The Reasonable as Rational?

doi:10.3790/978-3-428-49265-7

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Krawietz, W., Summers, R., Weinberger, O., Wright, G. (Eds.) (2000). The Reasonable as Rational?. On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-49265-7

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The Reasonable as Rational?

On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio

Editors: Krawietz, Werner | Summers, Robert S. | Weinberger, Ota | Wright, Georg Henrik von

(2000)

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Book Details

Publisher Name: Duncker & Humblot
ISBN: 978-3-428-49265-7
978-3-428-09265-9 (print edition)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-49265-7
Edition: 1
Language: English
Pages: 686
Collections: NBE PHIL
NBE RECHT
NBE D&H
Subjects: Methods, theory & philosophy of law

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Abstract

In the course of the last few decades Aulis Aarnio has made a major contribution to the process of laying of new foundations for the theory of practical legal argumentation and modern jurisprudence (legal theory, philosophy of law). He was influenced by the modern philosophy of language and by the late works of Ludwig Wittgenstein as well as being inspired by the analytical-hermeneutic philosophy of his teacher Georg Henrik von Wright.

With his original and widely acknowledged research in law and legal systems and the rationality of the resulting scholarly interpretation which have been crowned and honoured with the Alexander von Humboldt Research Award in the field of the Humanities he has changed the face of modern legal science, above all, that of juridical or legal method, the methodology of law and the social sciences and of legal and social theory, the latter in his capacity as editor-in-chief of »Associations«, a new periodical from the same publisher.

The »Festschrift« was presented to him on his 60th birthday in the name of his friends and colleagues from all over the world in a specially hand-rafted copy. This book is a kind of handbook to his discipline and contains very profound and sophisticated responses to his magnum opus, »The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification«, which has determined and significantly advanced contemporary research in the field of legal and scholarly interpretation and argumentation. It deals with nearly all the central issues in the application of law and its justification.

Section Title	Page	Action	Price
Werner Krawietz: Hommage à Professor Aulis Aarnio to his 60th Birthday	V
I.	V
II.	VI
III.	VII
IV.	VIII
V.	X
Conclusion	XI
Content	XIII
I. New Analytical Hermeneutics, Moral Relativism and Legal Rightness	1
Robert Alexy: Recht und Richtigkeit	3
I. Zum Begriff des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit	4
1. Die Subjekte	4
2. Die Adressaten	5
3. Das Erheben	5
II. Die Notwendigkeit der Verknüpfung von Recht und Richtigkeit	7
1. Ein absurder Verfassungsartikel	7
2. Ein absurdes Urteil	7
3. Die Alternative	11
III. Rechtliche und moralische Richtigkeit	13
1. Die Offenheit des Rechts	13
2. Der Autonomieeinwand	14
3. Der Unmöglichkeitseinwand	15
4. Wirklichkeit und Ideal	16
Åke Frändberg: The Relation between Norm and Reality as a Key to the Understanding of Law	21
I.	21
II.	22
III.	23
IV.	24
V.	24
VI.	25
VII.	27
Hermann Klenner: Aufklärungshistorisches zur Gerechtigkeit als Rechtfertigung des Rechts	31
Maija-Riitta Ollila: Moral Relativism and Social Criticism	39
References	46
Michel Troper: Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l` Homme de 1789	47
Nature de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme	52
Fonctions de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme	55
Contenus de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme	61
Bibliographie	65
II. On Reasonableness and Legal Rationality in Modern Legal Systems	67
Gunnar Bergholtz: Rationality and Reasonableness of Judicial Decisions. Some Thoughts from the Swedish Point of View on Judges' Decision-Making	69
I. Introduction	69
II. What Actually Happens in the Court?	69
III. The Analogy from Theory of Science	70
IV. The Context of Discovery	71
V. The Context of Justification	73
VI. The Reasons as a Description of the Decision Process	74
VII. The Reasons as Justification of the Judgment	74
VIII. Rational Reasons	76
IX. Some Critical Voices	77
X. The Sociology of Knowledge Analogy	78
Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen: Changing Conceptions of Legal Rationality	81
I. Introduction	81
II. Two Conceptions of Legal Rationality	82
III. Lines of Evolution	84
IV. The Circle is Closed	86
Rex Martin: On Hohfeldian Liberties	87
References	98
Ilkka Niiniluoto: Is it Rational to be Rational?	101
I. Introduction	101
II. The Rationality of Rationality: A Puzzling Question	102
III. Three Notions of Rationality	102
IV. Is it Rational to be Rational?: Nine Questions	105
V. Concluding Remarks: Rationality and Law	108
Bibliography	109
Valentin Petev: Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts	111
I. Welche Rationalität?	112
II. Elemente einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts	116
III. Inwiefern ist die sozio-axiologische Konzeption des Rechts rational?	123
III. Norms and Normpropositions in the Perspectives of Legal Expressivism	127
Eugenio Bulygin: On Norm Propositions	129
References	134
Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki: Types of Vagueness	135
I. Introduction	135
II. Scale Vagueness	138
III. Multidirectional Vagueness	139
IV. Multi-sided Vagueness	140
V. Open Texture	141
VI. Conclusion	144
Ricardo Guibourg: The Concept of Reasonability and the Argumentative Tree	145
I. Reason & Opinion, Inc.	145
II. Acceptability and Thinking Systems	147
III. Acceptability and Acceptance	150
IV. The Argumentative Tree	152
V. Argumentation, or How to Climb the Tree	154
Aleksander Peczenik: Certainty or Coherence?	157
I. The Background	157
II. Aarnio on Audience and Paradigms	158
III. Aarnio and Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy	159
IV. Description of Reconstruction	159
V. Coherence and Epistemologica! Conservatism	160
VI. Coherence and Truth	163
VII. Wittgenstein Behind Coherentism?	163
VIII. Social Epistemology of Law?	165
IX. Social Coherence Without Epistemology	167
X. On the Postulate that the Law Should Be Coherent	168
References	170
Georg Henrik von Wright: On Norms and Norm-Propositions. A Sketch	173
I.	173
II.	174
III.	174
IV.	175
V.	176
VI.	177
References	178
IV. New Constitutionalism and Legalism in Modern State Legal Systems	179
Zenon Bańkowski / Neil MacCormick: Legality without Legalism	181
I. Introduction	181
II. Shklar and the Meaning of Legalism	182
III. Legalism and Legal Theory	186
1. Positivism	186
2. Natural Law	189
3. American Legal Realism	190
IV. Legalism, Formalism and Certainty	192
V. Legality: The Same as Legalism?	193
References	195
Jes Bjarup: Authority and Roles	197
I.	197
II.	198
III.	200
IV.	205
V.	208
Werner Krawietz: New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? On how to Differentiate between Legal Systems and the Modern State	219
I. Constitutionalism and Constitutional Patriotism - New or Old?	219
II. The Concept of the Constitutional State ("Rechtsstaat") as an Ideal Type	222
III. Critical Review of the Relations between Constitution, Legal Systems and the State Legal System	225
IV. Relations between Constitution, State Legal Systems and Society	228
V. Résumé	230
Burton M. Leiser: Custom as Constitutive of Law	233
I. Positivist Conceptions of the Relations of Custom to Law	233
II. Implications for International and Primitive Law	235
III. Critique of the Positivist Position	235
IV. What Is Custom?	239
V. The Unwritten Law	243
VI. Custom and the Abrogation of Law	243
Enrico Pattaro: Language and Behaviour: An Introduction to the Normative Dimension	251
I. Senders and Receivers: Uses and Effects of Language	251
II. Representative Effects and Uses of Language - Meaning as Representative Effect of Language	253
III. The Declarative Use of Language and its Illative (Belief-Inducing) Effect	256
IV. Emotional Uses and Effects of Language - Expressive Use and Illative Effects of Language	257
V. The Illative Effect of Language and of Non-Linguistic Signs	258
VI. Language, Communication, and Causes of the Linguistic Effects which are neither Linguistic nor Communicative	260
VII. The Directing Use of Language	261
1. Illative Effect and Directing Use of Language	261
2. Representative Effect and Directing Use of Language	261
3. Some Distinctions Concerning the Definition of Directive	262
4. Definition of Directive	264
VIII. Conative Effects of Language	265
1. Conative Effects Determined by the Receiver's Suggestibility	265
2. Conative Effects Determined by the Receiver's Interests ( Especially His/Her Interest in Avoiding Sanctions	266
3. Conative Effects Determined by the Idea or Belief of Obligation , i. eby a Preexisting Norm Internalised by the Receiver	267
4. The Nature of the Factors that Bring About the Conative Effects of Language is neither Linguistic nor Communicative	267
IX. Directives and Norms: Norms as Customs	267
X. Some Conclusions With Reference to the Italian Tradition in Analytical Legal Philosophy	270
Stig Strömholm: Rationality and Goal-Setting - Tasks for Legal Scholars?	273
I.	273
II.	274
III.	277
IV.	280
Kaarlo Tuori: The Supreme Courts and Democracy. Who are the Princes of Law's Empire?	283
I. The Courts and Democracy: The Vulgar Conception	283
II. Three Contenders	284
III. The Problem of the Limits of Law	286
IV. The Aspects and the Levels of Law	287
V. Principles and Policies	292
VI. Are There Any Princes in the Realm of Law?	295
References	295
V. Law, Meta-Legal Positivism and Legal Dogmatics as a Rational Legal Science	297
Martin Schulte: Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens	299
I.	300
II.	302
III.	306
IV.	308
V.	310
Matti Sintonen: Fact and Value: The Copernican Revolution in the Sciences of Man	311
I. The Rational and the Reasonable	312
II. Cognitive and Non-cognitive Values	313
III. The Copernican Revolution	315
IV. From Classical to Analytic Hermeneutics	317
References	319
Robert S. Summers: The Formality of Rules	321
I. The Special Importance of Rules	321
II. The Essential Preceptual Formality of Rules	323
III. The Affirmatively Formal Features of Rules	324
IV. Definiteness as an Affirmatively Formal Attribute of a Rule - an Excursus	328
V. Organizational and Other Formality of Rule Content	329
VI. The Pervasiveness of Formality in Rules	329
References	330
Sebastián Urbina: Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress	331
Ota Weinberger: Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik	347
I. Der Non-Kognitivismus und wohlerwogenes Werten	347
II. Gibt es Fehl Wertungen? Grundlagen der Methodologie des Wertediskurses	349
III. Wertekategorien und die Präferenzentscheidung	351
IV. Persönlich freie Wertung und gesellschaftliche Einflüsse	352
V. Die Genesis kollektiver Wertungen	353
VI. Anmerkung	354
VII. Differenzierende Charakteristik des Wertens in Moral, Recht und Politik	356
VI. Democracy, Legislative Powers and Ultimate Authority	365
Ernesto Garzón Valdés: Democratic Consensus: Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities	367
I. The Instrumental Value of Democracy	367
II. The Irrelevance of Factual Consent and the Conceptual Uselessness of Hypothetical Consent	373
III. Minority Dissent	373
IV. The Insufficiency of a Minimalist Conception of Democracy for the Regulation of the Basic Principles of a Morally Valuable Social Organization	375
V. The Recourse to an "Off Limits"	377
VI. A Proposal for a Rational Foundation of the Content and the Limits of the "Off Limits" Area	380
VII. Once More: Minority Reaction as a Measure for the Effective Validity of the "Off Limits"	383
Stanley L. Paulson: On Hans Kelsen's Role in the Formation of the Austrian Constitution and his Defense of Constitutional Review	385
I. Introduction: The Question of Kelsen's Role	385
II. Kelsen as Draftsman	386
III. The Ideas Underlying the High Court	388
IV. The Defense of Constitutional Review	390
1. Hierarchical Structure and the Nature of the Constitution	391
2. Objection and Reply	392
Kauko Pietilä: Normative Sociology	397
I. Social Responsibility	397
II. Different and Widely Apart?	398
III. From the Science of Police to Sociology	401
IV. A Case	405
V. The Legal Dogmatist's Interest	406
VI. The Sociologist's Interest	407
VII. Normative Sociology	409
VIII. Sociological Rationality	413
References	415
Mihály Samu: Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit	417
I.	417
II.	422
III.	424
IV.	428
Resümee	432
Agustín Squella Narducci: Democracy and the Law	433
I.	433
II.	433
III.	434
IV.	435
V.	436
VI.	438
VII.	440
Ruth Zimmerling: Power and Freedom. A Comment on the Conception of Felix Oppenheim	441
I. Introduction	441
II. An Approach to the Relationship between Power and Freedom	441
III. Oppenheim's Conception	446
IV. Discussion	453
V. Conclusion	459
References	459
VII. On Normative Argumentation and Justification and the Critique of Legal Reasoning	461
Paolo Comanducci: Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report	463
I. Introduction	463
II. Materials for a Meta-Theoretical Map	463
III. The Judicial Role in the Interpretation of Law	476
Svein Eng: Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law?	483
I. The Question to be Discussed	483
II. How Does the Doctrine of Precedent in Respect of its Content Fit Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law?	486
1. The Relevance of Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law	487
2. Ways of Generating Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law	487
3. The Weight of Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law. Transition to a New Question	493
III. Is the Doctrine of Precedent in Respect of its Foundation Applicable to Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law?	494
1. Policy Considerations	494
2. Case Law	497
IV. Legislation, Particularly Act No. 2 of 25 June 1925 ("Plenary Proceedings Act")	498
V. Legal Literature	500
VI. Summary	501
Hannu Tapani Klami: Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory	503
I. Cosmos - But How?	503
II. Elements of Chaos	506
III. Inherent Chaos?	508
1. Socioeconomic Effects	508
2. Evidentiary Problems	512
IV. Concluding Remarks	515
Summary	516
Geoffrey Marshall: Values, Intentions, Objectives and Purposes: Some Fallacies about Statutory Interpretation	517
I. Theories and Values	518
II. Textualism and Legislative Intention	519
III. The Purpose or Object of Legislation	522
Rodolfo Vázquez: Rights and Tolerance	525
I.	528
II.	531
Luc J. Wintgens: On Coherence and Consistency	539
VIII. Jurisprudence, Jurisdictional Power and Legal Professions	551
Ghita Holmström-Hintikka: Reasonable Doubt	553
I. Introduction	553
II. The Interrogative Framework	554
1. The Dialectic Model	554
2. The Interrogative Model	555
III. On Evidence	560
1. Basic Features and General Terminology	560
2. Language and Basic Assumptions	562
3. What Kind of Evidence	562
4. Binding and Partial Evidence	563
IV. Beyond Reasonable Doubt	564
1. 'Reasonable Doubt'	565
2. Deliberation and Bracketing	565
Bibliography	570
Raul Narits: Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz und ihre Bedeutung für eine vergleichende Rechtstheorie	571
I. Über die Arten der Erkenntnis des Rechts	571
II. Wertungsjurisprudenz als rechtliche Handlungsform und Art der Rechtserkenntnis	576
III. Vom Wahrheitswert der Rechtserkenntnis und den Rechtswahrheiten der Wertungsjurisprudenz	580
Dieter Wyduckel: Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches und rechtstheoretisches Problem	591
I. Die Normenflut und Mittel ihrer Bewältigung	591
II. Begriff und Funktion der Rechtsbereinigung	592
III. Gegenstand der Rechtsbereinigung	594
IV. Methoden der Rechtsbereinigung	595
V. Rechtsbereinigung als Problem intertemporaler Rechtsgeltung	597
VI. Rechtswirkung der Rechtsbereinigung und rechtsdogmatische Folgeprobleme	599
VII. Rechtsbereinigung als rechtliches und politisches Problem in Umbruchzeiten	602
VIII. Rationalität und Vernünftigkeit als Maßstab der Rechtsbereinigung	604
Marek Zirk-Sadowski: Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics	607
Appendix	619
Werner Krawietz: Aulis Aarnio - Analytische Jurisprudenz und Neue Hermeneutik im Dienste des Rechts	621
I.	621
II.	624
Bibliography Aulis Aarnio	629
List of Contributors	665

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The Reasonable as Rational?

On Legal Argumentation and Justification. »Festschrift« for Aulis Aarnio

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