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Krawietz, W., Summers, R., Weinberger, O., Wright, G. (Eds.) (2000). The Reasonable as Rational?. On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-49265-7
Krawietz, Werner; Summers, Robert S.; Weinberger, Ota and Wright, Georg Henrik von. The Reasonable as Rational?: On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio. Duncker & Humblot, 2000. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-49265-7
Krawietz, W, Summers, R, Weinberger, O, Wright, G (eds.) (2000): The Reasonable as Rational?: On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-49265-7
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The Reasonable as Rational?
On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio
Editors: Krawietz, Werner | Summers, Robert S. | Weinberger, Ota | Wright, Georg Henrik von
(2000)
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Abstract
In the course of the last few decades Aulis Aarnio has made a major contribution to the process of laying of new foundations for the theory of practical legal argumentation and modern jurisprudence (legal theory, philosophy of law). He was influenced by the modern philosophy of language and by the late works of Ludwig Wittgenstein as well as being inspired by the analytical-hermeneutic philosophy of his teacher Georg Henrik von Wright.With his original and widely acknowledged research in law and legal systems and the rationality of the resulting scholarly interpretation which have been crowned and honoured with the Alexander von Humboldt Research Award in the field of the Humanities he has changed the face of modern legal science, above all, that of juridical or legal method, the methodology of law and the social sciences and of legal and social theory, the latter in his capacity as editor-in-chief of »Associations«, a new periodical from the same publisher.The »Festschrift« was presented to him on his 60th birthday in the name of his friends and colleagues from all over the world in a specially hand-rafted copy. This book is a kind of handbook to his discipline and contains very profound and sophisticated responses to his magnum opus, »The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification«, which has determined and significantly advanced contemporary research in the field of legal and scholarly interpretation and argumentation. It deals with nearly all the central issues in the application of law and its justification.
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Werner Krawietz: Hommage à Professor Aulis Aarnio to his 60th Birthday | V | ||
| I. | V | ||
| II. | VI | ||
| III. | VII | ||
| IV. | VIII | ||
| V. | X | ||
| Conclusion | XI | ||
| Content | XIII | ||
| I. New Analytical Hermeneutics, Moral Relativism and Legal Rightness | 1 | ||
| Robert Alexy: Recht und Richtigkeit | 3 | ||
| I. Zum Begriff des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit | 4 | ||
| 1. Die Subjekte | 4 | ||
| 2. Die Adressaten | 5 | ||
| 3. Das Erheben | 5 | ||
| II. Die Notwendigkeit der Verknüpfung von Recht und Richtigkeit | 7 | ||
| 1. Ein absurder Verfassungsartikel | 7 | ||
| 2. Ein absurdes Urteil | 7 | ||
| 3. Die Alternative | 11 | ||
| III. Rechtliche und moralische Richtigkeit | 13 | ||
| 1. Die Offenheit des Rechts | 13 | ||
| 2. Der Autonomieeinwand | 14 | ||
| 3. Der Unmöglichkeitseinwand | 15 | ||
| 4. Wirklichkeit und Ideal | 16 | ||
| Åke Frändberg: The Relation between Norm and Reality as a Key to the Understanding of Law | 21 | ||
| I. | 21 | ||
| II. | 22 | ||
| III. | 23 | ||
| IV. | 24 | ||
| V. | 24 | ||
| VI. | 25 | ||
| VII. | 27 | ||
| Hermann Klenner: Aufklärungshistorisches zur Gerechtigkeit als Rechtfertigung des Rechts | 31 | ||
| Maija-Riitta Ollila: Moral Relativism and Social Criticism | 39 | ||
| References | 46 | ||
| Michel Troper: Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l` Homme de 1789 | 47 | ||
| Nature de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme | 52 | ||
| Fonctions de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme | 55 | ||
| Contenus de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme | 61 | ||
| Bibliographie | 65 | ||
| II. On Reasonableness and Legal Rationality in Modern Legal Systems | 67 | ||
| Gunnar Bergholtz: Rationality and Reasonableness of Judicial Decisions. Some Thoughts from the Swedish Point of View on Judges' Decision-Making | 69 | ||
| I. Introduction | 69 | ||
| II. What Actually Happens in the Court? | 69 | ||
| III. The Analogy from Theory of Science | 70 | ||
| IV. The Context of Discovery | 71 | ||
| V. The Context of Justification | 73 | ||
| VI. The Reasons as a Description of the Decision Process | 74 | ||
| VII. The Reasons as Justification of the Judgment | 74 | ||
| VIII. Rational Reasons | 76 | ||
| IX. Some Critical Voices | 77 | ||
| X. The Sociology of Knowledge Analogy | 78 | ||
| Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen: Changing Conceptions of Legal Rationality | 81 | ||
| I. Introduction | 81 | ||
| II. Two Conceptions of Legal Rationality | 82 | ||
| III. Lines of Evolution | 84 | ||
| IV. The Circle is Closed | 86 | ||
| Rex Martin: On Hohfeldian Liberties | 87 | ||
| References | 98 | ||
| Ilkka Niiniluoto: Is it Rational to be Rational? | 101 | ||
| I. Introduction | 101 | ||
| II. The Rationality of Rationality: A Puzzling Question | 102 | ||
| III. Three Notions of Rationality | 102 | ||
| IV. Is it Rational to be Rational?: Nine Questions | 105 | ||
| V. Concluding Remarks: Rationality and Law | 108 | ||
| Bibliography | 109 | ||
| Valentin Petev: Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts | 111 | ||
| I. Welche Rationalität? | 112 | ||
| II. Elemente einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts | 116 | ||
| III. Inwiefern ist die sozio-axiologische Konzeption des Rechts rational? | 123 | ||
| III. Norms and Normpropositions in the Perspectives of Legal Expressivism | 127 | ||
| Eugenio Bulygin: On Norm Propositions | 129 | ||
| References | 134 | ||
| Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki: Types of Vagueness | 135 | ||
| I. Introduction | 135 | ||
| II. Scale Vagueness | 138 | ||
| III. Multidirectional Vagueness | 139 | ||
| IV. Multi-sided Vagueness | 140 | ||
| V. Open Texture | 141 | ||
| VI. Conclusion | 144 | ||
| Ricardo Guibourg: The Concept of Reasonability and the Argumentative Tree | 145 | ||
| I. Reason & Opinion, Inc. | 145 | ||
| II. Acceptability and Thinking Systems | 147 | ||
| III. Acceptability and Acceptance | 150 | ||
| IV. The Argumentative Tree | 152 | ||
| V. Argumentation, or How to Climb the Tree | 154 | ||
| Aleksander Peczenik: Certainty or Coherence? | 157 | ||
| I. The Background | 157 | ||
| II. Aarnio on Audience and Paradigms | 158 | ||
| III. Aarnio and Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy | 159 | ||
| IV. Description of Reconstruction | 159 | ||
| V. Coherence and Epistemologica! Conservatism | 160 | ||
| VI. Coherence and Truth | 163 | ||
| VII. Wittgenstein Behind Coherentism? | 163 | ||
| VIII. Social Epistemology of Law? | 165 | ||
| IX. Social Coherence Without Epistemology | 167 | ||
| X. On the Postulate that the Law Should Be Coherent | 168 | ||
| References | 170 | ||
| Georg Henrik von Wright: On Norms and Norm-Propositions. A Sketch | 173 | ||
| I. | 173 | ||
| II. | 174 | ||
| III. | 174 | ||
| IV. | 175 | ||
| V. | 176 | ||
| VI. | 177 | ||
| References | 178 | ||
| IV. New Constitutionalism and Legalism in Modern State Legal Systems | 179 | ||
| Zenon Bańkowski / Neil MacCormick: Legality without Legalism | 181 | ||
| I. Introduction | 181 | ||
| II. Shklar and the Meaning of Legalism | 182 | ||
| III. Legalism and Legal Theory | 186 | ||
| 1. Positivism | 186 | ||
| 2. Natural Law | 189 | ||
| 3. American Legal Realism | 190 | ||
| IV. Legalism, Formalism and Certainty | 192 | ||
| V. Legality: The Same as Legalism? | 193 | ||
| References | 195 | ||
| Jes Bjarup: Authority and Roles | 197 | ||
| I. | 197 | ||
| II. | 198 | ||
| III. | 200 | ||
| IV. | 205 | ||
| V. | 208 | ||
| Werner Krawietz: New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? On how to Differentiate between Legal Systems and the Modern State | 219 | ||
| I. Constitutionalism and Constitutional Patriotism - New or Old? | 219 | ||
| II. The Concept of the Constitutional State ("Rechtsstaat") as an Ideal Type | 222 | ||
| III. Critical Review of the Relations between Constitution, Legal Systems and the State Legal System | 225 | ||
| IV. Relations between Constitution, State Legal Systems and Society | 228 | ||
| V. Résumé | 230 | ||
| Burton M. Leiser: Custom as Constitutive of Law | 233 | ||
| I. Positivist Conceptions of the Relations of Custom to Law | 233 | ||
| II. Implications for International and Primitive Law | 235 | ||
| III. Critique of the Positivist Position | 235 | ||
| IV. What Is Custom? | 239 | ||
| V. The Unwritten Law | 243 | ||
| VI. Custom and the Abrogation of Law | 243 | ||
| Enrico Pattaro: Language and Behaviour: An Introduction to the Normative Dimension | 251 | ||
| I. Senders and Receivers: Uses and Effects of Language | 251 | ||
| II. Representative Effects and Uses of Language - Meaning as Representative Effect of Language | 253 | ||
| III. The Declarative Use of Language and its Illative (Belief-Inducing) Effect | 256 | ||
| IV. Emotional Uses and Effects of Language - Expressive Use and Illative Effects of Language | 257 | ||
| V. The Illative Effect of Language and of Non-Linguistic Signs | 258 | ||
| VI. Language, Communication, and Causes of the Linguistic Effects which are neither Linguistic nor Communicative | 260 | ||
| VII. The Directing Use of Language | 261 | ||
| 1. Illative Effect and Directing Use of Language | 261 | ||
| 2. Representative Effect and Directing Use of Language | 261 | ||
| 3. Some Distinctions Concerning the Definition of Directive | 262 | ||
| 4. Definition of Directive | 264 | ||
| VIII. Conative Effects of Language | 265 | ||
| 1. Conative Effects Determined by the Receiver's Suggestibility | 265 | ||
| 2. Conative Effects Determined by the Receiver's Interests ( Especially His/Her Interest in Avoiding Sanctions | 266 | ||
| 3. Conative Effects Determined by the Idea or Belief of Obligation , i. eby a Preexisting Norm Internalised by the Receiver | 267 | ||
| 4. The Nature of the Factors that Bring About the Conative Effects of Language is neither Linguistic nor Communicative | 267 | ||
| IX. Directives and Norms: Norms as Customs | 267 | ||
| X. Some Conclusions With Reference to the Italian Tradition in Analytical Legal Philosophy | 270 | ||
| Stig Strömholm: Rationality and Goal-Setting - Tasks for Legal Scholars? | 273 | ||
| I. | 273 | ||
| II. | 274 | ||
| III. | 277 | ||
| IV. | 280 | ||
| Kaarlo Tuori: The Supreme Courts and Democracy. Who are the Princes of Law's Empire? | 283 | ||
| I. The Courts and Democracy: The Vulgar Conception | 283 | ||
| II. Three Contenders | 284 | ||
| III. The Problem of the Limits of Law | 286 | ||
| IV. The Aspects and the Levels of Law | 287 | ||
| V. Principles and Policies | 292 | ||
| VI. Are There Any Princes in the Realm of Law? | 295 | ||
| References | 295 | ||
| V. Law, Meta-Legal Positivism and Legal Dogmatics as a Rational Legal Science | 297 | ||
| Martin Schulte: Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens | 299 | ||
| I. | 300 | ||
| II. | 302 | ||
| III. | 306 | ||
| IV. | 308 | ||
| V. | 310 | ||
| Matti Sintonen: Fact and Value: The Copernican Revolution in the Sciences of Man | 311 | ||
| I. The Rational and the Reasonable | 312 | ||
| II. Cognitive and Non-cognitive Values | 313 | ||
| III. The Copernican Revolution | 315 | ||
| IV. From Classical to Analytic Hermeneutics | 317 | ||
| References | 319 | ||
| Robert S. Summers: The Formality of Rules | 321 | ||
| I. The Special Importance of Rules | 321 | ||
| II. The Essential Preceptual Formality of Rules | 323 | ||
| III. The Affirmatively Formal Features of Rules | 324 | ||
| IV. Definiteness as an Affirmatively Formal Attribute of a Rule - an Excursus | 328 | ||
| V. Organizational and Other Formality of Rule Content | 329 | ||
| VI. The Pervasiveness of Formality in Rules | 329 | ||
| References | 330 | ||
| Sebastián Urbina: Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress | 331 | ||
| Ota Weinberger: Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik | 347 | ||
| I. Der Non-Kognitivismus und wohlerwogenes Werten | 347 | ||
| II. Gibt es Fehl Wertungen? Grundlagen der Methodologie des Wertediskurses | 349 | ||
| III. Wertekategorien und die Präferenzentscheidung | 351 | ||
| IV. Persönlich freie Wertung und gesellschaftliche Einflüsse | 352 | ||
| V. Die Genesis kollektiver Wertungen | 353 | ||
| VI. Anmerkung | 354 | ||
| VII. Differenzierende Charakteristik des Wertens in Moral, Recht und Politik | 356 | ||
| VI. Democracy, Legislative Powers and Ultimate Authority | 365 | ||
| Ernesto Garzón Valdés: Democratic Consensus: Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities | 367 | ||
| I. The Instrumental Value of Democracy | 367 | ||
| II. The Irrelevance of Factual Consent and the Conceptual Uselessness of Hypothetical Consent | 373 | ||
| III. Minority Dissent | 373 | ||
| IV. The Insufficiency of a Minimalist Conception of Democracy for the Regulation of the Basic Principles of a Morally Valuable Social Organization | 375 | ||
| V. The Recourse to an "Off Limits" | 377 | ||
| VI. A Proposal for a Rational Foundation of the Content and the Limits of the "Off Limits" Area | 380 | ||
| VII. Once More: Minority Reaction as a Measure for the Effective Validity of the "Off Limits" | 383 | ||
| Stanley L. Paulson: On Hans Kelsen's Role in the Formation of the Austrian Constitution and his Defense of Constitutional Review | 385 | ||
| I. Introduction: The Question of Kelsen's Role | 385 | ||
| II. Kelsen as Draftsman | 386 | ||
| III. The Ideas Underlying the High Court | 388 | ||
| IV. The Defense of Constitutional Review | 390 | ||
| 1. Hierarchical Structure and the Nature of the Constitution | 391 | ||
| 2. Objection and Reply | 392 | ||
| Kauko Pietilä: Normative Sociology | 397 | ||
| I. Social Responsibility | 397 | ||
| II. Different and Widely Apart? | 398 | ||
| III. From the Science of Police to Sociology | 401 | ||
| IV. A Case | 405 | ||
| V. The Legal Dogmatist's Interest | 406 | ||
| VI. The Sociologist's Interest | 407 | ||
| VII. Normative Sociology | 409 | ||
| VIII. Sociological Rationality | 413 | ||
| References | 415 | ||
| Mihály Samu: Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit | 417 | ||
| I. | 417 | ||
| II. | 422 | ||
| III. | 424 | ||
| IV. | 428 | ||
| Resümee | 432 | ||
| Agustín Squella Narducci: Democracy and the Law | 433 | ||
| I. | 433 | ||
| II. | 433 | ||
| III. | 434 | ||
| IV. | 435 | ||
| V. | 436 | ||
| VI. | 438 | ||
| VII. | 440 | ||
| Ruth Zimmerling: Power and Freedom. A Comment on the Conception of Felix Oppenheim | 441 | ||
| I. Introduction | 441 | ||
| II. An Approach to the Relationship between Power and Freedom | 441 | ||
| III. Oppenheim's Conception | 446 | ||
| IV. Discussion | 453 | ||
| V. Conclusion | 459 | ||
| References | 459 | ||
| VII. On Normative Argumentation and Justification and the Critique of Legal Reasoning | 461 | ||
| Paolo Comanducci: Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report | 463 | ||
| I. Introduction | 463 | ||
| II. Materials for a Meta-Theoretical Map | 463 | ||
| III. The Judicial Role in the Interpretation of Law | 476 | ||
| Svein Eng: Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law? | 483 | ||
| I. The Question to be Discussed | 483 | ||
| II. How Does the Doctrine of Precedent in Respect of its Content Fit Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law? | 486 | ||
| 1. The Relevance of Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law | 487 | ||
| 2. Ways of Generating Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law | 487 | ||
| 3. The Weight of Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law. Transition to a New Question | 493 | ||
| III. Is the Doctrine of Precedent in Respect of its Foundation Applicable to Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law? | 494 | ||
| 1. Policy Considerations | 494 | ||
| 2. Case Law | 497 | ||
| IV. Legislation, Particularly Act No. 2 of 25 June 1925 ("Plenary Proceedings Act") | 498 | ||
| V. Legal Literature | 500 | ||
| VI. Summary | 501 | ||
| Hannu Tapani Klami: Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory | 503 | ||
| I. Cosmos - But How? | 503 | ||
| II. Elements of Chaos | 506 | ||
| III. Inherent Chaos? | 508 | ||
| 1. Socioeconomic Effects | 508 | ||
| 2. Evidentiary Problems | 512 | ||
| IV. Concluding Remarks | 515 | ||
| Summary | 516 | ||
| Geoffrey Marshall: Values, Intentions, Objectives and Purposes: Some Fallacies about Statutory Interpretation | 517 | ||
| I. Theories and Values | 518 | ||
| II. Textualism and Legislative Intention | 519 | ||
| III. The Purpose or Object of Legislation | 522 | ||
| Rodolfo Vázquez: Rights and Tolerance | 525 | ||
| I. | 528 | ||
| II. | 531 | ||
| Luc J. Wintgens: On Coherence and Consistency | 539 | ||
| VIII. Jurisprudence, Jurisdictional Power and Legal Professions | 551 | ||
| Ghita Holmström-Hintikka: Reasonable Doubt | 553 | ||
| I. Introduction | 553 | ||
| II. The Interrogative Framework | 554 | ||
| 1. The Dialectic Model | 554 | ||
| 2. The Interrogative Model | 555 | ||
| III. On Evidence | 560 | ||
| 1. Basic Features and General Terminology | 560 | ||
| 2. Language and Basic Assumptions | 562 | ||
| 3. What Kind of Evidence | 562 | ||
| 4. Binding and Partial Evidence | 563 | ||
| IV. Beyond Reasonable Doubt | 564 | ||
| 1. 'Reasonable Doubt' | 565 | ||
| 2. Deliberation and Bracketing | 565 | ||
| Bibliography | 570 | ||
| Raul Narits: Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz und ihre Bedeutung für eine vergleichende Rechtstheorie | 571 | ||
| I. Über die Arten der Erkenntnis des Rechts | 571 | ||
| II. Wertungsjurisprudenz als rechtliche Handlungsform und Art der Rechtserkenntnis | 576 | ||
| III. Vom Wahrheitswert der Rechtserkenntnis und den Rechtswahrheiten der Wertungsjurisprudenz | 580 | ||
| Dieter Wyduckel: Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches und rechtstheoretisches Problem | 591 | ||
| I. Die Normenflut und Mittel ihrer Bewältigung | 591 | ||
| II. Begriff und Funktion der Rechtsbereinigung | 592 | ||
| III. Gegenstand der Rechtsbereinigung | 594 | ||
| IV. Methoden der Rechtsbereinigung | 595 | ||
| V. Rechtsbereinigung als Problem intertemporaler Rechtsgeltung | 597 | ||
| VI. Rechtswirkung der Rechtsbereinigung und rechtsdogmatische Folgeprobleme | 599 | ||
| VII. Rechtsbereinigung als rechtliches und politisches Problem in Umbruchzeiten | 602 | ||
| VIII. Rationalität und Vernünftigkeit als Maßstab der Rechtsbereinigung | 604 | ||
| Marek Zirk-Sadowski: Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics | 607 | ||
| Appendix | 619 | ||
| Werner Krawietz: Aulis Aarnio - Analytische Jurisprudenz und Neue Hermeneutik im Dienste des Rechts | 621 | ||
| I. | 621 | ||
| II. | 624 | ||
| Bibliography Aulis Aarnio | 629 | ||
| List of Contributors | 665 |