raul Narits: Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz und ihre Bedeutung für eine vergleichende Rechtstheorie 571
I. Über die Arten der Erkenntnis des Rechts 571
II. Wertungsjurisprudenz als rechtliche Handlungsform und Art der Rechtserkenntnis 576
III. Vom Wahrheitswert der Rechtserkenntnis und den Rechtswahrheiten der Wertungsjurisprudenz 580
Dieter Wyduckel: Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches und rechtstheoretisches Problem 591
I. Die Normenflut und Mittel ihrer Bewältigung 591
II. Begriff und Funktion der Rechtsbereinigung 592
III. Gegenstand der Rechtsbereinigung 594
IV. Methoden der Rechtsbereinigung 595
V. Rechtsbereinigung als Problem intertemporaler Rechtsgeltung 597
VI. Rechtswirkung der Rechtsbereinigung und rechtsdogmatische Folgeprobleme 599
VII. Rechtsbereinigung als rechtliches und politisches Problem in Umbruchzeiten 602
VIII. Rationalität und Vernünftigkeit als Maßstab der Rechtsbereinigung 604
Marek Zirk-Sadowski: Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics 607
Appendix 619
Werner Krawietz: Aulis Aarnio - Analytische Jurisprudenz und Neue Hermeneutik im Dienste des Rechts 621
I. 621
II. 624
Bibliography Aulis Aarnio 629
List of Contributors 665