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Summers, R. (1992). Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning. Duncker & Humblot.
Summers, Robert S.. Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning. Duncker & Humblot, 1992. Book.
Summers, R (1992): Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning, Duncker & Humblot, [online]


Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning

Summers, Robert S.

Schriften zur Rechtstheorie, Vol. 151


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Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Forward 7
Acknowledgments 9
Table of Contents 11
Part One: The Nature of Law 13
Chapter One: The Technique Element in Law 13
I. Social Techniques Distinguished from Social Functions 14
II. Social Techniques of a Legal Nature 15
A. The Grievance-Remedial Technique 16
B. The Penal Technique 16
C. The Administrative-Regulatory Technique 17
D. The Public Benefit Conferral Technique 19
E. The Private Arranging Technique 21
F. Differentiation of Techniques 24
III. Utility of the Preceding Analysis 26
A. Descriptive Utility 26
B. Normative Utility 27
C. Pedagogical Utility 29
Conclusion 30
Chapter Two: Toward a Better General Theory of Legal Validity 31
I. Introduction 31
II. Issues of Legal Validity - The Phenomena 33
III. Resolution of Issues of Validity - The Phenomena 35
IV. Issues of Validity and their Resolution - According to Leading Theorists 36
1. The Phenomena Misrepresented 36
2. Phenomena Neglected 40
3. A Mirage in the Phenomena - The Idea of a \" Master Test\" of Validity 42
V. Some Features of an Ideal System for Determining Whether Putative Law is Law 43
VI. Conclusion 47
Chapter Three: Positivism, Natural Law and the Theory of Legal Validity 49
I. Introduction 49
II. The Debate (one Version) 49
III. A Criticism 52
Chapter Four: Naïve Instrumentalism and the Law 55
I. Introduction 55
II. Naïve Instrumentalism and Legal Goals 56
III. Naïve Instrumentalism and the Nature of Laws 59
IV. Naïve Instrumentalism and How Laws Serve Goals 62
Conclusion 66
Chapter Five: Pragmatic Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory 67
I. Introduction 67
II. The American Pragmatic Instrumentalists 68
III. The Leading Tenets of American Pragmatic Instrumentalism 69
IV. The Name \"Pragmatic Instrumentalism 72
V. Inappropriateness of the Name \"Legal Realism 72
VI. Major Strengths of American Pragmatic Instrumentalism 73
VII. Major Weaknesses of American Pragmatic Instrumentalism 74
VIII. Conclusion 76
Chapter Six: Professor Lon L. Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law 77
I. Introduction 77
I. 77
II. 80
A. Basic Values 80
B. Means and Goals 81
C. Legal Validity and Law Creation 82
D. Law and Social Science 85
E. Forms of Legal Ordering 87
F. Coercion 88
G. The Role of Officials 90
H. Criterion of Legal Success 91
III. 91
Part Two: Law and Legal Reasoning 93
Chapter Seven: Working Conceptions of \"the Law 93
I. Prefatory Note 93
II. Introduction 93
III. The Nature of a Working Conception 96
IV. Possible Working Conceptions 100
V. The \"Reason\" and the \"Rule\" Alternatives: Some Comparisons 103
A. Comparative Serviceability 103
B. \" Normative \" Side Effects 105
VI. The \"Reason\" and the \"Rule\" Alternatives: Consequences when Officials Become Preoccupied 108
VII. Conclusion 112
Chapter Eight: Two Types of Reasons of Substance in Common Law Cases 113
I. Definitional Preliminaries 113
II. Main Theses 113
III. Two Types of Reasons of Substance - Some Actual Examples from Common Law Cases 114
IV. How the Two Types of Reasons Differ 117
V. Importance of Distinction between the Two Types of Reasons 123
Chapter Nine: Resolving Conflicts Between Substantive Reasons 125
I. Introduction 125
II. One Primary Substantive Reason May Support a Decision That Can Be \"Generalized\" into a Decisively Better Legal Rule, qua Rule 126
III. One Primary Substantive Reason May Be Decisively Reinforced by One or More Independent Institutional Reasons 128
IV. One Primary Substantive Reason May Support a Decision That is More in Harmony with the Content and/or Rationales of Related General Law 129
V. One Primary Substantive Reason May Be Decisively Reinforced by Virtue of its Congruence with a Relevant Customary Practice 130
VI. One Primary Substantive Reason May Be Decisively Reinforced by One or More Additional Primary Substantive Reasons 131
VII. One Primary Substantive Reason May, upon Appropriate Analysis, Be Seen to \"Cancel\" the Conflicting Primary Substantive Reason 131
VIII. One Primary Substantive Reason May, on Consideration, Ultimately Turn out to Be an Inappropriate Basis for a Judicial Decision 132
IX. It May Be Possible to Reach a Justified Decision by Accomodating the Conflicting Substantive Reasons rather than by Choosing between them 133
X. One of the Primary Substantive Reasons in Conflict May, on Careful Scrutiny, Turn out to Have Little Justificatory Force, in Absolute Terms 134
XI. The Conflicting Substantive Reasons May Turn out to Be of Roughly Equal Force 135
XII. One Primary Substantive Reason May Turn out, in Relative Terms, to Have Somewhat More Justificatory Force than its Conflicting Counterpart 136
XIII. Significance of my Thesis, and Possible Objections 136
Chapter Ten: Form and Substance in Legal Reasoning 138
I. Introduction 138
II. Two General Types of Reasons: Substantive and Formal 138
III. The Attribute of Authoritative Formality 144
IV. The Attribute of \"Content\" Formality 145
V. The Attribute of \"Interpretive\" Formality 147
VI. The Attribute of Mandatory Formality 148
VII. Inter-Relations 150
VII. Conclusion 153
Chapter Eleven: Theory, Formality and Practical Legal Criticism* 154
I. Introduction 154
II. The Theorist as Critic and Reformer of Practical Legal Criticism 155
1. Constitutive Formality and its Pathology 157
2. Close-Ended Formality and its Pathology 166
III. The Theorist and the Theory of Practical Legal Criticism 174
IV. Conclusion 175
Chapter Twelve: Statutes and Contracts as Founts of Formal Reasoning 177
I. Introduction 177
II. Constitutive Formality 179
III. Expressional Formality 182
IV. Close-ended Formality 183
V. Interpretative Formality 184
VI. Mandatory Formality 189
VII. Conclusion 190
Chapter Thirteen: Policy on the Anvil of Law 191
I. Introduction 191
II. The Desideratum of Making Law in the Form of Rules 193
III. The Desideratum of Intelligibility 196
IV. The Desideratum of Sufficient \"Factual\" Administrability 198
V. The Desideratum of Prospective Applicability 200
VI. The Desideratum of Requiring Fault Before Any Penal Sanctions are Imposed 201
VII. The Desideratum of Providing Due Protection for Any Relevant \"Process Value 203
VIII. Appropriate Regard for Other Desiderata of a More Implementational Kind 204
IX. Conclusion 206
References 206
Chapter Fourteen: The Ideal Socio-Legal Order: Its \"Rule of Law\" Dimension 209
I. Introduction 209
II. The Rule of Law Dimension: Its Conceptual Component 209
III. The \"Value Component\" of the Rule of Law Dimension 214
IV. Arguments for a Relatively Thin Theory of the Rule of Law 216