Values, Rights and Duties in Legal and Philosophical Discourse
BOOK
Cite BOOK
Style
Dahlman, C., Krawietz, W. (Eds.) (2005). Values, Rights and Duties in Legal and Philosophical Discourse. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-51685-8
Dahlman, Christian and Krawietz, Werner. Values, Rights and Duties in Legal and Philosophical Discourse. Duncker & Humblot, 2005. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-51685-8
Dahlman, C, Krawietz, W (eds.) (2005): Values, Rights and Duties in Legal and Philosophical Discourse, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-51685-8
Format
Values, Rights and Duties in Legal and Philosophical Discourse
Editors: Dahlman, Christian | Krawietz, Werner
Rechtstheorie. Beihefte, Vol. 21
(2005)
Additional Information
Book Details
Pricing
Abstract
Das vorliegende Beiheft der Zeitschrift »Rechtstheorie« fasst Tagungsergebnisse des 21. Weltkongresses der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie zusammen, der 2003 in Lund abgehalten wurde. Insgesamt fünf Sektionen präsentieren hier ihre Ergebnisse, u.a. zu den Themen »Integration of Democracy and Law with Markets and Morality« oder »Legal Norms as Reasons for Action - Universalism versus Particularism«.
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| CONTENTS | V | ||
| Stig Stromholm: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW Address at the Inauguration of the 21st IVR World Congress, Lund, Sweden, 12 August 2003 | 1 | ||
| I. Integration of Democracy and Law with Markets and Morality | 9 | ||
| Kenneth Avio: LEGITIMACY, MARKET ORDER, AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS | 11 | ||
| I. Introduction | 11 | ||
| II. Jean-Philippe Platteau on Market Order | 12 | ||
| III. Experimental Economics and Norms of Reciprocity | 14 | ||
| IV. Discourse-Theoretic Explanations | 16 | ||
| V. Concluding Comment | 20 | ||
| References | 21 | ||
| Feodor F. Cruz: IN SEARCH OF THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF LAW AND POLITICS | 23 | ||
| I. Interpretations of Freedom | 24 | ||
| II. Toward a third Option | 28 | ||
| III. Intimation of a Universal Community | 30 | ||
| Alistair M. Macleod: WHEN FREEDOMS CONFLICT | 35 | ||
| I. The Issues | 36 | ||
| II. Freedom and Particular Freedoms | 37 | ||
| III. Freedom as a Value | 40 | ||
| IV. When Freedoms Conflict | 43 | ||
| V. Freedom-maximization and Freedom-equalization as Criteria for the Ranking of Conflicting Freedoms? | 44 | ||
| VI. The Scope of "Quantitative" Judgments about Freedom | 46 | ||
| David A. Reidy: RECIPROCITY CONFRONTS REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT: FROM LIBERAL TO DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY | 49 | ||
| I. Introduction | 49 | ||
| II. Reciprocity and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy | 49 | ||
| III. Reasonable Disagreement: Deeper and Wider | 53 | ||
| IV. From Liberal to Democratic Legitimacy | 58 | ||
| II. On Transformation of Legal Systems and Crafting Stability - Rights, Rules or Institutions? | 63 | ||
| Christopher B. Gray: TARDE ON LEGITIMACY IN LEGAL PROCEDURE | 65 | ||
| I. | 66 | ||
| II. | 68 | ||
| III. | 69 | ||
| References | 71 | ||
| Burton M. Leiser: THE EVILS OF SADDAM'S REGIME IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MORALITY | 73 | ||
| I. Utilitarian Arguments Against the War | 74 | ||
| II. International Law and Morality | 76 | ||
| Lester J. Mazor: DELIGITIMATING DELIGITIMACY: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECIDES A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION | 81 | ||
| Selected Bibliography | 93 | ||
| Dorota Mokrosinska: FROM NATURAL DUTIES TO POLITICAL OBLIGATION - A PROBLEMATIC PASSAGE | 95 | ||
| I. The Arguments | 96 | ||
| II. Natural Duties are Imperfect Duties | 97 | ||
| III. Imperfect Duties and Political Obligation | 98 | ||
| IV. No Political Authority | 101 | ||
| V. No Political Authority | 103 | ||
| Michael Roumeliotis: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF REASON FROM PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND THE CONSEQUENT CHANGE IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE LAW, THE JUDGE AND THE LEGAL DISPUTE | 107 | ||
| I. The Disappearance of Reason from Ordinary Politics | 107 | ||
| II. The Contrast with the Law and the Trial by Court | 109 | ||
| III. The Change in our Basic Concepts | 110 | ||
| IV. Traditional Concepts | 111 | ||
| V. New Concepts | 113 | ||
| VI. A Note on Language | 114 | ||
| III. Law as Black-Letter Law, Law as Contextual and Judicial Review | 115 | ||
| Bruce Anderson: "CONTEXT" IN CANADIAN LAW AND ADJUDICATION | 117 | ||
| I. Introduction | 117 | ||
| II. Assessment | 121 | ||
| III. Other Questions | 124 | ||
| Kota Fukui: ON THE COUPLING BETWEEN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND REALIZATION OF GENERAL RULES OF LAW - IN RELATION TO JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM IN JAPAN | 129 | ||
| I. Premises of Argument | 130 | ||
| 1. The Three Sorts of Legal Relevant Communications | 130 | ||
| 2. The Coupling between Communication A and | 131 | ||
| 3. The Coupling between Communication A and B | 131 | ||
| II. Conflict Resolution in Sociological Sense | 132 | ||
| 1. Traditional Theory of Litigation Process | 132 | ||
| 2. The Conflict in Sociological Sense | 132 | ||
| 3. The Conflict Resolution in Sociological Sense | 133 | ||
| III. Proper Conflict Management and Realization of General Rules of Law | 134 | ||
| 1. To Consider the Relation between Proper Conflict Management and Realization of General Rules of Law | 134 | ||
| 2. Whether and how Communication C is Controlled by Application of Rules of Law | 135 | ||
| 3. The Distinction of Sort of Activities which Needs to Realize the Rules of Law Rigidly or not | 136 | ||
| a) The Sort of Activities in which the Realization of Rules of Law is Essential | 136 | ||
| b) The Sort of Activities in which the Realization of Rules of Law is Less Significant | 136 | ||
| 4. The Compatibility between Realization of Rules of Law and Conflict Management in Relation to the Justice System Reform in Japan | 137 | ||
| IV. Conclusion | 140 | ||
| Veli-Pekka Hautamaki: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND "THE FINAL FRONTIER" - REMARKS ON THE NORDIC LAW | 141 | ||
| I. Introduction | 141 | ||
| II. Definition of Judicial Activism | 143 | ||
| III. Measurement of Judicial Activism | 144 | ||
| IV. Explanatory Factors for Judicial Activism | 145 | ||
| 1. Judges as Civil Servants or as Creators of Law? | 146 | ||
| 2. Judicial System | 147 | ||
| 3. Judges as Political Actors | 148 | ||
| 4. Legislation Technique and the Growing Number of Norms | 150 | ||
| V. Comparing Judicial Activism | 150 | ||
| VI. Epilogue | 151 | ||
| Hans-Rudolf Horn: JUDGES VERSUS LEGISLATORS: SOME CRITICAL REMARKS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW | 153 | ||
| I. Introduction | 153 | ||
| II. Origin of the American Judicial Review | 154 | ||
| III. Some Remarks on American Constitutional Jurisdiction | 156 | ||
| IV. The American Model in Latin America | 158 | ||
| V. The Austrian System in Europe | 159 | ||
| VI. Some Considerations on Legitimacy and Limits of Judicial Review | 161 | ||
| References | 163 | ||
| IV. Legal Norms as Reasons for Action - Universalism versus Particularism | 165 | ||
| Uta Bindreiter: THE MODALITY OF KELSEN'S SOLLSAT | 167 | ||
| I. | 167 | ||
| II. | 169 | ||
| III. | 171 | ||
| IV. | 173 | ||
| V. | 176 | ||
| References | 177 | ||
| María Cristina Redondo: LEGAL REASONS* | 179 | ||
| I. Introduction | 179 | ||
| II. First Part | 180 | ||
| 1. Universalism vs. Particularism | 180 | ||
| 2. Universal Predicates, Universal Quantifiers and Universal Relevance | 182 | ||
| 3. Two Senses of "Defeasibility": Defeasible Conditionals as Opposed to Universal Conditionals - Defeasible Reasons as Opposed to Absolute Reasons | 185 | ||
| 4. Some Remarkable Consequences | 188 | ||
| III. Second Part | 189 | ||
| 1. Legal Reasons | 189 | ||
| 2. Universalism in Legal Domain | 189 | ||
| 3. Particularism in Legal Domain | 191 | ||
| 4. The Debate in Legal Theory | 193 | ||
| IV. Concluding Remarks | 194 | ||
| References | 195 | ||
| Jan-R. Sieckmann: PRINCIPLES AS NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS | 197 | ||
| I. Introduction | 197 | ||
| II. Normative Arguments as Reiterated Requirements of Validity | 198 | ||
| III. Formal Structure of Normative Arguments | 201 | ||
| IV. Adequacy of the Analysis | 204 | ||
| V. Objections and Problems | 206 | ||
| VI. Résumé | 208 | ||
| References | 208 | ||
| Giovanni Tuzet: ABDUCTION AND DEDUCTION: EPISTEMIC JUSTICE VS. POLITICAL JUSTICE? | 211 | ||
| I. Abduction | 212 | ||
| II. Deduction | 218 | ||
| III. Epistemic Justice vs. Political Justice | 220 | ||
| V. Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation and Adjudication - The Argument from Consequences | 223 | ||
| Eveline T. Feteris: ARGUMENTS FROM UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES IN THE JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS | 225 | ||
| I. Introduction | 225 | ||
| II. Descriptions of Arguments from Unacceptable Consequences in Legal Theory | 226 | ||
| III. A Pragma-Dialectical Reconstruction of Arguments from Unacceptable Consequences in the Context of a Reasonable Application of Law | 229 | ||
| 1. The Structure of the Argumentation in a Context in which the Judge only Rejects the Strict Literal Interpretation | 229 | ||
| 2. The Structure of the Argumentation in a Context in which the Judge Rejects the Strict Literal Interpretation and Chooses an Extensive Objective-Teleological Interpretation | 230 | ||
| 3. An Exemplary Analysis of Argumentation from Unacceptable Consequences with an Appeal to a Reasonable Application of Law | 232 | ||
| IV. Conclusion | 234 | ||
| References | 236 | ||
| Hendrik J. R. Kaptein: SECRETS OF CONFIDENTIALITY: ADJUDICATION AD IGNORANTIAM AGAINST MATERIAL RIGHTS AND JUSTICE? | 239 | ||
| I. Introduction: Rights to Remain Silent | 239 | ||
| II. Against Confidentiality: Hiding Facts Means Hurting Justice | 240 | ||
| III. Confidentiality Reconsidered | 242 | ||
| IV. Case | 244 | ||
| V. The Impossible Panacea of Burdens of Proof Divided | 245 | ||
| VI. Background Assumptions and their Problems | 247 | ||
| VII. The Unfashionable Way Out: Confidentiality (Heavily) Qualified | 248 | ||
| References | 250 | ||
| Heidi Malm: AUTOMATIC TRANSFERS FROM JUVENILE COURT: ON MORAL LEGITIMACY OF TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS BASED ON THE SIZE OF THE CRIME | 251 | ||
| Sonia Esperanza Rodríguez Boente:THE VALUE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL REASONING IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS | 261 | ||
| LIST OF THE AUTHORS | 273 |