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Summers, R. (1992). Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-47427-1
Summers, Robert S.. Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning. Duncker & Humblot, 1992. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-47427-1
Summers, R (1992): Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-47427-1
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Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning
Schriften zur Rechtstheorie, Vol. 151
(1992)
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Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Forward | 7 | ||
| Acknowledgments | 9 | ||
| Table of Contents | 11 | ||
| Part One: The Nature of Law | 13 | ||
| Chapter One: The Technique Element in Law | 13 | ||
| I. Social Techniques Distinguished from Social Functions | 14 | ||
| II. Social Techniques of a Legal Nature | 15 | ||
| A. The Grievance-Remedial Technique | 16 | ||
| B. The Penal Technique | 16 | ||
| C. The Administrative-Regulatory Technique | 17 | ||
| D. The Public Benefit Conferral Technique | 19 | ||
| E. The Private Arranging Technique | 21 | ||
| F. Differentiation of Techniques | 24 | ||
| III. Utility of the Preceding Analysis | 26 | ||
| A. Descriptive Utility | 26 | ||
| B. Normative Utility | 27 | ||
| C. Pedagogical Utility | 29 | ||
| Conclusion | 30 | ||
| Chapter Two: Toward a Better General Theory of Legal Validity | 31 | ||
| I. Introduction | 31 | ||
| II. Issues of Legal Validity - The Phenomena | 33 | ||
| III. Resolution of Issues of Validity - The Phenomena | 35 | ||
| IV. Issues of Validity and their Resolution - According to Leading Theorists | 36 | ||
| 1. The Phenomena Misrepresented | 36 | ||
| 2. Phenomena Neglected | 40 | ||
| 3. A Mirage in the Phenomena - The Idea of a " Master Test" of Validity | 42 | ||
| V. Some Features of an Ideal System for Determining Whether Putative Law is Law | 43 | ||
| VI. Conclusion | 47 | ||
| Chapter Three: Positivism, Natural Law and the Theory of Legal Validity | 49 | ||
| I. Introduction | 49 | ||
| II. The Debate (one Version) | 49 | ||
| III. A Criticism | 52 | ||
| Chapter Four: Naïve Instrumentalism and the Law | 55 | ||
| I. Introduction | 55 | ||
| II. Naïve Instrumentalism and Legal Goals | 56 | ||
| III. Naïve Instrumentalism and the Nature of Laws | 59 | ||
| IV. Naïve Instrumentalism and How Laws Serve Goals | 62 | ||
| Conclusion | 66 | ||
| Chapter Five: Pragmatic Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory | 67 | ||
| I. Introduction | 67 | ||
| II. The American Pragmatic Instrumentalists | 68 | ||
| III. The Leading Tenets of American Pragmatic Instrumentalism | 69 | ||
| IV. The Name "Pragmatic Instrumentalism" | 72 | ||
| V. Inappropriateness of the Name "Legal Realism" | 72 | ||
| VI. Major Strengths of American Pragmatic Instrumentalism | 73 | ||
| VII. Major Weaknesses of American Pragmatic Instrumentalism | 74 | ||
| VIII. Conclusion | 76 | ||
| Chapter Six: Professor Lon L. Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law | 77 | ||
| I. Introduction | 77 | ||
| I. | 77 | ||
| II. | 80 | ||
| A. Basic Values | 80 | ||
| B. Means and Goals | 81 | ||
| C. Legal Validity and Law Creation | 82 | ||
| D. Law and Social Science | 85 | ||
| E. Forms of Legal Ordering | 87 | ||
| F. Coercion | 88 | ||
| G. The Role of Officials | 90 | ||
| H. Criterion of Legal Success | 91 | ||
| III. | 91 | ||
| Part Two: Law and Legal Reasoning | 93 | ||
| Chapter Seven: Working Conceptions of "the Law" | 93 | ||
| I. Prefatory Note | 93 | ||
| II. Introduction | 93 | ||
| III. The Nature of a Working Conception | 96 | ||
| IV. Possible Working Conceptions | 100 | ||
| V. The "Reason" and the "Rule" Alternatives: Some Comparisons | 103 | ||
| A. Comparative Serviceability | 103 | ||
| B. " Normative " Side Effects | 105 | ||
| VI. The "Reason" and the "Rule" Alternatives: Consequences when Officials Become Preoccupied | 108 | ||
| VII. Conclusion | 112 | ||
| Chapter Eight: Two Types of Reasons of Substance in Common Law Cases | 113 | ||
| I. Definitional Preliminaries | 113 | ||
| II. Main Theses | 113 | ||
| III. Two Types of Reasons of Substance - Some Actual Examples from Common Law Cases | 114 | ||
| IV. How the Two Types of Reasons Differ | 117 | ||
| V. Importance of Distinction between the Two Types of Reasons | 123 | ||
| Chapter Nine: Resolving Conflicts Between Substantive Reasons | 125 | ||
| I. Introduction | 125 | ||
| II. One Primary Substantive Reason May Support a Decision That Can Be "Generalized" into a Decisively Better Legal Rule, qua Rule | 126 | ||
| III. One Primary Substantive Reason May Be Decisively Reinforced by One or More Independent Institutional Reasons | 128 | ||
| IV. One Primary Substantive Reason May Support a Decision That is More in Harmony with the Content and/or Rationales of Related General Law | 129 | ||
| V. One Primary Substantive Reason May Be Decisively Reinforced by Virtue of its Congruence with a Relevant Customary Practice | 130 | ||
| VI. One Primary Substantive Reason May Be Decisively Reinforced by One or More Additional Primary Substantive Reasons | 131 | ||
| VII. One Primary Substantive Reason May, upon Appropriate Analysis, Be Seen to "Cancel" the Conflicting Primary Substantive Reason | 131 | ||
| VIII. One Primary Substantive Reason May, on Consideration, Ultimately Turn out to Be an Inappropriate Basis for a Judicial Decision | 132 | ||
| IX. It May Be Possible to Reach a Justified Decision by Accomodating the Conflicting Substantive Reasons rather than by Choosing between them | 133 | ||
| X. One of the Primary Substantive Reasons in Conflict May, on Careful Scrutiny, Turn out to Have Little Justificatory Force, in Absolute Terms | 134 | ||
| XI. The Conflicting Substantive Reasons May Turn out to Be of Roughly Equal Force | 135 | ||
| XII. One Primary Substantive Reason May Turn out, in Relative Terms, to Have Somewhat More Justificatory Force than its Conflicting Counterpart | 136 | ||
| XIII. Significance of my Thesis, and Possible Objections | 136 | ||
| Chapter Ten: Form and Substance in Legal Reasoning | 138 | ||
| I. Introduction | 138 | ||
| II. Two General Types of Reasons: Substantive and Formal | 138 | ||
| III. The Attribute of Authoritative Formality | 144 | ||
| IV. The Attribute of "Content" Formality | 145 | ||
| V. The Attribute of "Interpretive" Formality | 147 | ||
| VI. The Attribute of Mandatory Formality | 148 | ||
| VII. Inter-Relations | 150 | ||
| VII. Conclusion | 153 | ||
| Chapter Eleven: Theory, Formality and Practical Legal Criticism* | 154 | ||
| I. Introduction | 154 | ||
| II. The Theorist as Critic and Reformer of Practical Legal Criticism | 155 | ||
| 1. Constitutive Formality and its Pathology | 157 | ||
| 2. Close-Ended Formality and its Pathology | 166 | ||
| III. The Theorist and the Theory of Practical Legal Criticism | 174 | ||
| IV. Conclusion | 175 | ||
| Chapter Twelve: Statutes and Contracts as Founts of Formal Reasoning | 177 | ||
| I. Introduction | 177 | ||
| II. Constitutive Formality | 179 | ||
| III. Expressional Formality | 182 | ||
| IV. Close-ended Formality | 183 | ||
| V. Interpretative Formality | 184 | ||
| VI. Mandatory Formality | 189 | ||
| VII. Conclusion | 190 | ||
| Chapter Thirteen: Policy on the Anvil of Law | 191 | ||
| I. Introduction | 191 | ||
| II. The Desideratum of Making Law in the Form of Rules | 193 | ||
| III. The Desideratum of Intelligibility | 196 | ||
| IV. The Desideratum of Sufficient "Factual" Administrability | 198 | ||
| V. The Desideratum of Prospective Applicability | 200 | ||
| VI. The Desideratum of Requiring Fault Before Any Penal Sanctions are Imposed | 201 | ||
| VII. The Desideratum of Providing Due Protection for Any Relevant "Process Value" | 203 | ||
| VIII. Appropriate Regard for Other Desiderata of a More Implementational Kind | 204 | ||
| IX. Conclusion | 206 | ||
| References | 206 | ||
| Chapter Fourteen: The Ideal Socio-Legal Order: Its "Rule of Law" Dimension | 209 | ||
| I. Introduction | 209 | ||
| II. The Rule of Law Dimension: Its Conceptual Component | 209 | ||
| III. The "Value Component" of the Rule of Law Dimension | 214 | ||
| IV. Arguments for a Relatively Thin Theory of the Rule of Law | 216 |